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Traditional enforcement of access control policies heavily relies on reference monitors,
which need to be run in trusted domains, be permanently online and mediate every
access request from users. This inherent limitation directly impacts scalability and
deployability of its applications. A solution to this problem is to employ cryptography,
where policy enforcement depends on both security of the underlying cryptographic
primitives and appropriate key distribution. This approach is known as cryptographic
access control. It has the potential to reduce the reliance on monitors or even eliminate
this need while enforcing the access control policies.
The existing works in cryptographic access control mainly focused on implementing
various access control systems from basic cryptographic primitives and/or designing new
primitives tailored for access control systems. However, the study on formal security
models for cryptographic access control systems, which are of central importance, is
usually neglected. Specifically, without formal security models, one cannot establish the
link between security guarantees from cryptographic primitives and the enforcement of
access control policies.
This problem was first addressed by Ferrara et al., whose recent work on crypto-
graphic Role-Based Access Control (cRBAC) establishes rigorous foundations for the
analysis of cryptographic access control systems. In this thesis, we continue their line of
research. Our main contributions are definitional. We study security of cRBAC systems
in both game-based and simulation-based settings, and the relations between the secu-
rity notions. We also initiate the study of policy privacy in the context of cryptographic
access control systems. The privacy issue does not arise in traditional monitor-based
policy enforcement, but cryptographic access-control systems may inadvertently leak
information on the underlying access control policies. Such information can be sensitive
in many scenarios. Next, we propose a construction of cRBAC system which employs
a new privacy-preserving encryption. Our security proofs confirm that our purposal
securely enforces both read and write access to the file system, while preserving pol-
icy privacy to a certain degree. Finally, we study the efficiency implications of secure
cRBAC systems. Our result shows that supporting permission revocation is inherently
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Traditional access control mechanisms heavily rely on reference monitors to enforce
policies [3]. Since the reference monitors have to be executed in the trusted domains and
be permanently online to mediate every access request from users, this approach has the
inherent limitations that impact scalability and deployability of applications. Especially,
it is not suitable for the emerging trend of outsourcing data storage to untrusted file
storage servers where hosting a trusted monitor is almost impossible. An alternative
solution is to employ cryptographic techniques to enforce access control policies, which is
known as cryptographic access control. The idea behind is simple and elegant: the files
are protected by cryptographic primitives, while the access control policies are enforced
by appropriately providing the keys to the authorised users. It is a promising solution
as cryptography is a natrual solution for preserving data confidentiality and integrity.
More importantly, cryptographic enforcement of access control policies does not suffer
from the limitations mentioned above. Therefore, cryptography can help to reduce the
reliance on reference monitors and even to eliminate this need.
Previous results in cryptographic access control range from designing access control
systems from basic cryptographic primitives [32, 1, 24, 22, 21, 18] to the more advanced
cryptographic primitives tailored for access control [35, 50, 52, 30]. However, a primary
concern of the most existing works is the absence of formal security models for the whole
systems. Although cryptogrpahic primitives can protect data privacy at points, security
of the primitives does not necessarily translate to security of the whole system. More
precisely, the correct policy enforcement in cryptographic access control systems involves
more subtle issues like appropriate key management/distribution and timely update of
cryptographic materials. Without formal security models, one cannot establish the
link between the implementation of the cryptographic access control system and the
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specification of the policy being enforced. Thus many of the existing works do not offer
any proof at all for their constructions [39, 59, 20, 56], meaning only informal security
guarantees can be provided.
This problem was first addressed by Ferrara et al. in their recent work [28]. They
showed how to use attribute-based encryption scheme to provably enforce Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) policy on read access to a file system. Particularly, they defined
a precise syntax of the access control system and proposed a formal security model that
captures secure read access to the file system within their framework. Their result comes
with a construction that meets the proposed security notion, but write access to the file
system is still handled by the reference monitor.
The work in this thesis continues the line of Ferrara et al.’s research and extends it in
several directions. First, we further reduce the dependency on policy-enforcing monitors
by supporting access control on write access. In our extended system model, users are
allowed to have (quasi-)unrestricted write access to the files, but only those contents
written by authorised users will be considered as valid. The monitor is therefore tasked
with policy administration only. Based on this, we propose a formal security model with
respect to secure write access for cRBAC systems.
We also address the policy privacy issues in the context of cryptographic access con-
trol. The correct enforcement of policies is the core requirement of cryptographic access
control systems, yet policy privacy is not an ordinary security concern. In traditional
access control, the policy being enforced is kept by the policy enforcer and only policy-
compliant access request will be granted. Therefore, the information about the access
control policy is perfectly hidden from users: they can only learn whether they have ac-
cess to particular files or not. However, cryptographic implementations of access control
systems may reveal more information than desirable. Any change to the policy being
enforced will be directly reflected in the system global state, which means the publicly
available information (e.g. metadata and the encrypted files) and even users’ local states
might unintentionally reveal information about the policy. Such informaiton can be crit-
ical in the areas where privacy is mandated by law or regulations (e.g. governments,
enterprises, etc.) or it can be highly sensitive in some other areas (e.g. institutions,
hospitals, etc.). In such settings, cryptographic access control may become unusable.
There have been many cryptographic primitives for preserving various forms of poli-
cies proposed [11, 31, 63, 9, 58], but these may not suffice to preserve policy privacy in
the access control systems that employ them. Specifically, the absence of formal security
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models could result in the impossibility of rigorously proving that such information is
not revealed in the system. To this end, we propose different security notions to capture
several distinct aspects of policy privacy. Our work can be considered as the first rig-
orous approach to policy privacy in cryptographic access control systems. Even though
our results are in the RBAC model, they still can serve as an inspiration to the work in
similar contexts.
As widely acknowledged, coming up with precise security models for complex sys-
tems turns out to be a tricky business. In order to appropriately model cryptographic
enforcement of RBAC policies, so far we have already proposed several security mod-
els for different security properties in game-based setting. To step further towards the
goal, we then turn to study cryptographic RBAC system in simulation-based setting,
where security is defined by requiring the information revealed during the execution of
a system is at most as much information revealed by an ideal version of the system.
This type of security notions is intuitive but often cumbersome to work with. Since the
idealised system preserves all security properties expected of a given cryptographic task,
the real system which is considered to be secure under this paradigm therefore inherits
all those security properties. For cryptographic RBAC systems, the idealised version is
exactly the correct enforcement of RBAC policies. Therefore, there is no need to enu-
merate all security properties separately and to worry about if a system that holds all
those security properties can cryptographically enforce the RBAC policy as expected.
Moreover, simulation-based security with composability property is highly desirable in
cryptographic access control due to its applicability. Cryptographic access control sys-
tems need to maintain their security guarantees when employed within different higher
level protocols.
We propose the first simulation-based security notion for cryptographic RBAC sys-
tems within the Universal Composable (UC) security framework [12]. Then we study its
relation with the existing game-based security notions. The result shows our new secu-
rity notion is strictly stronger than the existing ones with respect to secure access. We
also identify a gap between the simulation-based security and the game-based security.
More precisely, we show that there exists no UC-secure cRBAC system with adaptive
corruptions, even given access to secure channels and an idealised versioning file system.
Inspired by the study of the relation between the two types of security models for
cRBAC systems, we identify two different attacks which are not captured by the existing
game-based security notions. Therefore, we propose two new security notions of secure
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read and write access respectively. The new security notion for read security is called
past confidentiality which is strictly stronger than the existing one. Interestingly, we
found that the recent results on cryptographically access control systems fall short to
this security property, even though their constructions were proven to securely enforce
the access control policies within their individual frameworks. The other one for write
access is called local correctness and serves as a complementary notion to the existing
notion of secure read access.
We then propose a construction of cRBAC system that enforces both read and
write access to a file system. The main ingredient of our construction is a variant of
Predicate Encryption (PE) scheme called Predicate Encryption with Specific Public
Keys (PE-SK). It allows our construction to preserve a certain degree of privacy for the
policy being enforced. Our proofs confirm that the construction securely enforces access
control on both read and write access to a file system, while preserving a certain degree
of policy privacy.
Finally, we present some theoretic results with respect to the lower bounds for secure
cRBAC systems. By lower bound for secure cRBAC systems, we mean the intrinsic
computation overheads of cRBAC systems which securely enforce RBAC policy with
respect to read and write access.
1.1 Related Work
The enforcement of access control policies with the use of cryptographic techniques has
received considerable attention in recent decades. Gudes’ work in 1980 [37] can be seen
as the seminal work in cryptographic access control. He showed how to use cryptography
to enforce different protection policies on a local file system and also suggested some
basic design principles of the use of cryptographic schemes. However, his result does not
include a concrete construction of the access control system and he does not consider
the key management problem in such systems. Later, the works of Gifford’s [32] and
Akl et al.’s [1] addressed the key-management problem in cryptographic access control
but policy update was not considered. Harrington and Jensen discussed the infeasi-
bility of employing traditional monitor-based access control on distributed file systems
and suggests to use cryptographic techniques to enforce the access control policies [39].
However, the access control system they proposed only uses cryptography to implement
partial access control mechanism rather than to enforce the access control policies.
Recently, with the development of advanced cryptographic primitives such as Identity-
4
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Based Encryption (IBE) [8], Predicate Encryption (PE) [47] and Attribute-Based En-
cryption (ABE) [36, 7] which are well-suited for enforcing different access control policies,
there have been significant works on cryptographic access control. Crampton has shown
that cryptography can be used to enforce RBAC policy by re-writing RBAC policies as
information flow policies and applying the key assignment scheme accordingly. He also
examined the connection between his cryptographic role-based access control scheme and
ABE [22]. Later, Campton showed that general interval-based access control policies can
be enforced using key assignment schemes [23]. Zhu et al. proposed an access control
system based on role-key hierarchy model and designed new signature and encryption
schemes (both are pairing-based) which are tailored for the system they proposed [70].
There also have been many other similar works on cryptographic access control systems
or on designing new primitives for them [17, 18, 16, 41, 19, 66]. The common problem
of these works is the absence of formal security definitions for the whole system, which
will lead to a worrying situation where only informal security proofs can be provided.
Halevi et al. proposed the first formal security definition for access control in dis-
tributed file storage system [38]. However, their security definition is for a specific
protocol rather than for a general one. Ferrara et al. formally defined security for
cryptographic Role-Based Access Control (cRBAC) systems with respect to read access
[28]. They also provided a construction of the access control system based on a variant
of Predicate Encryption scheme, and showed that the security notion can be provably
achieved. Later, Alderman et al. followed this line of research. They proposed formal
security definitions for cryptographic enforcement of information flow policies (on read
access only) and provided a construction which is proven to be secure with respect to
their security definitions [2]. However, their security definition for read security does not
capture the security concern of retrieving the previous file contents in an unauthorised
manner (which will be discussed in Session 4.3.2).
Garrison III et al. studied the practical implications of cryptographic access control
systems that enforces RBAC policies [43]. They analysed the computational costs of
two different constructions of cryptographic role-based access control systems via sim-
ulations with the use of real-world datasets. Their result shows that supporting for
dynamic access control policy enforcement may be prohibitively expensive, even under




In this thesis, we mainly focus on formal security models of cryptogrpahic Role-Based
Access Control (cRBAC). We highlight our main contributions as follows.
1. We propose several formal security models for cRBAC systems to precisely model
cryptographic enforcement of RBAC policy.
2. We address the policy privacy issues in the context of cryptographic access con-
trol and propose formal security models for different flavours of policy privacy.
Our work can be considered as the first rigorous approach to policy privacy in
cryptographic access control systems.
3. We propose a construction of cRBAC system based on a variant of predicate
encryption, and formally prove that our construction meets the existing security
notions.
4. We study security of cRBAC systems in UC framework. We propose a security
notion for cRBAC systems in UC framework and show that this notion is strictly
stronger than the existing ones. We also identify a gap between simulation-based
and game-based security: it is impossible for a cRBAC system to be UC-secure
with adaptive corruptions.
5. We show some lower-bounds for secure cRBAC systems.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organised as follows:
The preliminaries are presented in Chapter 2. We include the notations and the
relevant background which are required to understand the remainder of this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we introduce our notion of a cRBAC system, which extends the notion
introduced by Ferrara et al. in [28] by allowing authorised users to perform write
operations on files.
In Chapter 4, we tease out the security properties expected from a cRBAC system
that correctly enforces the policy and formalise them in the game-based setting. Specifi-
cally, we redefine the two existing security definitions: correctness and secure read access
in our current system model and introduce a security definition with respect to write
access. After having studied security of cRBAC systems in simulation-based setting, we
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identify two different types of attacks which are not captured by the existing security
definitions. Therefore, we propose two new security definitions: past confidentiality and
local correctness. The former provides stronger security guarantee on read access, while
the latter serves as complementary to the definition of secure write access. We also
start to address the issue of policy privacy, which is another important feature in cryp-
tographic access control systems. We identify and formalise several different flavours of
policy privacy targeting to systems with different privacy demands. Finally, we present
a construction of cRBAC system which is built on a PE-SK scheme. Our construction
securely enforces both read and write access to a file system, while preserving a certain
degree of policy privacy.
In Chapter 5, we study security of cRBAC systems in simulation-based setting. Our
first result is a formal security definition for secure cRBAC systems in the UC framework.
Then we study the relation between our UC security definition and the existing security
definitions for cRBAC systems. Finally, we show an impossibility result of the UC secure
cRBAC system with adaptive corruptions.
In Chapter 6, we show some lower bounds for secure cRBAC systems. We mathe-
matically show that the support of dynamic policy update can be costy in secure cRBAC
systems.
In Chapter 7, we make conclusions from our results and discuss the possible directions
for future work.
1.4 Publications
Here we list all the publications related to the work presented in the thesis.
[27] Anna Lisa Ferrara, Georg Fuchsbauer, Bin Liu, and Bogdan Warinschi. Policy
privacy in cryptographic access control. In IEEE 28th Computer Security Foun-
dations Symposium, CSF 2015, Verona, Italy, 13-17 July, 2015, pages 4660, 2015.
[51] Bin Liu and Bogdan Warinschi. Universally composable cryptographic role-based
access control. In Provable Security - 10th International Conference, ProvSec




In this chapter we introduce all of the notations and the foundational concepts which
will be used in the rest of this thesis.
2.1 Notations
For assignment, we use x ← y to denote that we assign x the value of y. If S is a set,
x← S denotes that we assign x the value of a member in S, where the member is chosen
uniformly at random. If A is an algorithm, x← A(y) denotes the assignment of x with
the output of running A on the input y. If A is a randomised algorithm, then we use
x←$A(y) to denote the assignment.
If s is a string, |s| denotes its length. If S is a set, |S| denotes its size. ε denotes
the empty string. ⊥ denotes an error, its meanning depends on the content: it could be
decryption failure or an error returned by the oracle. If k is an integer, 1k denotes the
string of k 1s.
Negligible function. In cryptography, security are usually defined by requiring some
“bad event” to happen with very small probability. When using a function to represent
a probability, we say the function is negligible if it tends to zero faster than the inverse
of any polynomial.
Definition 1 (Negligible Function). A function µ : N → R is negligible if for every
positive polynomial p there exists an integer N such that for every integer n > N ,
µ < 1p(n) .
We say a function µ is non-negligible, if there exists a polynomial p, there exists




In 1984, a paradigm was proposed by Goldwasser and Micali in their seminal paper
probabilistic encryption [34] which was later known as provable security. This approach
relates the security of a scheme to some specified mathematically intractable problem.
The proof of security can be given by reduction. Any efficient algorithm that breaks
the security of the scheme can be used to solve the mathematical problem. However,
if the problem is really intractable, we get a contradiction. Therefore such an efficient
algorithm does not exist and we prove the security of the scheme.
2.3 Security Definitions
In order to reason about the security of a protocol, a security definition must be available.
As a central task of provable security, establishing appropriate security definitions is of
great importance. Typically, there are two main definitional approaches to capture
security requirements of protocols.
2.3.1 Game-Based Security
The so-called game is a conceptualisation of the interactions between the protocol (or
scheme) and an adversary who attacks the protocol. The game specifies some goal for
the adversary to achieve, which is usually posed by a hypothetical challenger. The
goal precisely clarifies what constitutes an attack against the protocol. The adversary
may further get access to some oracles, which will provide it some information that it
can obtain when attacking the protocol. Any oracle call that will lead to a trivially
win is always prohibited. Security defined via this approach demands that no efficient
adversary can achieve its goal with probability exceeding some threshold particularly
the probability of winning by chance.
The security of numerous cryptographic schemes and protocols have been defined
by this approach (e.g. public key encryption[34], key exchange [5, 15], etc.). The
most appealing advantage of this approach is its relative simplicity: executions only
consider stand-alone scenarios where the protocol is in complete isolation from others,
and different security goals (e.g. privacy and integrity of sensitive data) are treated
independently from one another. However, the main concern is the information that
an adversary can learn when attacking the protocol must be specified in the game.
The threat from the environment that the protocol is being employed might not be
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appropriately captured. One solution is to explicitly define the security for specific
environments. But in such case the proofs can hardly provide security guarantee when
the protocol is employed in the environments that have not been considered. In addition,
it may not always be possible to exhaustively enumerate the different properties that
one may desire from a system of a certain degree of scale.
2.3.2 Simulation-based Security
An alternative approach to define security is based on the simlulation paradigm. The
root of this approach goes back to Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson’s paper [33]. It is
also known as the real/ideal-world paradigm. Security is defined by comparing a system
with an idealized version and demands that the real execution of a system reveals at
most as much information is revealed by an ideal version of the system. Canetti’s UC-
framework [12], Pfitzmann and Waidner’s composed system [55] are of this paradigm.
Simulation-based security definitions offen demand stringent requirements which
might lead to inefficient implementations of some cryptographic tasks, or even prevent
the implementations - even if some protocols seem to be secure for practice purposes,
they might not be secure under simulation-based definitions (e.g. UC-secure commit-
ment scheme [13]). In addition, some tasks cannot be proved to be secure in simulation-
based settings (e.g. the non-commitment encryption with adaptive corruptions in the
plain model [54]).
2.4 The Universal Composability(UC) Framework
The real/ideal-world paradigm has been further developed by the UC framework. In the
UC framework, the trusted party of the ideal process is modelled as an entity called ideal
functionality and denoted by F . In addition to handling the inputs obtained repeatedly
from the parties and generating the prescribed outputs, F is allowed to interact with
the adversary, in a way that captures the allowed adversarial influence and information
leakage of the protocol. To provide security guarantee under composition, the UC
framework introduces an adversarial entity called the environment Z, which represents
all possible settings in which the protocol can be executed. Z acts as an interactive
distinguisher which aims to tell if it is interacting with the real protocol or with the
ideal one. In the process, the environment is allowed to exchange information with the
adversary, to provide inputs to the participants of it choice and to obtain outputs from
them. A protocol Π is said to securely realise the functionality F , if for any adversary
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A, there exists a simulator S such that no environment can distinguish between its
interactions with parties running Π and A and the interactions with the ideal process
for F and S.
An special type of adversary is the so-called dummy adversary D. This adversary
simply delivers the messages from the environment to the parties and forwards the
messages from the parties to the environment: this adversary essentially allows the en-
vironment to fully control the input/output and the communication between the parties.
A simulator that works for the dummy adversary essentially gives rise to a simulator for
any other adversary.
An important concept in the UC framework is the hybrid model, an execution setting
which is a mix between a real protocol and an idealised setting. Specifically, in an F-
hybrid the parties running the protocol can use multiple copies of an ideal functionality
F . The extension of the notion of realizing of an ideal functionality in the hybrid model
is immediate. In fact, it captures the essence of the general composition theorem specific
to UC. If a protocol ρ securely realises an ideal functionality G in F-hybrid model and
there is a protocol π securely realises F , then the composed protocol ρπ/F where all
the calls to F are replaced by calls to π securely realises G. Hence π provides the same
security guarantee as the ideal functionality F even if used within an arbitrary protocol
ρ; furthermore the composed protocol ρπ/F still provides the same security guarantee
as the ideal functionality G.
One particular application of hybrid models is to capture various communication
models. This is achieved by formulating an appropriate ideal functionality F that
represents the abstraction from the communication, then real-world protocols in the
communication model can be presented in the F-hybrid model. To exemplify this ap-
proach, we present Fsmt, the ideal functionality for secure message transmission (aka
secure communication) in Fig. 2.1. In Fsmt, a sender PS with input m sends its input
to a receiver PR, while the adversary only learns |m|, the length of the message m, and
can delay the message delivery. Notice that Fsmt can only transmit a single message, to
transmit multiple messages we need to use multiple instances of Fsmt. We refer to [12]
for more details and formal descriptions about the UC framework.
2.5 Digital Signature
The concept of digital signature schemes was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in




Fsmt proceeds as follows, with a sender PS , a receiver PR and an adversary S.
1. Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, PR,m) from PS , send
(Sent, sid, PS , PR, |m|) to the adversary and generate a delayed output
(Sent, PS , sid,m) to PR then halt.
2. Upon receiving (Corrupt, sid, P ) from S, where P ∈ {PS , PR}, reveal m to the
adversary. If P = PS and the message has not yet been sent to PR, then ask S
for a value m′ and output (Sent, PS , sid,m
′) to PR then halt.
Figure 2.1: Ideal functionality for secure message transmission, Fsmt.
also non-repudiation. The following definition of digital signature schemes is adapted
from [46].
Definition 2. A digital signature scheme Σ is given by a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms (KeyGen, Sign,Verify) that satisfy the following:
1. The randomised key-generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input a security param-
eter 1λ and outputs a pair of keys (vk , sk), where vk is the verification key and sk
is a secret signing key.
2. The randomised signing algorithm Sign takes as input a secrect signing key sk and
a message m and outputs a signature σ.
3. The deterministic verification algorithm Verify takes as input a verification key vk,
a message m and a signature σ and outputs a bit b, where b = 1 if σ is a valid
signature of m under vk and b = 0 otherwise.
The Existentially Unforgeable under Chosen Message Attacks (EU-CMA) security
is considered as the standard security requirement for digital signature schemes. It is
defined through the experiment Expeu-cmaΣ,A which involves an a digital signature scheme
Σ = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) and adversary A. In the experiment, a pair of keys (vk , sk) is
generated by running the key generation algorithm. Then A is handed the verification
key vk and has access to a signing oracle Sign. Eventually, the adversary terminates
with an output (m∗, σ∗), where m∗ is a message of its choosing and σ∗ is the signature.
It wins the game if m∗ has never been queried to Sign and σ∗ is a valid signature of m∗
under vk .
Definition 3 (EU-CMA). A digital signature scheme Σ = (KeyGen,Sign,Verify) is Exis-
tentially Unforgeable under Chosen Message Attacks if for any probabilistic polynomial-
12
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES
time adversary A, it holds that




is negligible in λ, where Expeu-cmaΣ,A is defined as follows:
Expeu-cmaΣ,A (λ)
L← ∅
(vk , sk)←$ KeyGen(λ)
(m∗, σ∗)←$A(1λ, vk : Sign)




L← L ∪ {m}
return σ←$ Sign(sk ,m)
2.6 Predicate Encryption with Specific Public Keys
In classical predicate encryption [47], ciphertexts are encrypted with identities (sets of
attributes) and secret keys correspond to predicates. A ciphertext associated with an
identity I can be decrypted by a secret key corresponding to a predicate f only when
f(I) = 1 is satisfied, whereas the identity I must be given explicitly as the input of
the encryption algorithm. This very nature of predicate encryption reveals the identity
associated to the ciphertext explicitly. Thus, we need a way to hide the identity during
encryption.
In [27], we overcome this by introducing a variant of predicate encryption called
predicate encryption with (identity-) specific public keys (PE-SK). It allows for gener-
ating public key with any identity, which can be used to encrypt a message instead of
providing the identity explicitly in the encryption algorithm, while the obtained cipher-
text can be decrypted by the users with secrect keys for predicates which hold on the
identity.
Definition 4. A Predicate Encryption with Specific Public Keys (PE-SK) scheme PE is
given by a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Setup,PKGen,DKGen,Enc,Dec):
1. The randomised setup algorithm Setup on input the security parameter λ (and
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optional parameters such as the attribute universe) returns a pair (mpk ,mdk) of
a master public and master secret (decryption) key.
2. The randomised public-key generation algorithm PKGen on inputs mpk and I re-
turns a public encryption key pk I for identity I.
3. The randomised decryption-key generation algorithm DKGen on inputs mdk and a
predicate f returns a decryption key dkf for f .
4. The randomised encryption algorithm Enc on inputs pk I and m returns a ciphertext
c.
5. The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec on inputs skf and a ciphertext c re-
turns a string m (or ⊥).
Correctness A PE-SK scheme PE is correct if for all λ, f, I,m, r, all (mpk ,mdk) out-
put by Setup(1λ), all pk I output by PKGen(mpk , I) and all dkf output by SKGen(mdk , f)
we have Dec(dkf ,Enc(pk I ,m; r)) = m if and only if f(I) = 1. Since when knowing mdk
one can always derive a key and then decrypt, we also directly write Dec(mdk , c).
Identity-hiding public keys We first introduce a security notion that formalises the
requirement that keys do not reveal for which identity they are. An adversary must
guess a random bit b after getting the master public key mpk and access to a challenge
oracle LR, which on input (I0, I1) returns an encryption key for Ib. Note that this also
formalises the fact that an adversary cannot tell whether two keys are for the same
identity: given mpk , it can produce a key for pk I0 and being given pk Ib guess b by
linking keys.
The adversary is also provided a DKGen oracle, which models collusions between
users. To prevent trivial attacks, we require the following restriction. When queried
on f , DKGen first checks whether f(I0) = f(I1) for all (I0, I1) queried to LR (other-
wise the decryption key could be used to test whether a ciphertext produced with the
challenge key pk Ib decrypts correctly or not). Analogously, LR only answers queries
(I0, I1) if f(I0) = f(I1) for all f queried to DKGen (otherwise the adversary can use




Definition 5 (Identity-hiding public keys). The following game formalises the security
requirement that ID-specific public keys do not reveal any non-trivial information about
the identities they are for:
Expid-h-pkPE,A (λ)
b←$ {0, 1};F ← ∅; Ch ← ∅
(mpk ,mdk)←$ Setup(1λ)
b′←$A(mpk : DKGen,LR)
Return (b′ = b)
DKGen(f)
For all (I0, I1) ∈ Ch:
If f(I0) 6= f(I1) then Return ⊥
F ← F ∪ {f}
Return dkf ←$ DKGen(mdk , f)
LR(I0, I1)
For all f ∈ F :
If f(I0) 6= f(I1) then Return ⊥
Ch ← Ch ∪ {(I0, I1)}
Return pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , Ib)
We say a PE-SK scheme PE has identity-hiding encryption keys if for any p.p.t.
adversary A,
Advid-h-pkPE,A (λ) :=
∣∣Pr[Expid-h-pkPE,A (λ)→ 1]− 12 ∣∣
is negligible in λ.
Message-hiding While our first security notion ensures that public keys (and ci-
phertexts created from them) do not reveal their associated identity, the second notion
formalises the traditional requirement that ciphertexts of different messages should be
indistinguishable. In contrast to the first notion, this also exists for standard PE, where
this is termed as payload-hiding [47].
This notion is formalised via a game where the adversary must distinguish messages
encrypted under a key whose corresponding secret key it must not know. We give the ad-
versary access to an oracle that generates public keys pk I for I of the adversary’s choice.
The adversary then chooses one such key and two equal-length messages (M0,M1) and
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gets an encryption of Mb under that key.
More formally, the game stores queried keys pk I and the identity I in the first empty
index of two lists PK and I, respectively. When the adversary asks for a challenge under
the j-th key by querying (j,M0,M1), it receives an encryption of Mb under PK [j]. The
corresponding identity I[j] is then added to the list of challenges Ch.
The adversary can also query decryption keys for any predicate f , which is then
added to a list F . To prevent trivial attacks, the experiment maintains the invariant
that for all f ∈ F and I ∈ Ch it should hold that f(I) = 0; otherwise, if for some f and
I we had f(I) = 1, the adversary could query a challenge under the key for I and then
decrypt it using dkf .
Definition 6 (Message hiding). The following game formalises the fact that ciphertexts
hide the encrypted message:
Expmsg-hidePE,A (λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; ctr ← 1; PK , I, F,Ch ← ∅
(mpk ,mdk)←$ Setup(1λ)
b′←$A(mpk : PKGen,DKGen,LR)
Return (b′ = b)
PKGen(I)
pk I ←$ PKGen(mpk , I)
I[ctr ]← I; PK [ctr ]← pk I ; ctr ← ctr + 1
Return pk I
DKGen(f)
For all I ∈ Ch:
If f(I) = 1 then Return ⊥
F ← F ∪ {f}
Return dkf ←$ DKGen(mdk , f)
LR(j,M0,M1)
If |M0| 6= |M1| then Return ⊥
Let (pk I , I)← (PK [j], I[j])
For all f ∈ F :
If f(I) = 1 then Return ⊥
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Ch ← Ch ∪ {I}
Return C←$ Enc(pk I ,Mb)
We say a PE-SK scheme PE has message-hiding ciphertexts if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A,
Advmsg-hidePE,A (λ) :=
∣∣Pr[Expmsg-hidePE,A (λ)→ 1]− 12 ∣∣
is negligible in λ.
2.7 Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a general access control model that has been
widely adopted in various systems. It simplifies the management on users’ permissions
by introducing an indirection, namely the roles [61, 60, 26]. Roles are the central con-
cept of RBAC, since the policies are constructed around roles. The RBAC policies are
decomposed into two assignments: the user-role assignment and the permission-role as-
signment. Both of the assignments can be managed seperately. A user is authorised to
a permission if there exists a role of the users’ has been assigned with the permission.
In this thesis, we will only focus on the core RBAC [60].
An RBAC system consists of:
• U : a finite set of users
• R: a finite set of roles
• O: a finite set of objects
• P : a finite set of permissions where each permission is an object-operation pair
• UA ⊆ U ×R: a relation modelling the user-role assignment
• PA ⊆ P ×R: a relation modelling the permission-role assignment
We denote the read permission and the write permission of a file o ∈ O by (o, read)
and (o, write) respectively. Follow the work of [28], we assume that the set of roles
R is fixed due to the fact that the role structures in organisations are usually stable.
Therefore, at any point the state of a RBAC system over a fixed role set R is a tuple
S = (U,O, P,UA,PA). We summarise the typical administrative RBAC commands and




AddUser(u) Add a new user u to the system
DelUser(u) Remove an existing user u from the system
AddObject(o) Add a new object o to the system
DelObject(o) Remove an existing object o from the system
AssignUser(u, r) Assign the user u to the role r
DeassignUser(u, r) Deassign the user u from the role r
GrantPerm(p, r) Grant the permission p to the role r
RevokePerm(p, r) Revoke the permission p from the role r
Figure 2.2: Administrative RBAC commands.
We describe an RBAC system in terms of a state-transition system. Let RULES
be the set of state-transition rules correspond to the administrative RBAC commands
which are specified in Figure 2.2, given two states S = (U,O, P,UA,PA) and S′ =
(U ′, O′, P ′,PA′,UA′), there is a transition from S to S′ with command q ∈ RULES de-
noted S
q−→S S′ if one of the following conditions holds:
• [AddUser(u)]: q = (AddUser, u), u /∈ U , U ′ = U∪{u}, O′ = O, P ′ = P , PA′ = PA
and UA′ = UA;
• [DelUser(u)]: q = (DelUser, u), u ∈ U , U ′ = U \ {u}, O′ = O, P ′ = P , PA′ = PA
and UA′ = UA \ {(u, r) ∈ UA ‖ r ∈ R)};
• [AddObject(o)]: q = (AddObject, o), o /∈ O, O′ = O ∪ {o}, U ′ = U , P ′ =
P ∪ {(o, read), (o, write)}, PA′ = PA and UA′ = UA;
• [DelOject(o)]: q = (DelObject, o), o ∈ O, O′ = O \ {o}, U ′ = U , P ′ = P \ {(o, ·)},
PA′ = PA \ {((o, ·), r) ∈ PA ‖ r ∈ R)} and UA′ = UA;
• [AssignUser(u,r)]: q = (AssignUser, (u, r)), u ∈ U , r ∈ R, U ′ = U , O′ = O,
P ′ = P , PA′ = PA and UA′ = UA ∪ {(u, r)};
• [DeassignUser(u,r)]: q = (DeassignUser, (u, r)), u ∈ U , r ∈ R, U ′ = U , O′ = O,
P ′ = P , PA′ = PA and UA′ = UA \ {(u, r)};
• [GrantPerm(p,r)]: q = (GrantPerm, (p, r)), p ∈ P , r ∈ R, U ′ = U , O′ = O,
P ′ = P , PA′ = PA ∪ {(p, r)} and UA′ = UA;
• [RevokePerm(p,r)]: q = (RevokePerm, (p, r)), p ∈ P , r ∈ R, U ′ = U , O′ = O,
P ′ = P , PA′ = PA \ {(p, r)} and UA′ = UA.






qn−→S Sn+1, where S0 is an initial state of the RBAC system.
A predicate IsValid(Cmd , arg) reflects that the execution of an RBAC administrative
command q = (Cmd , arg) is valid for the current state S. It is defined as follows:
IsValid(Cmd , arg)⇔ q ∈ RULES ∧ ∃S′ : S q−→S S′.
A predicate HasAccess(u, p) reflects that a user u has symbolically access to a per-
mission p. It is defined as follows:





The content presented in this chapter is adapted from the paper Policy Privacy in
Cryptographic Access Control [27]. My contribuitons to the paper will be introduced in
the next chapter.
3.1 Introduction
The notion of a cryptographic RBAC system (cRBAC) was first introduced in [28]
where read access to a file system is controlled using cryptography, while write access is
monitored on-line by the manager. We extend their notion by allowing authorised users
to execute write operations on files, thereby foregoing completely the need for on-line
monitors.
Concretely, we extend the cRBAC system in [28] to a setting where the users have
(quasi) unrestricted read/write access to the file system and the manager is now tasked
with the administration of access control policies only. Consider that if users are pro-
vided unrestricted write access to the file system, no amount of cryptography can prevent
a malicious user to simply overwrite the existing contents. To this end, we propose using
versioning file storage where users can only append contents but not delete any. These
appends are then interpreted as logical writes to files. In practice, such a file system can
be implemented with the use of log-structured techniques [64, 65]. In fact, our system
model can be considered as a general model for cryptographic RBAC systems due to the
features of the versioning file storage: the cryptographically protected files are always
publicly accessible to all the users in the system and the file system does not implement
20
CHAPTER 3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
any access control mechanism, namely the enforcement of access control policy solely
relies on cryptography.
In the published paper [27], the extended cryptographic RBAC system (cRBAC) is
denoted by w-cRABC in order to be distinguished from the previous notion which only
enforces read access. In this thesis, by a slight abuse of notation, we still denote it by
cRBAC.
To summarise, in this chapter we make the following contributions:
• We present the notion of the extended cRBAC system that enforces access
control on both read and write access to the file system.
• We provide a formal definition of cRBAC schemes.
3.2 System Model
The system model of a cRBAC is depicted in Figure 3.1. It involves three main entities:
a manager, a file system and a set of users. The manager is assumed to be a trusted
party and it is tasked with the administration of access control policies. Specifically, it
is in charge of excuting RBAC administrative commands outlined in Session 2.7. The
implementation of those commands involves key management and data encryption/re-
encryption. In traditional monitor-based access control systems (depicted in Figure
3.2), the policy enforcer (the reference monitor) has to mediate every access request
such that only the authorised requests (according to the access control policy being
enforced) will be granted. In fact, the reference monitor needs to be involved in both
policy administration and also the access to the files. Here, the manager of a cRBAC
system is only responsible for the policy administration and does not involve in any
access operation.
Figure 3.1: The system model of cRBAC.
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The file system of a cRBAC is an untrusted storage that stores the files being enforced
access control on. Unlike the file system of a traditional access control system which is in
the protection domain and is controlled by the inherently centralised reference monitor,
the file system of a cRBAC is assumed to be publicly accessible to the users (such as
cloud storage). In implementation, it contains arrays of encrypted files and the related
metadata. The file system itself does not implement any access control mechanism, but
it must guarantee the availablity of data it stores. To support writing to the files by
users, we require that the file system provide some extra guarantee to prevent malicious
users from simply overwriting files and causing denial-of-service. We purpose the use of
versioning storage, where the users can only write to the files by appending new versions
to them instead of overwriting the existing contents. As the data owner, the manager
could have richer interfaces to the file system than the users have and is therefore able
to overwrite the file contents and to add/delete files.
Figure 3.2: The system model of traditional monitor-based access control.
The users can get read and write accesses to the file system directly. When reading
a file, one should first verify and fetch the most recent “valid” version (the file system
should also guarantees correct ordering of file versions and the validity of a file version
is guaranteed by cryptographic primitives) and then retrieve that as the current content
by carrying out some decryption (if it holds the appripriate keys).
Secure channels are assumed between each of any two entities (but not between
the users). For simplicity, we assume the implementation of any RBAC administrative
command as non-interactive multi-party computations which proceeds as follows: when
executing any RBAC command, the manager first carries out some local computation
according to the command to produce some update messages for the file system and also
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the users. After that, those update messages will be sent via secure channels. The users
will update their local states accordingly upon receiving the update messages. The file
system proceeds the update in a similar manner.
The global state of a cRBAC system stG at any point during its execution is given by
the tuple (stM , fs, {stu}u∈U ), where stM is the local state of the manager, fs is the state of
the file system and stu is the local state of each user u. Since the manager is tasked with
access control policy administration, we assume the RBAC policy S = (U,O, P,UA,PA)
is a part of its local state stM and let φ(stG) denote the RBAC policy of the global state
stG.
3.3 Cryptographic RBAC Scheme
A cRBAC system is defined by a cRBAC scheme which consists of the following algo-
rithms:
• Init, the initialisation algorithm: A probabilistic algorithm that takes the security
parameter λ and a set of roles R as input and outputs the initial global state of
the cRBAC system.
• AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm,
RevokePerm, the RBAC administrative algorithms: Probabilistic algorithms that
implement the corresponding RBAC administrative commands. Each of these al-
gorithms takes the state of the manager stM , the current state of the file system fs
and the argument for the RBAC command arg as input and then outputs the up-
dated state for the manager and the file system, and also a set of update messages
{msgu}u∈U for all the users u ∈ U .
• Read, the read algorithm: A deterministic algorithm that allows a user retrieve
the current content of a file. It takes the user’s local state stu, the current state
of the file system fs and a file name o as input and outputs the current content of
the file o if u has the read permission; if not, or if the file is empty, the algorithm
returns ⊥;
• Write, the write algorithm: A probabilistic algorithm that allows a user write
content to a file. It takes a user’s local state stu , the current state of the file
system fs, a file name o and the content to be written m as input and outputs the
updated file system.
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• Update, the update algorithm: A deterministic algorithm that takes the local state
of a user stu and an update message msgu received from the manager and outputs
the updated local state.
Recall that the write access to the file system is implemented by letting users ap-
pend new versions to the file system. When one reads a file, it first needs to locate the
latest valid file version so that it can retrieve the current content of the file. There-
fore, in addition to the algorithms mentioned above, there also exists a sub-algorithm
FindValidEntry.
• FindValidEntry: A deterministic algorithm that takes the local state of a user stu,
the current state of the file system fs and a file name o as input and outputs the
most recent valid file version number. In the case that there is no valid version
exists, it returns 0.
Notice that in a cRBAC system, the manager enforces the symbolic access control
policy in a computational sense by generating appropriate cryptographic materials. It
is therefore capable of retrieving the content from any file in order to carrying out
some operations including file re-encryption. For simplicity, we let the manager retrieve
the file content by running the user-specific algorithm Read with its local state stM as
input. Similarly, the manager can also locate the latest valid file version by running
FindValidEntry on its own.
There is also a remark on the updated file system, which is as a part of the output of
some algorithms outlined above. More specifically, the algorithms will produce update
instructions to be carried out on the file system. For example, after running the Write
algorithm, a user will get the update instruction info that includes the information of
the file name and also the content to be appended to the file system. Then the user
uploads info to the file system and the latter gets updated accordingly. The manager
proceeds similarly but the update instructions might be different from the users due
to its privilege of the data owner. For simplicity, we just let those algorithms output
the updated file system. In terms of effect, all the above algorithms except Read can
protentially update the global state of the cRBAC system. Therefore, we may write the
execution of a cRBAC algorithm in the following form:
stG
Q−→ st ′G ⇔ st ′G←$ Cmd(stG, arg),
where Cmd is one of the algorithms that defines a cRBAC scheme, arg is its argument,
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Q is a sequence of operations that implements the algorithm, stG and st
′
G are global
state of the cRBAC system.
Let Qi for i = 0 . . . n be a sequence of operations, the execution of ~Q = (Q0, ..., Qn)
can be written as:
stG0
~Q−→ stGn+1 ⇔ stG0
Q0−−→ stG1
Q1−−→, ..., Qn−1−−−→ stGn
Qn−−→ stGn+1 ,
where stG and st
′
G are global state of the cRBAC system.
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Chapter 4
Game-Based Security of cRBAC
The contents presented in this chapter include results adapted from the paper Policy
Privacy in Cryptographic Access Control [27] and also some new results from our follow-
up work.
The aforementioned paper is a collaborative work with Anna Lisa Ferrara, Georg
Fuchsbauer and Bogdan Warinschi. I am responsible for providing all the security
definitions, the construction of the cRBAC system and the security statements with
their proofs. My idea of policy privacy in access control systems is spurred by our work
on using attribute-based signature schemes to enforce write access. Later, the idea is
pushed further with Dr. Ferrara and Prof. Warinschi.
4.1 Introduction
The heavy reliance on reference monitors is a significant shortcoming of traditional access
control mechanisms. It greatly impacts scalability and deployability, since monitors are
single points of failure that need to run in protected mode and have to be permanently
online to deal with every access request of users. Cryptography has the potential to
alleviate this problem. This alternative approach that employs cryptographic primitives
to enforce access control policies, is widely known as cryptographic access control. It
aims to reduce the reliance on monitors or even eliminate this need, since the policy
enforcement is achieved in an indirect way: data is protected by cryptographic primitives
and the policies are enforced by distributing the appropriate keys to right users.
A primary concern of cryptographic access control is the large gap between the policy
specification and the implementation of the access control system. It is best understood
by contrasting it with policy enforcement via monitors. In monitor-based access con-
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trol, every access request to the protected files is mediated by the reference monitor
so that only the policy-compliant request will be granted. Therefore, the enforcement
of access control policies holds by design. In cryptographic access control, the policy
enforcement is more complicated. It relies on security guarantees of the underlying
cryptographic primitives and also the appropriate key distribution/management in the
system. Even though some advanced cryptographic primitives are seemingly well-suited
for cryptographic access control, their security guarantees cannot be directly translated
to security guarantee of the whole system. Therefore, formal security models for cryp-
tographic access control systems are particularly important, since they establish the
link between the implementation of the systems and the specification of access control
policies, and also allow for rigorous security proofs.
There have been works in this area that focus on designing new primitives motivated
by access control systems [32, 1, 42, 19, 67] and on designing access control systems based
on those primitives [44, 66, 4, 70, 41]. Throughout the literature, rigorous definitions
that look at the security of systems for access control have only been heuristically stud-
ied. Halevi et al. proposed a simulation-based security definition for access control on
distributed file storage system in order to reason about the confinement problem [38].
Ferrara et al. defined a precise syntax for cryptographic role-based access control (cR-
BAC) systems and proposed a formal security definition with respect to secure read
access [28]. They also suggested an construction based on predicate-encryption (PE).
Their work eliminates the need for the trusted monitors to mediate every read access
request, while write access is still delegated to the trusted monitors.
We follow the line of Ferrara et al.’s research on cRBAC systems and expand their
works in several distinct directions. In Chapter 3, we have already introduced our
extended system model that allows authorised users to execute write operations on files.
Here, in this chapter, we are going to present our security definitions which aim to
model the correct enforcement of the policies. More importantly, we initiate the study
of policy privacy in the context of cryptographic access control. The information about
the policy being enforced in a cryptographic access control system might be leaked
during its execution. We begin to address this problem by providing formal security
definitions to allow for rigorous study the information leak about the policy. We detail
our contributions next.
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4.1.1 Our results
Secure enforcement of RBAC policy. Our first results are formal security defini-
tions for cRBAC systems. Very roughly, a cRBAC implementation is considered to be
secure if it correctly enforces the RBAC policy. In order to formulate this, we propose
multiple security definitions that capture the distinct security properties expected from
a secure cRBAC system. Our security definitions are based on games, where the adver-
sary is allowed to drive the execution of the system and to take over users. Then security
is defined by measuring the inability of the adversary to triger some event during the
execution or to distinguish between two possible executions.
The notions of correctness and secure read access were first introduced by Ferrara
et al. in [28]. The former captures the security requirement that any user in the system
should have access to the files to which it is allowed to access. The latter requires that
by any means a user cannot learn any partial content of the file to which it does not have
read access. Since their system model is extended here to support for enforcing access
control over write operations to the file system, the two existing security definitions need
to be redefined in our current system model. Next, we introduce a security definition
for write access, which is called secure write access. Informally, it requires that all those
contents written by unauthorised users will not be interpreted as valid.
After having formally defined security of cRBAC systems in game-based setting,
as a step towards the goal for providing formal security definitions that precisely cap-
ture secure policy enforcement, we then turn to study security of cRBAC systems in
simulation-based setting. In the follow-up work, we identify two different types of secu-
rity concerns which are not captured by the existing security definitions. The first one
corresponds to the ability of retrieving the previous contents in an unauthorised manner.
More specifically, a user who is authorised to read a file might be able to retrieve the
previous contents of that file, even it is not authorised to get access to those contents.
The second one is related to secure write access to the files. A user who has the write
permission of a file might be able to cause the other users fail in writing contents to that
file. We propose two new security definitions past confidentiality and local correctness
accordingly to capture the above mentioned security concerns .
Policy privacy in cryptographic access control. Our second contribution is bring-
ing forth the policy privacy issues that appear in the context of cryptographic access
control systems. The problem does not occur in monitor-based policy enforcement: when
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interacting with the access control system, users can only learn if they have access to
certain resources or not, while no other information will be leaked. But in cryptographic
access control, dynamic changes to the files due to the administrative RBAC commands
may reveal some information about the access control policy being enforced, especially
in the case that the adversary has some partial knowledge on the access structure. One
may imagine numerous situations where this information is sensitive. For example, in a
paper submission system, one may always want to keep hidden the information about
the PC members who have been assigned with certain papers in order to prevent au-
thors from affecting them personally. In a hospital, it is always not desirable to leak
if a patient’s medical record can be accessed by certain specialists (e.g. oncologist and
AIDS specialist, etc.).
Some existing works on cryptographic primitives tailored for access control have
already attempted to deal with this type of leak. However, the privacy guarantees from
the underlying cryptographic primitives may not suffice to preserve policy privacy in the
access control systems that employ them. Moreover, there exists no security definition
for policy privacy to allow one to formally prove that an implementation of the system
can preserve such policy privacy guarantees.
Here, we clearly identify the abilities of an attacker and specify what are to be
considered as privacy breaches in a cryptographic access control system. We propose
multiple security definitions instead of a single one to allow for privacy-effiency trade-
offs.
A construction of cRBAC. The additional security requirements mentioned above
lead to a new construction of cRBAC system which strengthens the one proposed in the
published paper [27]. We prove that our new construction meets the stronger security
notions with respect to secure access, while offering a certain degree of privacy for the
underlying policy.
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To summarise, in this chapter we make the following contributions:
• We redefine two existing security definitions for cRBAC in the extended system
model.
• We provide a formal security definition for secure write access.
• We provide two new security definitions called past confidentiality and local
correctness.
• We provide formal security definitions for different flavours of policy privacy.
• We provide a construction which is proven to preserve correctness, write secu-
rity, past confidentiality, local correctness and to preserve policy privacy to a
certain extent.
4.2 Correctness
Informally, a cRBAC system is said to be correct if it guarantees that every user in
the system can get access to the data for which it is authorised according to the policy.
More specifically, a cRBAC system preserves correctness if:
1. any user u has the permission (o, read) should be able to retrieve the current
content of o by reading it, and
2. the current content of a file o which is written by a user u who has the permission
(o, write) will be correctly read by any other user who has the permission (o, read).
We formalise the requirements via a game between a challenger who acts as the
manager of a cRBAC system and a polynomial-time adversary A. The adversary is
allowed to ask the manager to execute any RBAC administrative command and to
request any user to write to the file system. But it cannot take over users. After carrying
out some sequence of operations, A should show that the cRBAC system reaches the
global state where there exists some user who cannot retrieve the current content of the
file correctly to which he has the read access.
We define the following experiment ExpcorrCRBAC,A. The experiment maintains the
RBAC state of the system State which consists of (U,O, P,UA,PA). State is initialised
as (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and evolves according to the (symbolic) execution of the RBAC com-
mands as requested by A. It also maintains an object-indexed list T to record the latest
content written to the files by authorised users. After the initialisation of the cRBAC
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system with a given set of roles R, the adversary can call the oracles to execute the
intended RBAC administrative commands and to write to the file system. Since secure
channels are assumed and party corruption is not allowed, the adversary will be only
provided the current state of the file system as the response for any query it makes. In
addition, A is allowed to query the current state of the file system. At some point in
the experiment, the adversary should output a user u∗ along with a file o∗. The exper-
iment terminates when A outputs a user-object pair (u∗, o∗). The adversary wins the
game if u∗ has the read permission of o∗ but the content it retrieves from o∗ by running
Read(stu∗ , o
∗, fs) does not match the record in T [o∗].
Definition 7 (Correctness). A cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC = (Init,
AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm,






is 0, where the experiment ExpcorrCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
ExpcorrCRBAC,A(λ)
T ← ∅; State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
(u∗, o∗)←$A(1λ : Ocorr)
if HasAccess(u∗, (o∗, read)) ∧ T [o∗] 6= Read(stu∗ , o∗, fs) then
return true
else return false
The oracles Ocorr that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.1 and
discussed below.
Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
State ← Cmd(State, arg)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)




if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m)
T [o]← m; return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
Figure 4.1: Ocorr: Oracles for defining the experiment ExpcorrCRBAC,A.
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The oracle Cmd allows the adversary to ask the manager for the execution of any
RBAC command by providing an RBAC administrative command Cmd (specified in 2.2)
and the command-specific arguments arg . It will first check if the symbolic execution
of Cmd with arg is valid: if not, an error is returned; otherwise, it will execute the
command symbolically and then run the algorithm Cmd that implements the command.
After that, A will be provided the current state of the file system.
The adversary can request an honest user u to write some content m to the file o.
If u has the write permission of o, the oracle runs the algorithm Write to carry out the
write opeartion and then stores m in T [o]. The adversary can check the current state
of the file system at any point during the game by calling the oracle FS with the query
“state” but appending file versions to the file system is not allowed here.
4.3 Read Security
In this section, we introduce two formal security definitions for a cRBAC system with
respect to secure read access. The first one, called secure read access, is presented in the
published paper [27]. The other security definition is called past confidentiality, which
is strictly stronger than secure read access.
4.3.1 Secure Read Access
A cRBAC system is said to be secure with respect to read accesses if no user can deduce
any partial content of a file without having the read permission. It is formalised via an
indistinguishability-based game which involves a challenger who plays as the manager
of a cRBAC system and an adversary A. During the game, the adversary can choose
two messages to be written to a file of which it does not have the read permission. Then
one of the two messages will be written to that file and A’s goal is to determine which
of the messages it is.
More precisely, we define the following experiment ExpreadCRBAC,A. The experiment
starts with selecting a random bit b←$ {0, 1}. It maintains the symbolic RBAC state
of the system as it evolves through the adversary’s requests for the execution of RBAC
commands. It also maintains a list Cr to record the corrupt users and another list Ch to
record the files which are specified as challenges. The adversary can drive the execution
of the system by asking the manager to execute any RBAC command and requesting
any honest user to write to the file system. A can also take over any user by corrupting
it and have unrestricted read and write (by appending) access to the file system. The
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experiment only maintains local states for all honest users. For those corrupt users,
their update messages will be sent to adversary instead. At some point, the adversary
can ask for a challenge by specifying a tuple (u, o,m0,m1), where u is a user that has
write access to the file o, m0 and m1 are two mesasges of the same length. In response,
the challenger will run Write(stu, o,mb) to carry out the write operation on bahalf of u.
When A terminates and outputs a guess of the random bit b′, it wins the game if b′ = b.
To prevent trivial wins, the experiment maintains the following invariant: there
exists no user in the list Cr can have the read permission of any file in Ch, which means
A cannot read the contents written to the challenge files directly by corrupting the users
who are authorised to read.
Definition 8 (Secure Read Access). A cRBAC system which is defined by the scheme
CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser,
GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Read, Write, Update) is secure with respect to read ac-
cess if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, it holds that
AdvreadCRBAC,A(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[ExpreadCRBAC,A(λ)→ true]− 12 ∣∣
is negligible in λ, where ExpreadCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
ExpreadCRBAC,A(λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; Cr ,Ch ← ∅
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
b′←$A(1λ : Oread)
return (b′ = b)
The oracles Oread that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.2 and
discussed below.
Still, by calling the oracle Cmd the adversary can request for the execution of any
administrative RBAC command, providing the symbolic execution of the command with
its arguments is valid and it will not lead to a violation to the invariant. If the RBAC
command causes some user or some file deleted from the system, the record in Cr or
Ch will be removed accordingly.
The adversary can put a challenge by calling the oracle Challenge. Noticed that
it is allowed to put multiple challenges in the game. In addition, Challenge returns
an error if A’s query will violate the invariant.
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Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
(U ′, O′, P ′,UA′,PA′)← Cmd(State, arg)
foreach u ∈ Cr AND o ∈ Ch:
if ∃r ∈ R:
(u, r) ∈ UA′ ∧ ((o, read), r) ∈ PA′
then return ⊥
State ← (U ′, O′, P ′,UA′,PA′)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if u /∈ U then Cr ← Cr \ {u}
foreach o ∈ Ch:
if o /∈ O then Ch ← Ch \ {o}
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
CorruptU(u)
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach o ∈ Ch:
if HasAccess(u, (o, read)) then
return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u}; return stu
Write(u, o,m)
if u ∈ Cr then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m)
return fs
Challenge(u, o,m0,m1)
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return ⊥
foreach u′ ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u′, (o, read)) then
return ⊥
Ch ← Ch ∪ {o}
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,mb)
return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.2: Oread: Oracles for defining the experiment ExpreadCRBAC,A.
The adversary can obtain the current state of the file system by calling the oracle
FS with the query “state”. To model the unrestricted append-only access to the file
system, the adversary is allowed to write (append) arbitrary content to the file system
by calling the oracle FS with the query “append(info)”, where info should contain a
file name and the content to be appended to the file.
The experiment does not provide the adversary an oracle for read access to the file
system. Since by corrupting users, the adversary can obtain their local states and receive
user-specific update messages afterwards, which means A can retrieve file contents by
running Read on its own.
4.3.2 Past Confidentiality
In our extended cRBAC system, the enforcement of access control on write access is
supported by employing a versioning file storage where users can append contents only.
The versioning file stroage allows users to have quasi-unrestricted read and write access
to the file system, but it is also accompanied by some subtle security issues, even though
it does not implement any access control mechanism.
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The concept of file versions does not appear in traditional monitor-based access
control. When a user gets access to the file to which it is authorised, only the current
content will be available to it but not the previous contents. The previous contents
here refer to those which are not a part of the current content. In cryptographic access
control, due to the publicly accessible file system, users can easily obtain the previous
file versions (even in an encrypted form) by monitoring the state of the file system.
Therefore, a user who is recently granted the read permission of a file might have the
ability to retrieve those previous contents which are written at the time when it does not
have the permission - this can be considered as a violation of the access control being
enforced.
The security concern mentioned above is not appropriately captured by the existing
game-based security definitions of read security from the previous works [28, 27]. Recall
that in those games that define the secure read access, the adversary is not allowed to get
read access to the challenge files at any point during the game. This restriction imposed
on the adversary leads to the attack mentioned above not being ruled out. In fact, the
attack can be easily carried out in the constructions proposed in [28, 27]. Interestingly,
the recently proposed constructions of cryptographic access control systems have the
similar security concern [2, 43, 57], even though they have been proven to securely
enforce the corresponding access control policies within their individual frameworks.
Here we propose a refinement of the existing definition of read security for cRBAC
system. We name our strengthened security definition past confidentiality. The security
property is formalised via the experiment ExppcCRBAC,A which proceeds similarly to the
ExpreadCRBAC,A, but the adversary here is allowed to corrupt the users who have the read
permission of the challenge files under some conditions. The adversary’s goal is still to
determine a random bit b←$ {0, 1} which is selected at the beginning of the game.
The experiment maintains the symbolic RBAC state of the system State, which is
initalised as (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and gets updated according to A’s request for the execution
of RBAC commands. The experiment keeps the following lists during the execution:
Cr for the corrupt users, Ch for the files of which some contents have been specified as
challenges, L for the users who have read access to the challenged contents and Ud for
the files of which the current contents are specified as challenges.
In the experiment, the adversary can request for executing any RBAC administrative
command, taking over users and requesting an honest user to write to a file with the
content it specifies. The adversary can check the current state of the file system and
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also write (append) some new content to it at any time during the experiment. A can
ask for a challenge by specifying a tuple (u, o,m0,m1), where u is a user that has the
write permission of the file o, m0 and m1 are two messages of the same length. Then the
challenger will carry out Write(stu, o,mb) and provide the current state of the file system
to the adversary as response. A can ask for multiple challenges. When A terminates
with an output b′, it wins the game if b′ = b.
To prevent the adversary from winning the game trivially by corrupting a user who
has read access to the challenge contents, the experiment maintains the following invari-
ants. First, there exists no user in Cr can have read access to any file o in Ud . Second,
no user in the list L can be corrupted. In other words, A is not allowed to grant the
read permission of the challenge file to any corrupt user when the file’s current content
is specified as a challenge. Also, any user who has direct access to the challenge contents
cannot be taken over by the adversary.
Definition 9 (Past Confidentiality). A cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC =
(Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm,
RevokePerm, Read, Write, Update) is said to preserve past confidentiality if for any
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, it holds that
AdvpcCRBAC,A(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[ExppcCRBAC,A(λ)→ true]− 12 ∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the experiment ExppcCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
ExppcCRBAC,A(λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; Cr ,Ch,L,Ud ← ∅
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
b′←$A(1λ : Opc)
return (b′ = b)
The oracles Opc that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.3 and
discussed below.
The oracle Cmd allows the adversary to request for the execution of any valid RBAC
command. When A’s query will lead to an update to Cr , Ch, L or Ud , the lists will get
updated accordingly. When any user in L loses the read permission of any file in Ch, it
will be removed from the list L. When A requests to grant the read permission of the
files in Ud to an honest user, the user will be added to L.
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Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
(U ′, O′, P ′,UA′,PA′)← Cmd(State, arg)
foreach (u, o) ∈ Cr ×Ud :
if ∃r ∈ R: (u, r) ∈ UA′
∧ ((o, read), r) ∈ PA′ then
return ⊥
State ← (U ′, O′, P ′,UA′,PA′)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)
foreach u ∈ U \ L :
if ∃o ∈ Ud : HasAccess(u, (o, read)) then
L← L ∪ {u}
foreach u ∈ L:
if @o ∈ Ch : HasAccess(u, (o, read))
∨u /∈ U then
L← L \ {u}
foreach o ∈ Ch:
if o /∈ O then
Ch ← Ch \ {o}; Ud ← Ud \ {o}
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
CorruptU(u)
if u /∈ U ∨ u ∈ L then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u}; return stu
Write(u, o,m)
If u ∈ Cr then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m)
if o ∈ Ch then
Ud ← Ud \ {o}
return fs
Challenge(u, o,m0,m1)
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return ⊥
foreach u′ ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u′, (o, read)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,mb)
foreach u′ ∈ U :
if HasAccess(u′, (o, read)) then
L← L ∪ {u′}
Ch ← Ch ∪ {o}; Ud ← Ud ∪ {o}
return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.3: Opc: Oracles for defining the experiment ExppcCRBAC,A.
When the adversary requests an honest user to write some content to a file of which
the current content is specified as a challenge, the file will be removed from the list Ud ,
meaning from then on, the read permission of the file can be granted to a corrupt user.
When A requests to put a challenge by calling the oracle Challenge, if there exists
some corrupt user that has read access to the specified file, the oracle returns an error.
Otherwise, it carries out the write operation and add the file to the lists Ch and Ud .
4.4 Write Security
The security definition for cRBAC system with respect to write security is first presented
in our published paper [27]. When updating the paper for this thesis, we refine our
security definition by making a small change to the adversary’s output, which yields a
slightly stronger security definition.
After presenting the security definition for write security, we will introduce a new
security definition called local correctness. This security requirement is considered as a
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sort of write security, but it is closely related to correctness.
4.4.1 Secure Write Access
We first introduce our security definition for secure write access. Informally, a cRBAC
system is secure with respect to write accesses if no user can write any “valid” content
to a file without having the write permission. Here “valid” means the entry appended
by an unauthorised user is considered as valid and there is no requirement on wheather
the content can be correctly retrieved or not. We use the term valid due to the use of
open-accessible file system in our framework: every user can write to the file system by
appending new file versions, but only those contents written (appended) by authorised
users should be considered as valid.
We formalise this security requirement via a game between a challenger who plays
the role as the manager of a cRBAC system and an adversary A. The adversary can
ask for executing any RBAC administrative command, impersonating any user by party
corruption and writing some content to a file it specifies on behalf of any honest user.
In addition, A is allowed to query the current state of the file system and also to append
arbitrary content to it.
The experiment maintains the symbolic RBAC state of the system State, which is
initialised as (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) and gets updated as the system evolves. It also keeps a list
Cr ∈ U to record the corrupt users and another object-indexed list T to record the
contents written to the files by honest users. In addition, whenever there exists some
corrupt user which has the write permission of o, T [o] will store a special value adv and
the content written by honest user will not be stored in T [o]. This remains invariant in
the experiment.
When the adversary terminates with an output a file o∗, A wins the game if the
content of o∗ read by the manager is different from the record in T [o∗] and T [o∗] 6=
adv, which means A has successfully written some valid content to o∗ while no corrupt
user can get write access to o∗, meaning it manages to write some content to the file
successfully without having the permission.
To prevent trivial wins, from the point when the last write operation to the target
file is carried out by an honest user till when A generates its output, no corrupt user is
allowed to be granted the write permission of the target file. Otherwise, the adversary
can write to the file system on his own with the use of the local states of any corrupt
user who has write access to the target file.
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Definition 10 (Secure Write Access). A cRBAC system which is defined by the scheme
CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser,
GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Read, Write, Update)is secure with respect to write ac-





is negligible in λ, where ExpwriteCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
ExpwriteCRBAC,A(λ)
Cr ,T ← ∅
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
o∗←$A(1λ : Owrite)
if T [o∗] 6= adv ∧ T [o∗] 6= Read(stM , fs, o∗) then
return true
else return false
The oracles Owrite that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.4 and
discussed below.
Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
State ← Cmd(State, arg)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)
if Cmd = “DelObject” then
Parse arg as o; T [o]← ∅
if Cmd = “DelUser” then
Parse arg as u; Cr ← Cr \ {u}
foreach o ∈ O:
if ∃u′ ∈ Cr : HasAccess(u′, (o, write)) then
T [o]← adv
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
CorruptU(u)
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach o ∈ O:
if HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
T [o]← adv
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u}; return stu
Write(u, o,m)
if u ∈ Cr then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m)
foreach u′ ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u′, (o, write)) then
return fs
T [o]← m; return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.4: Owrite: Oracles for defining the experiment ExpwriteCRBAC,A.
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By calling the oracle Cmd, A can make the manager execute any RBAC command
Cmd if its execution with the argument arg is valid. After executing the command
symbolically, the oracle runs the corresponding algorithm Cmd to update the file system
accordingly and to generate update messages for all the users. For every honest user,
the oracle updates its local state by running Update with the dedicated update message.
For those corrupt users, their update messages are sent to adversary. Throughout the
game Cmd ensures that whenever there is any corrupt user has the write permission of
a file o, T [o] = adv.
The adversary can request for taking over any user u ∈ U by calling the oracle
CorruptU. The oracle then adds u to the list Cr and returns the local state stu to A.
For every file o ∈ O such that u has the permission (o, write), the record T [o] will be
assigned with the special value adv. The adversary can request an honest user to write
some content m to a file o by calling the oracle Write. If the specified user has the
permission, the oracle then runs Write with the user’s local state to carry out the write
operation. Only if there exists no user in the list Cr has the write permission of the file
to be written to, T [o] will store the content m. Otherwise, it stores the special value
adv instead.
4.4.2 Local Correctness
The local correctness of a cRBAC system can be considered as a sort of write security
notion. It captures the security concern from the “insiders” with respect to data avail-
ability. Namely, a user who has the write permission of a file should not be able to
invalidate the file’s future version which is written by an authorised user.
In other words, local correctness guarantees that even though there exists some
corrupt user who has write access to a file, as long as it does not touch the file after an
authorised user writes to the system, then any user who has the read permission should
be able to retrieve the current content of that file.
This security requirement is formalised via the following experiment Expl-corrCRBAC,A
that involves an adversary A. The experiment maintains a list Cr to record the corrupt
users and another object-indexed list T to record the contents written to files by the
honest users. After the initialisation of the cRBAC system, the adversary can request for
the execution of any administrative RBAC command, taking over any user and writing
some content to a file on behalf of any honest user. A can also query for the current
state of the file system and request to append arbitrary content to it.
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The use of the list T here is different from that in the experiment of Definition 10.
When an hoenst user writes some content to a file o, the content will be recorded in
T [o]. If the adversary requests to update the file by appending any entry to it, T [o]
will store a special value adv, which means the file has been touched after the previous
authorised write access.
The experiment terminates when the adversary outputs an object o∗. A wins the
game if the content of o∗ read by the manager is different from the record in T [o∗] while
T [o∗] cannot be the special value adv.
Definition 11 (Local Correctness). A cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC =
(Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm,
RevokePerm, Read, Write, Update) is said to preserve local correctness if for any





is negligible in λ, where Expl-corrCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
Expl-corrCRBAC,A(λ)
T ,Cr ← ∅; State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
(u∗, o∗)←$A(1λ : Ol-corr)
if T [o∗] 6= adv ∧ T [o∗] 6= Read(stu∗ , o∗, fs) then
return true
else return false
The oracles Ol−corr that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.5.
To append some content to the file system, A can call FS with the query “append(info)”,
where info should contain a file name o and the content to be appended to the file. Then
T [o] will store the special value adv.
4.5 Policy Privacy
In cryptographic access control systems, the particular type of privacy we are concerned
with is related to the access polices. In traditional monitor-based access control, the
users only know the resource they have access to and there is no other information is
leaked. But when we use cryptographic techniques in access control, the information
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Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
State ← Cmd(State, arg)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if u /∈ U then
Cr ← Cr \ {u}
if Cmd = “DelObject” then
Parse arg as o; T [o]← ∅
if Cmd = “DelUser” then
Parse arg as u; Cr ← Cr \ {u}
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
return (fs, {stu}u∈Cr )
CorruptU(u)
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u}; return stu
Write(u, o,m)
if u ∈ Cr then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m)
T [o]← m; return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
Parse info as (o, c)
T [o]← adv; fs ← fs‖info
return fs
Figure 4.5: Ol-corr : Oracles for defining the experiment Expl-corrCRBAC,A.
about access policies might be unintentionally revealed, while such information might
be sensitive.
In this section, we address the problem of keeping the access policy private by de-
signing the formal security models that clearly identify the abilities of an attacker and
specify what are to be considered as privacy breaches in cRBAC systems.
Here we are faced with a choice. One possibility is to provide a general privacy
definition that any adversary would not be able to distinguish among any changes to
the access control privacy. For example, we could require that no adversary can tell when
a user is added to the system, or a permission has been revoked from some role. It is not
difficult to see that such onerous requirements would immediately lead to prohibitively
expensive implementations.
Instead, we pursue another approach where we identify privacy requirements seper-
ately. This approach allows for trade-off between privacy and efficiency such that system
designers can choose to sacrifice the privacy of some component deems less important in
order to gain efficiency. The first distinction we made is to consider the privacy of the
two matrices UA and PA separately. Then for each component we identify two further
refinements. For privacy notions regarding the PA matrix we define two distinct notions:
p2r-privacy, modelling the idea that a cRBAC system hides the assignment that maps a
single permission to the roles that have it. Conversely, r2p-privacy demands that a cR-
BAC system hides the assignment that which permissions a certain role has. Similarly,
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u2r-privacy and r2u-privacy model that a cRBAC system hides the assignment of a user
to its roles and which users have a certain role.
We describe our formalisation of these notions below. For conciseness, we present
one security experiment here and the different notions are obtained as instances.
The experiment involves a challenger who plays the role as the manager of a cRBAC
system and an adversary A. It starts with selecting a random bit b←$ {0, 1}. The
experiment maintains the symbolic RBAC state of the system as it evolves throught
adversary’s requests for the execuiton of RBAC commands. The adversary can corrupt
arbitrary users and can ask for performing a write operation on behalf of an honest user
to some file with the content it specifies. Moreover, the adversary can query for the
current state of the file system and also append information to it. At some point, the
adversary can request for a challenge about privacy of the policy information in UA or
in PA by calling the challenge oracle. The oracle can be called only once. For privacy
related to PA, the adversary can speicify an RBAC command of either GrantPerm or
RevokePerm with a quadruple (p0, p1, r0, r1) ∈ P 2 ×R2. Then the manager will execute
the command on (pb, rb) depending on the random bit b. After that, the adversary is not
allowed to query oracles other than query the state of the file system and must output a
guess of the bit b′. It wins the game if b′ = b. The intuition behind the definition is that
an adversary that observes the execution should not learn which of the two roles and
which of the two permissions are involved in the execution of the command. We obtain
two notions that capture different flavours of policy privacy related to the matrix PA
by requiring p0 = p1, which defines p2r-privacy; and r0 = r1 which defines r2p-privacy.
For instance, p2r-privacy models that a cRBAC system hides which roles have a certain
permission by requiring the adversary not to be able to tell which of the two roles the
permission has been granted/revoked.
We also define a weaker notion of p2r-privacy that we call p2r∗-privacy. This notion
is defined just like p2r-privacy except that the adversary can only request for permission
granting when it queries the challenge oracle. Although very simple, p2r∗-privacy is
relevant for practical purposes. Indeed, in our motivating example of RBAC controlled
access to hospital files, p2r∗-privacy suffices to guarantee that granting access to the
clinical record of a patient to a doctor would not reveal the speciality of the doctor.
Definition 12 (Policy Privacy). A cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC =
(Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm,
RevokePerm, Read, Write, Update) preserves x-privacy, where x ∈ {u2r, r2u, p2r, r2p, p2r∗},
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if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, it holds that
Advx-privacyCRBAC,A(λ) :=
∣∣Pr[Expx-privacyCRBAC,A(λ)→ true]− 12 ∣∣
is negligible in λ, where the experiment Expx-privacyCRBAC,A is defined as follows:
Expx-privacyCRBAC,A(λ)
b←$ {0, 1}; Cr ← ∅
(stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R)
b′ ← A(1λ : Ox)
return (b = b′)
The oracles Ox that the adversary has access to are specified in Figure 4.6. Here
Ou2r and Or2u consist of all oracles except ChllPA. Analogously, Op2r, Or2p and Op2r∗
are the oracles except ChllUA. The different notions are obtained via the restrictions
outlined in the same figure. The adversary is allowed to call the challenge oracle only
once, and after that it is not allowed to make any query to the oracles other than FS.
4.6 A Construction of cRBAC
In this section, we present our instantiation of cRBAC. We first describe how the files
are stored in the file system and how to enforce access control on files via a combination
of key-management and resigning/re-encrypting operations. Then we provide a detailed
description of the algorithms of which our cRBAC scheme consists.
4.6.1 Overview of the Construction
The main ingredient of our cRBAC scheme is a PE-SK scheme. Specifically, we require
that the PE-SK scheme is based on the Predicate Encryption for Non-Disjoint Sets
(PE-NDS) scheme introduced in [28]. It is used as follows. To each role in the system
we associate two attributes: attribute arr to which we refer as the read attribute of the
role r and arw to which we refer as the write attribute of r. We use former to control
reading rights associated to the role and latter to control writing rights. To all the users
who have the role r, we provide them the decryption keys associated to arr and arw
respectively. More precisely, each user in the system will be provided two keys and it
will only hold two keys: one corresponds to the read attribtues of all the roles it belongs
and the other corresponds to the write attributes of the same roles.
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Cmd(Cmd , arg)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) then
return ⊥
State ← Cmd(State, arg)
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ Cmd(stM , fs, arg)
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
CorruptU(u)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u}; return stu
ChllUA(x)(Cmd , (u0, u1, r0, r1))
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if Cmd /∈{AssignUser ,DeassignUser}
∨¬IsValid(Cmd , (u0, r0))
∨¬IsValid(Cmd , (u1, r1)) then
return ⊥
if (x = u2r ∧ u0 6= u1)
∨ (x = r2u ∧ r0 6= r1) then
return ⊥
if u0 ∈ Cr ∨ u1 ∈ Cr then return ⊥
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
←$ Cmd(stM , fs, (ub, rb))
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
challd← 1; return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Write(u, o,m)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u ∈ Cr then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
fs ←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m); return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
ChllPA(x)(Cmd , (p0, p1, r0, r1))
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if Cmd /∈{GrantPerm,RevokePerm}
∨¬IsValid(Cmd , (p0, r0))
∨¬IsValid(Cmd , (p1, r1)) then
return ⊥
if (x = p2r ∧ p0 6= p1)
∨ (x = r2p ∧ r0 6= r1)
∨ (x = p2r∗ ∧ p0 6= p1
∧ Cmd 6= GrantPerm) then
return ⊥
foreach u ∈ Cr:
if (u, r0) ∈ UA ∨ (u, r1) ∈ UA then
return ⊥
(stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
←$ Cmd(stM , fs, (pb, rb))
foreach u ∈ U \ Cr :
stu ← Update(stu,msgu)
challd← 1; return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Figure 4.6: Ox: Oracles for defining the experiment Expx-privacyCRBAC,A.
To control read access to a file o, we simply encrypt the file content under a public
key that corredponds to all the read attributes of roles that have reading rights to o
(computing such keys is one of the functionalities provided by PE-SK schemes). If a
user is assigned with a role that has the reading right of o, it can retrieve the file content
with the use of its decryption key for read access. To control write access, we use a
standard digital signature scheme. Since all users in the system can append to the
storage, the challenge is to ensure that only those contents appended by the users who
have the writing right can be recognised as valid. We proceed as follows. To each file
o, we associate it with a signing/verification key pair sko, vko. Users can update o by
adding the modified variant to the storage, but only those updates that are signed with
sko are valid, which can be verified by using vko. To ensure only the authorised users
can obtain sko, we encrypt the signing key under all the attributes of the roles that
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have write access to o and require that when writing to a file, a user needs to decrypt
and retrieve the signing key first.
In more detail, we assume an append-only file system is (logically) organised as a
matrix. Each row corresponding to a file and each column to a version of the file. The
structure of a row in the file system is specified in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: The structure of a row in the file system.
In the position i = 0 is the header of the file o to which the row corresponds. The
information here is publicly readable but can be written only by the manager. It consists
of three fields which, for a file o, we identify by fs[o][0].pk , fs[o][0].vk and fs[o][0].sk .
Here fs[o][0].pk is the encryption key that corresponds to the read attributes of the roles
that can read o, fs[o][0].vk is the verification key associates to o and fs[o][0].sk is the
encryption of the signing key associates to o.
Users can append new versions to a file o by appending them to the row corresponding
to o. Thus, each position i > 0 contains the i-th version of the file which we identify by
(fs[o][i].ctx , fs[o][i].sig). A valid entry on the row of the file o is of the form (ctx , sig),
where ctx is the encryption of the file content and sig is a signature on ctx . In a normal
execution, to add a new version to o an authorised user first needs to encrypt the file
content under the public key fs[o][0].pk . Then it retrieves the signing key from fs[o][0].sk
and signs the encrypted content with the obtained signing key. To prevent the roll-back
attack where a malicious user simply copies some old entries and appends them to the
file, the signature is on the ciphertext together with the index that corresponds to the
position of the row to which the new entry is appending. For a more powerful attack we
called content-copying attack (will be explained in the next section), the content to be
written to file needs to be appended with the index of the next available position and
then gets encrypted under the public key associated to the file. The user then posts the
ciphertext-signature pair to position i and this becomes the most recent version of the
file.
Whenever an authorised user wishes to read a file o, she first needs to fetches the
latest version of the file (fs[o][i].ctx , fs[o][i].sig) for some i > 0, and determines whether
fs[o][i].sig is a valid signature and whether the signed index is equal to i. If not, she
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fetches a previous version until a valid entry is encountered. When a valid entry is
located at the position i of the file, the user decrypts fs[o][i].ctx using her decryption
key for read access and obtains some file content m which is concatenated with an index
i′. In the case that i′ = i, the content m is considered as the current content of o.
To add a new version to o, an authorised user first encrypts the new content under
fs[o][0].pk, obtains sko by decrypting fs[o][0].sk and uses it to sign the ciphertext. To
prevent roll-back attacks where a malicious user simply copies some old entry, the signa-
ture is on the ciphertext together with the index of the entry. The user then appends the
ciphertext-signature pair to the row corresponding to file o on the next empty position,
and this becomes the most recent version of the file.
Whenever a role loses writing privileges to o, a new signature key pair for o is freshly
generated. The new verification key is made public and the signing key is encrypted
under the roles that still have the right to write. The latest valid version of the file
is signed by the manager, so that the signature is valid under the new verification key
associated to o.
Since multiple (encrypted) versions of the file are present in the system, the manage-
ment of keys needs to be carefully crafted to avoid pitfalls where newly assigned rights
permit access to old content. For example, whenever a read access is revoked from role
r, the manager (1) assigns a fresh read attribute ar to role r, (2) recomputes all the
public keys for files to which r has still read access (to account for the changed attribute
for r), (3) re-encrypts all latest (valid) ciphertexts under these public keys, and (4) sends
the decryption keys associated to ar to all users assigned to r.
Whenever a user is deassigned from a role r, the attribute for r is also changed and
all the steps (1)–(4) are executed as above. In fact, when revoking a read permission
p from some set of users, the local states of those users must be updated (will be
demonstrated in Chapter 6). In addition, all signature key pairs for files to which r has
write permission are also renewed; in particular, the new signing key is encrypted, and
the concerned files will be re-signed to maintain validity under the new verification key.
Thus if for example u is deassigned from r, she will no longer be able to decrypt the
encrypted signing key and also the file contents using the old attributes associated to r.
4.6.2 CRBAC[PE ,Σ] in details
Our cRBAC implementation CRBAC[PE ,Σ] starts with the initialisation algorithm Init,
which takes as input a security parameter and a set of roles. It first runs Setup, the setup
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algorithm of PE , with the security parameter and a sufficiently large attribute universe
A = {1, . . . , nmax}. It then initializes two role tables RT rd and RT wr with an increasing
counter. Both tables are indexed by roles and they associate each role with two separate
attributes (for read and write access respectively). Next, it initialises the file system fs,
the symbolic RBAC state State and two object-indexed list: SK for recording signing
keys of objects in the file system and TT rd for recording read attributes which helps the
manager retrieve the contents of the files to which no user can get read access. Finally,
it outputs the initial states of the manger stM and the users stu.
Algorithm Init(1λ, R)
1 : (mpk ,mdk)←$ Setup(1λ, A)
2 : fs,RT rd,RT wr,TT rd,SK ← ∅; ctr ← 1
3 : foreach r ∈ R :
4 : RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
5 : foreach r ∈ R :
6 : RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
7 : State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)
8 : stM ← (mdk ,RT rd,RT wr,TT rd,SK , ctr ,State)
9 : fs[0][0]← mpk ; {stu}u∈U ← ∅
10 : return (stM , fs, {stu}u∈U )
Before we specify the algorithms implementing the RBAC commands, for conve-
nience, we define the following auxiliary algorithms.
GetLength on input the state of the file system fs and a file o∗ outputs the index of
the last entry in fs[o∗]. EraseRest on input the state of the file system fs, a file o∗ and
an index idx erases all the entries at positions in fs[o∗] greater than or equal to idx.
Algorithm GetLength(fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return 0
3 : for i← 1 to ∞ :
4 : if fs[o∗][i] = ∅ then
5 : return i− 1
Algorithm EraseRest(fs, o∗, idx)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : for i← idx to GetLength(fs, o∗) :
4 : fs[o∗][i]← ∅
5 : return fs
FindValidEntry on input of the state of the file system fs and a file o∗ outputs the
index i of the last entry that contains a valid signature. If there is no valid entry in o∗,
FindValidEntry returns 0.
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Algorithm FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return 0
3 : for i← GetLength(fs, o∗) to 1 :
4 : m← fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i
5 : if Verify(fs[o∗][0].vk ,m, fs[o∗][i].sig) = 1 then
6 : return i
7 : return 0
The following auxiliary algorithms are run by the manager only.
ReEnc on input the manager’s state stM , the state of the file system fs and a file o
∗
re-encrypts the content of its last valid entry according to the current encryption key of
o∗ and signs the new ciphertext using the signing key of o∗, which is stored in SK [o∗].
Then all the entries with the index greater than the last valid entry’s will be erased.
The decryption of the content in the last valid entry of o∗ is carried out with the use
of a freshly generated decryption key by running DKGen on the predicate associates to
the attributes of the roles that have the read permission of o∗. Here it is possible that
there exist no such roles, this can be checked by looking up the record in TT rd[o
∗]: in
the case that TT rd[o
∗] 6= ∅, it means the current content of o∗ is written when there is
no role has the read permission of o∗. Then a decryption key is generated with respect
to the attribute stored in TT rd[o
∗]. After decryption, the validity of the file content will
be checked by comparing the obtained index i′ with the index of the last valid entry of
o∗, and comparing the obtained file name o′ with the current file name o∗. If the file
content is valid, the file content will be re-encryted and also a new signature will be
generated with it.
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Algorithm ReEnc(stM , fs, o
∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : if TT rd[o
∗] 6= ∅ then
6 : x← TT rd[o∗]
7 : else
8 : x← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
9 : dk ←$ DKGen(mdk , fx)
10 : m← Dec(dk , fs[o∗][i].ctx )
11 : if m 6= ⊥ then
12 : Parse m as m′ ‖ i′ ‖ o′
13 : if i′ = i ∧ o′ = o∗ then
14 : fs[o∗][i].ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m)
15 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i)
16 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
17 : return fs
ReSign on input the manager’s state stM , the state of the file system fs and a file
o∗ re-signs the last valid content of o∗ using the signing key of o∗. Then all the entries
with the index greater than the last valid entry of o∗’s will be erased.
Algorithm ReSign(stM , fs, o
∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : m← fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i
6 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗],m)
7 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
8 : return fs
RoleUpdate takes as input the manager’s state stM , the state of the file system fs
and a role r∗ then assigns r∗ with a new read attribute which is recorded in RT rd.
After that, the public keys and the content of the files for which r∗ has read access are
updated to the new attribute. The users of role r∗ are issued new decryption keys for
read access.
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Algorithm RoleUpdate(stM , fs, r
∗)
1 : if r∗ /∈ R then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : {rdku}u∈U ← ∅
4 : RT rd[r
∗]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
5 : foreach ((o, read), r∗) ∈ PA :
6 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o, read), r) ∈ PA}
7 : // y must be a non-empty here
8 : fs[o][0].pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
9 : fs ←$ ReEnc(stM , fs, o)
10 : foreach (u, r∗) ∈ UA :
11 : x← {RT rd[r] | (u, r) ∈ UA}
12 : rdku←$ DKGen(mdk , fx)
13 : return (stM , fs, {(rdku, ∅)}u∈U )
Now, we describe the algorithms implementing the RBAC commands. The algo-
rithms that implement the RBAC commands are of the form that takes as input the
manager’s state stM , the state of the file system fs and some argument specified by the
RBAC command. It outputs the udpated state of the manager stM , the file system fs
and a set of update messages {msgu}u∈U for all users.
AddUser simply adds a new user u∗ to U . The algorithm AddObject adds a new
object o∗ to O, and adds the related permissions to P . It generates a signature key pair
(sko∗ , vko∗) by running KeyGen. Then sko∗ is stored in SK [o
∗] while vko∗ is stored in
o∗’s header. It also runs PKGen with a distinct attribute to generate a public key for
o∗. Such an attribute is used only once for providing a public key to allow legal users
can write to the object, even if there is no user can get read access to it. In addition,
the attribute will not be recorded in either RT rd or RT wr but in TT rd, which means
the manager will never issue a user with an decryption key that contains this attribute
but he can still decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under this public key by generating
a decryption key for the read attribute recorded TT rd. At this point, the encrypted
signing key field in o∗’s header remains empty.
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Algorithm AddUser(stM , fs, u
∗)
1 : if u /∈ U then
2 : U ← U ∪ {u∗}
3 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
Algorithm AddObject(stM , fs, o
∗)
1 : if o /∈ O then
2 : O ← O ∪ {o∗}
3 : P ← P ∪ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
4 : y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
5 : fs[o∗][0].pk←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
6 : TT rd[o
∗]← y
7 : (sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
8 : fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗ ; SK [o∗]← sko∗
9 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
The algorithm AssignUser adds a new pair (u∗, r∗) to UA. The role r∗ will be assigned
with a new read attribute by running the algorithm RoleUpdate. Then the user u∗ is
given two decryption keys rdk and wdk which are for the sets of attributes corresponding
to u∗’s current roles (via RT rd and RT wr individually), while the other users who are
assigned with r∗ will be provided a new decryption key for read access.
Algorithm AssignUser(stM , fs, u
∗, r∗)
1 : if u∗ /∈ U ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (u∗, r∗) ∈ UA then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : UA← UA ∪ {(u∗, r∗)}
4 : {msgu}u∈U ← ∅
5 : (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ RoleUpdate(stM , fs, r∗)
6 : x← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
7 : wdk ←$ DKGen(mdk, fx)
8 : msgu∗ .wdk ← wdk
9 : return (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
GrantPerm adds a pair (p∗, r∗) to PA. If p∗ is a read permission of some o∗, it first
replaces the encryption key for o∗ by a new one for the set of attributes corresponding
to the roles (now including r∗) that have read access to o∗. The content of o∗ is then
re-encrypted under this new encryption key. Now there exists at least a role r∗ can
have read access to o∗, then the attribute stored in TT rd[o
∗] can be removed (recall that
when TT rd[o
∗] 6= ∅ it means no role can get read access to o∗).
If p∗ is for write access, the signing key sko∗ is encrypted with a set of attributes
of the roles that have the permission p∗ currently. Then the encrypted signing key is
stored in o∗’s header to replace the previous one.
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Algorithm GrantPerm(stM , fs, p
∗, r∗)
1 : if p∗ /∈ P ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (p∗, r∗) ∈ PA then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : PA← PA ∪ {(p∗, r∗)}
4 : Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
5 : if mode = read then
6 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
7 : fs[o∗][0].pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
8 : fs ←$ ReEnc(stM , fs, o∗)
9 : TT rd[o
∗]← ∅
10 : if mode = write then
11 : y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
12 : // set of attributes for roles with write access to o∗
13 : pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
14 : fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o∗])
15 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
DeassignUser removes (r∗, u∗) from UA and assigns a new read attribute to r∗ using
RoleUpdate. This then updates the file system accordingly and issues new decryption
keys to the users having the role r∗. It also runs KeyGen to generate new signature key
pairs for all the files for which r∗ has write access. The new signing keys are encrypted
under the attributes of the roles that have write access to them and are stored in the
corresponding files’ headers.
Algorithm DeassignUser(stM , fs, u
∗, r∗)
1 : if (u∗, r∗) /∈ UA then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : UA← UA \ {(u∗, r∗)}
4 : {msgu}u∈U ← ∅
5 : (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ RoleUpdate(stM , fs, r∗)}
6 : foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
7 : (sko, vko)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
8 : SK [o]← sko; fs ←$ ReSign(stM , fs, o)
9 : fs[o][0].vk ← vko
10 : y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o, write), r) ∈ PA}
11 : pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
12 : fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko)
13 : return (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
To delete a user u∗ from U , DelUser first deassigns u∗ from any of his roles and then
updates U .
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Algorithm DelUser(stM , fs, u
∗)
1 : if u∗ /∈ U then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : foreach (u∗, r) ∈ UA :
4 : (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ DeassignUser(stM , fs, u∗, r)
5 : U ← U \ {u∗}
6 : return (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
RevokePerm removes (p∗, r∗) from PA. If p∗ is a read permission for some file o∗,
the encryption key of o∗ is renewed and current content of o∗ is re-encrypted by using
ReEnc. If there is no role has the read access to o∗, a new read attribute will be assigned
for r∗ and is stored in TT rd[o
∗]. Then the read attribute associated to r∗ is updated by
running RoleUpdate (this is done so that users being assigned r∗ later cannot decrypt
ciphertexts of o∗ from before the revocation).
If p∗ is a write permission of some file o∗, a new signature key pair is generated for
o∗ and the last valid entry of o∗ is re-signed with the new signing key. Then the new
signing key is encrypted with the attribute set of the roles that write permission for o∗
and stored in o∗’s header. When there is no user has the permission p∗, the manager
will be the only one who can get access to the signing key. But the other users can still
verify the validity of the entries of o∗ by using the verification key.
Algorithm RevokePerm(stM , fs, p
∗, r∗)
1 : if (p∗, r∗) /∈ PA then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : PA← PA \ {(p∗, r∗)}
4 : {msgu}u∈U ← ∅
5 : Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
6 : if mode = read then
7 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
8 : if y = ∅ then
9 : y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
10 : fs[o∗][0].pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
11 : fs ← ReEnc(stM , fs, o∗)
12 : (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )← RoleUpdate(stM , fs, r∗)
13 : if mode = write then
14 : (sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
15 : SK [o∗]← sko∗ ; fs ←$ ReSign(stM , fs, o∗)
16 : fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗
17 : y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
18 : pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
19 : fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko∗)
20 : return (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
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To delete an object o∗, the manager revokes every permission granted to o∗ and
updates O and P accordingly. Then all the entries of o∗ is erased. The records in
TT rd[o
∗] and SK [o∗] will also be deleted.
Algorithm DelObject(stM , fs, o
∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return (stM , fs, {∅}u∈U )
3 : {msgu}u∈U ← ∅
4 : foreach (p, r) ∈ PA :
5 : if p ∈ {((o∗, read), (o∗, write)} then
6 : (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )← RevokePerm(stM , fs, p, r)
7 : O ← O \ {o∗}
8 : P ← P \ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
9 : TT rd[o
∗],SK [o∗]← ∅
10 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, 0)
11 : return (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )
Finally, we define the algorithms run by users: Update, Read and Write. The algo-
rithm Update allows the users to get their local states updated. The users can get read
and write access to files by running Read and Write.
An update message contains two decryption keys: rdk for read access and wdk for
write access. When a user receives such a message from the manager, it runs algorithm
Update to update its local state with the new keys.
Algorithm Update(stu,msgu)
1 : Parse msgu as (rdk ,wdk)
2 : if rdk 6= ∅ then
3 : stu.rdk ← rdk
4 : if wdk 6= ∅ then
5 : stu.wdk ← wdk
6 : return stu
To write some content m to a file, a user first encrypts the concatenation of m with
the index of the next available position i under the encryption key associated to the
file. Next, she uses wdk , her decryption key for write access, to obtain the signing key
encrypted in the file’s header. She then signs the ciphertext along with the current index
of the entry and the file name then appends a new entry containing the ciphertext and
the signature to the file.
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Algorithm Write(st , fs, o∗,m)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : Parse st as (rdk ,wdk)
4 : sko∗ ← Dec(wdk , fs[o∗][0].sk)
5 : i← GetLength(fs, o∗)
6 : ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i+ 1 ‖ o∗)
7 : sig ←$ Sign(sko∗ , ctx ‖ i+ 1)
8 : fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
9 : fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
10 : return fs
To read a file, a user first needs to locate the last valid entry of the file by verifying
the signatures of the entires starting from the last entry. Let i be the index of the first
entry found to contain a valid signature. If i = 0, meaning the file has no valid entry,
Read outputs ∅; otherwise, the user uses her decryption key for read access, to decrypt
the ciphertext of the last valid entry to obtain some file content m′ with an index i′
and a file name o′. If i′ = i and o′ = o∗, meaning m′ is valid then Read outputs m′;
otherwise, the algorithm outputs ⊥.
Algorithm Read(st , fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return ⊥
3 : Parse st as (rdk ,wdk)
4 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
5 : if i > 0 then
6 : m← Dec(rdk , fs[o∗][i].ctx )
7 : if m 6= ⊥ then
8 : Parse m as m′ ‖ i′ ‖ o′
9 : if i′ = i ∧ o′ = o∗ then
10 : return m′
11 : return ⊥
12 : return ∅
4.6.3 Cost analysis of CRBAC[PE ,Σ]
We remark that the main contribution of this chapter is the rigorous security definitions
for cRBAC systems with respect to secure access and policy privacy. The construction
we propose are not efficient and should be regarded as a proof of concept showing that
secure policy enforcement and also meaningful levels of policy privacy can be achieved.
Nevertheless, we list the costs of the administrative RBAC operations and read/write
operation in Figure 4.8. Since the computation overhead of each operation depends on
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the instantiation of the PE-SK scheme and also the digital signature scheme employed in
our construction, by a slight abuse of notation we represent the computations in terms
of the algorithms and even the operations themselves.
For simplicity, we also define the following notations:
• U (r): the set of users which have been assigned with the role r.
• R(u): the set of roles to which the user u has been assigned.
• R(p): the set of roles to which the permission p has been granted.
• Or (r): the set of objects of which the read permissions have been granted to the
role r.
• Ow (r): the set of objects of which the write permissions have been granted to the
role r.
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Figure 4.8: Cost analysis for the algorithms of CRBAC[PE ,Σ].
4.7 Security of CRBAC[PE ,Σ]
Having proposed formal security definitions for cRBAC systems and provided the con-
struction CRBAC[PE ,Σ], we now turn to examine security properties of our contruction.
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Past Confidentiality =⇒ Read Security. We start with the following theorem,
which shows that secure read access is implied by past confidentiality. This implication
is not surprising at first glance, as the adversary in the game that defines past con-
fidentiality is obviously more powerful due to its ability of granting read acess of the
challenged files to corrupt users.
Theorem 1. Past confidentiality is strictly stronger than secure read access.
Proof sketch. We first show that any cRBAC system which preserves past confiden-
tiality is secure with respect to read access. This part of proof is straightforward, since
the reduction from past confidentiality to read security is obvious. Given any adversary
A against read security of a cRBAC system, an adversary B for past confidentiality can
be easily constructed. B runs a local copy of A and then simulates to it the read security
game with the use of its oracles. During the simulation, B does not maintain the global
state of the cRBAC system, but it keeps the lists defined in the experiment for read
security. B starts the simulation by providing A the initial state of the file system it
received from its challenger. Next, B simply forwards A’s query to its oracles and then
answers A with the response obtained from its oracles. If A’s query will violate the
restrictions of the read security game, B just replies with an error and ignores the query.
When A outputs a guess of the random bit, B outputs the same guess.
Clearly, B just provides a perfect simulation. The global states in B’s game and
the simulated game are identical. All A’s oracle queries will not lead to a violation to
the restricitons of the past confidentiality game, since any query from A which does
not violate the restrictions of the read security game will not violate any of the past
confidentiality game’s. In addition, the simulation directly depends on the random bit
chosen in B’s game. Thus, B wins the game with the same probability as A wins the
simluated game. Thus, any cRBAC system is not secure with respect to read access
does not preserves past confidentiality.
In addition, the construction of cRBAC system proposed in [27] has been proven to
be secure with respect to read access. But clearly it does not preserve past confidentiality
since granting the read permission of any file to a user will allow the user get access to
those previous contents which are encrypted under the same public key. Therefore, we
can conclude that past confidentiality is strictly stronger than secure read access.
We next show that our construction preserves correctness, local correctness, past
confidentiality, write security and p2r∗-privacy. For brevity, we only provide the proof
ideas for the security statements about correctness and local correctness.
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Theorem 2. If both the predicate encryption scheme PE and the signature scheme Σ
are correct, CRBAC[PE ,Σ] is correct (Definition 7).
Proof idea. Recall that in the security game that defines correctness, the execution of
the cRBAC system is only considered in a setting that taking over users is not permitted
and users can update the file system by honestly running the write algorithm. In such
case, correctness of the system solely depends on if the system design can provide the
appropriate key management and resigning/re-encrypting operations. Meanwhile, from
the specification of CRBAC[PE ,Σ], we can observe that the design clearly satisfies the
above requirement. Then in such a normal execution, if at some point there exists a user
who cannot correctly retrieve the content of a file of which she has the read permission,
there are only two possible reasons: signature verification failed and/or decryption failed.
The former will lead to the user fetching some entry other than the last valid one or even
cannot find any valid entry; while the latter will prevent the user from retrieving the
signing key or the file content. Thus, if there exists any user who can break correctness
of CRBAC[PE ,Σ], it either breaks correctness of either PE or Σ.
Theorem 3. If both the predicate encryption scheme PE and the signature scheme Σ
are correct, CRBAC[PE ,Σ] preserves local correctness.
Proof idea. In the security game that defines local correctness, it is required that
from the time when the last write operation to a file carried out by an honest user untill
the adversary terminates with that file as its output, appending any content to that file
is not allowed. Before that, the adversary is allowed to corrupt any user who has the
write permission of that file and to append arbitrary content to it.
We need to show that in CRBAC[PE ,Σ], no matter what content the adversary writes
to a file, after that, any content written by an authorised user to the file will be correctly
retrieved by any user who has the read permission.
From the specification of the write algorithm Write, we can observe that the algorithm
will come up with the new entry to be appended to the file to be written to. The content
of the new entry is completely independent from any of the previous entries and it only
depends on the index of the file’s last entry and the metadata stored in the header of that
file. Since the file system is assumed to preserve correct ordering of the file indices and
the metadata can only be updated by the manager, these two factors will not be affected
by corrupt users’ behaviours to the file system. In such case, the other possibility is
either the predicate encryption scheme or the signature scheme is not correct and the
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manager therefore cannot correctly retrieve the content written to the target file. Then
we can conclude that CRBAC[PE ,Σ] preserves local correctness under the assumption
that both PE and Σ are correct.
Past Confidentiality. One might expect, if the underlying encryption scheme is se-
cure while the key-management and data encryption/re-encryption operations are per-
formed appropriately according to the policy updates, the cRBAC system should pre-
serve past confidentiality. However, this obvious intuition is not always true. Some
care is needed to be taken since the system enforces access control on write access with
the use of the append-only file system. The unrestricted write access to the files by
appending new versions may concern read security of a cRBAC system. Consider the
following “content-copying” attack. A malicious user may simply copy the encrypted
content from some previous entry of a file (or even the entry from some other file), then
come up with a new valid entry that contains the encrypted content and appends it to
another file of which it has the write permission. Later, after being granted the read
permission, the user might be able to retrieve the content by just reading it. This attack
can be a potential threat to the cryptographic access control systems where the read
access and write access are implemented based on separate mechanisms.
In fact, such an attack is thwarted in our implementation by requring the file content
to be encrypted with the current index of the entry and also the file name. But this is
not reflected in our theorem and its proof below.
The following theorem states that our cRBAC implementation preserves past confi-
dentiality, under the assumption that all write operations are carried out by the manager,
namely the manager will come up with the users’ local states and write to the file system
on behalf of them. Recall that the earlier result from Ferrara et al,’s work [28] showed
read security of their cRBAC implementation solely relies on security of the underly-
ing encryption scheme. In their system model, write opeartions are performed by the
manager. Technically, this means that the simulator always knows the contents written
to the file system when constructing the reduction. But our system model allows users
append file entries on their own and the simulator is not always able to retrieve those
contents. An alternative solution is to allow the manager to carry out the computation
over the encrypted content (e.g. to have a construction that jointly uses a public key
homomorphic encryption scheme with the predicate encryption scheme). However, it
does not mean the new construction is more secure than the current one while it clearly
leads to a more complicated result. Here, our theorem serves as a separation from the
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previous result under the similar assumption.
Theorem 4. If the PE-SK scheme PE has message-hiding ciphertexts, then CRBAC[PE ,Σ]
preserves past confidentiality in the setting that the manager carries out all write oper-
ations on behalf on the users.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing a reduction from past confidentiality of
CRBAC[PE ,Σ] to message-hiding of PE under the assumption that all write operations
can only be performed by the manager on behalf of the users, namely no user can append
new entries to the file system on its own. Given any adversary A for ExppcCRBAC[PE,Σ],
an adversary B for Expmsg-hidePE can be constructed with the use of A as a subroutine
such that:
Advmsg-hidePE,B (λ) = Adv
pc
CRBAC[PE,Σ],A(λ).
Recall that in Expmsg-hidePE , the adversary is provided the master public key mpk by
its challenger and has access to the following oracles: Oracle PKGen, on input a set of
attributes y, returns a public key pky for y. pky will be stored in a list PK and y will
be stored in another list I at the same position. Oracle DKGen, on input a predicate
f , return a decryption key dkf for f and records dkf in a list F . Finally, oracle LR, on
input an index k and a pair of mesages (m0,m1) returns the encryption of mb under the
public PK [k] and adds I[k] to a list Ch, here b is a random bit chosen by the challenger.
The oracles will return an error when any query from the adversary will lead to f(I) = 1
holds for some f ∈ F and I ∈ Ch. Notice that our construction is based on predicate
encryption for non-disjoint sets (PE-NDS) where the predicate is associated to a set of
attributes x ⊆ A and for any set of attributes y ⊆ A : fx(y) = 1⇔ x ∩ y 6= ∅. Let X be
the union of the attributes associated to all the predicates queried to DKGen and let
Y be the union of all attributes under which the the challenges were encrypted. Then
thoughtout the game, oracle queries will be answered only if the the following invariant
is maintained: X ∩ Y = ∅, meaning no queried key can decrypt a challenge ciphertext.
We now describe how B works. B simulates ExppcCRBAC[PE,Σ] depending on the random
bit chosen by its challenger (and unknown to B) and proceeds as the challenger of the
simulated game. It starts from initialising a CRBAC[PE ,Σ] as specified by Init, with
the exception that it does not run the setup algorithm Setup of PE but just stores
the received master public key mpk in fs[0][0]. B maintains two extra lists during the
simulation: MS , the “message system”, which is indexed by objects and it stores the
current contents of the file system. When B needs to re-encrypt the (non-challenge) file
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contents, it can look them up from MS instead of decrypting the ciphertexts. Thus,
with the use of MS there is no need to maintain the list TT rd; PK , a list to record the
public keys generated by PKGen so far, which corresponds to the list PK maintained
by B’s challenger. It is used along with a counter ctr ′, which is identical to the counter
ctr in B’s own game. Later, when B needs to call LR for the encryption under some
public key, it can look up PK to obtain the corresponding index of the key. Then B
runs A internally and answers to A’s queries as follows.
In general, B follows the specification of the oracles in the experiment ExppccRBAC
with the use of the implementation of the cRBAC scheme specified by CRBAC[PE ,Σ].
Notice that B does not hold a master decryption key mdk , it therefore does not create
and maintain decryption keys for honest users. For those corrupt users, B queries its
oracle DKGen to obtain the decryption keys when needed. When A asks for excution
of any valid RBAC command, B checks if the execution will lead to any corrupt user
getting read access to the files of which the current contents are specified as challenges
(i.e. those objects recorded in Ud). If so, B refuses the request and returns an error;
otherwise, B executes the algorithm implementing the command and updates the system
RBAC state accordingly. When B needs to generate a public key for some file, it queries
PKGen with the set of attributes associated to the roles which have the permission to
that file. Here the attribute set should be of the same type as the permission. When B
needs to create decryption keys for corrupt users, it calls DKGen with predicates related
to the attribute sets of the same type (either read attributes or write attributes). Any
request for corrupting the users in the list L will be refused.
When A requests a user u∗ to write some content to a file o∗, B records the content
in MS [o∗]. Since it is assumed that all write access to the file system can only be carried
out by the manager, u∗ is no longer required to be an honest user here. B then retrieves
the signing key from SK [o∗] and uses it to generate a new file version for o∗ directly,
without querying the decryption key for u∗. This has the same effect as that u∗ runs
Write with its local state to write the content to o∗. If o∗ is specified as a challenge, B
removes o∗ from the list Ud , namely the current content o∗ is no longer a challenge.
When A wants to be challenged on some file o∗ by specifying a user u∗ and two
messages m0,m1 of equal length, B first checks whether no corrupt user has read access
to o∗ at this point. If this is the case, it means that B has not made any decryption-key
query for the predicate associated to any attribute under which o∗ will be encrypted. B
then does the followings: add o∗ to both Ch and Ud , and record (m0,m1) in MS [o
∗] for
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further use of re-encryption. Look up the index k of fs[o∗][0].pk in PK and query the
left-right oracle LR on (k,m0 ‖ i + 1,m1 ‖ i + 1) to obtain the ciphertext and append
it to fs[o∗] together with a corresponding signature, here i is the index of the lastest
version of o∗. Then add all the users who can get read access to o∗ to the list L.
For any o ∈ Ud , it must hold that MS [o] stores a pair of plaintext. If re-encryption
is later required for a challenge file, B looks up the two plaintexts from MS , appends
them with the index of the current file version, and again sends them to LR with the
index of the file’s current public key in PK . The public key here should be a new one,
since re-encryption is required only after a new public key is generated for the file. After
that, B updates the entry with the ciphertext received from LR and generates a new
signature for it. For all other files, the re-encryption is done by looking up the file
content in MS and encrypting the content under the new key.
When A terminates with a guess of the random bit b′, B forwards it as the output.
We now argue that the simulation provided by B is perfect.
First, we show that the invariant X ∩ Y = ∅ is maintained thoughtout the game.
Assuming by contradiction that the invariant is violated, namely X∩Y 6= ∅. Then there
exists an attribtue a such that a ∈ X∩Y . We denote the role associated to the attribute
a in the cRBAC system by ra. Whenever the role is assigned with a new attribute, it is
not considered as ra from then on.
Recall that, the set X is the union of the attributes correspond to all the predicates
for which decryption keys were queried and B calls DKGen only when it needs to
generates decryption keys for corrupt users. Then set Y contains all the attributes
under which the challenges were encrypted. B queries LR for a ciphertext only when A
specifies its challenge or re-encryption is required for the challenged contents. Since Y
contains only read attributes (those have been ever stored in RT rd), a ∈ X ∩ Y implies
that the following two conditions must have ever been met in the simulated game:
∃u ∈ Cr :(u, ra) ∈ UA (C1)
∃o ∈ Ud :((o, read), ra) ∈ PA (C2)
Then there are two possibilities here: both the conditions (C1) and (C2) are satisfied
simultaneously at some point during the game, or they are satisfied one after another.
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Consider the first case, if at some point the two conditions hold, we immediately have:
∃u ∈ Cr , o ∈ Ud : HasAccess(u, (o, read)),
meaning there exists a corrupt user which is authorised to read one of the challenged
contents. Obviously, this will never occur during the simulation. B maintains the list L to
record the users who have read access to any of the challenge contents and it guarantees
that the invariant L ∩ Cr 6= ∅ should always hold during the game (in order to prevent
trivial wins). Thus, there cannot exist any corrupt user that has the read permission of
any challenge content during the simulation, which means that two conditions will not
be satisfied simultaneously.
Now consider the other possibility, the two conditions are met one after another. We
show that no matter which of the conditions is satisfied first, the other one will never
hold later in the game.
In the case that (C1) is satisfied first, it means that B calls DKGen to obtain the
decryption key for some corrupt user u who is assigned with the role ra before it asks
for a challenge under a public key with respect to the attribute set which contains a.
As we have already known that at no point in the game, the two conditions can be
both satisfied. Thus, in order to meet (C2), A must make queries to remove u from Cr
(by calling DelUser) or deassign u from the role ra (by calling DeassignUser). But
from the specification of the algorithms DelUser and DeassignUser, we can observe that
either call to invalidate (C1) will lead to a new attribute to be assigned to the role ra
and therefore B will not be able to request for a challenge with respect to the public
key which is related to the attribute a from then on, which means (C2) will never occur
later.
Similarly, in the case that (C2) is satisfied first, there should exist an object o ∈ Ud
such that ((o, read), ra) ∈ PA holds. Therefore, A needs to remove either o from Ud
or ((o, read), ra) from PA before it requests to corrupt some user who is assigned with
the role ra. In order to remove o from Ud , A can request a user to write some content
to o (by calling Write) or delete the object (by calling DelObject). After some
new content has been written to o, A can assign some corrupt user with ra (by calling
AssignUser). However, in such case a new attribute will be assigned to ra then (C1)
will never hold later. In addition, at the moment when o is specified as the challenge,
the users who have read access to o will be recorded in the list L, including all the users
who have the role ra. Even though o /∈ Ud holds after some new content is written to
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o, A cannot corrupt any of these users before their read permission to o is revoked (by
calling DeassignUser or RevokePerm). Still, from the specification of the algorithms
DeassignUser and RevokePerm, either deassigning some user from the role ra or revoking
(o, read) from ra will lead to a new attribute assigned to the role ra. In addition, without
writing some content to o, deleting o or just removing (o, read) from PA will also have
the same effect to the attribute associated to ra. So, if (C2) is satisfied first, (C1) will
not occur later during the simulation. Therefore we can conclude that such an attribute
a ∈ X ∩ Y does not exist so X ∩ Y = ∅ is always maintained.
Moreover, B is in charge of the signature scheme Σ and during the simulation it can
always udpate the file system correctly with the user of MS and SK . Thus, B provides
perfect simulation of ExppcCRBAC[PE,Σ] where the bit b is the same as the one chosen by
B’s challenger. Thus we have:
Advmsg-hidePE,B (λ) = Adv
pc
CRBAC[PE,Σ],A(λ).
We detail the adversary B in the following.
Adversary B(mpk : PKGen,DKGen,LR)
Cr ,Ch,Ud ,L,MS ,PK ← ∅
fs,RT rd,RT wr,SK ← ∅; ctr , ctr ′ ← 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT rd[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅); fs[0][0]← mpk
b′←$A(1λ : Õpc)
return b′
The auxiliary algorithms ReEnc, ReSign and RoleUpdate used in B’s simulation are
specified as follows. The other algorithms GetLength, EraseRest and FindValidEntry are
identical to those specified in the the cRBAC construction.
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Algorithm ReEnc(fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : if o∗ ∈ Ud then
6 : Parse MS [o∗] as (m0,m1)
7 : Let k be such that : PK [k] = fs[o∗][0].pk
8 : Query : fs[o∗][i].ctx ← LR(k,m0 ‖ i ‖ o∗,m1 ‖ i ‖ o∗)
9 : else
10 : fs[o∗][i].ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,MS [o∗] ‖ i ‖ o∗)
11 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i)
12 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
13 : return fs
Algorithm ReSign(fs, o∗)
1 : if o /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : m← fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i
6 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗],m)
7 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
8 : return fs
Algorithm RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
1 : {rdku}u∈Cr ← ∅
2 : RT rd[r
∗]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
3 : foreach ((o, read), r∗) ∈ PA :
4 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o, read), r) ∈ PA}
5 : // y must be non-empty here
6 : Query : fs[o][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
7 : fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o)
8 : PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk
9 : ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
10 : foreach u ∈ Cr :
11 : if (u, r∗) ∈ UA then
12 : x← {RT rd[r] | (u, r) ∈ UA}
13 : Query : rdku←$ DKGen(fx)
14 : return (fs, {(rdku, ∅)}u∈Cr )
B maintains the oracles that A has access to as specified in Figure 4.9 and 4.10.
Recall that in the security game that defines past confidentiality of cRBAC systems, the
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Oracle AddUser(u∗)
if u ∈ U then return ⊥
U ← U ∪ {u∗}
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AddObject(o∗)
if o ∈ O then return ⊥
O ← O ∪ {o∗}
P ← P ∪ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗ ; SK [o∗]← sko∗
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AssignUser(u∗, r∗)
if u∗ /∈ U ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (u∗, r∗) ∈ UA
then return ⊥
if ∃o ∈ Ud : ((o, read), r∗) ∈ PA then
if u∗ ∈ Cr then return ⊥
else L← L ∪ {u}
UA← UA ∪ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
x← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx)
msgu∗ .wdk ← wdk
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle DeassignUser(u∗, r∗)
if (u∗, r∗) /∈ UA then return ⊥
UA← UA \ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
(sko, vko)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
SK [o]← sko; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o)
fs[o][0].vk ← vko
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko)
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
foreach u ∈ L:
if @o ∈ Ch : HasAccess(u, (o, read))
then L← L \ {u}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle GrantPerm(p∗, r∗)
if p∗ /∈ P ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (p∗, r∗) ∈ PA
then return ⊥
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
if o∗ ∈ Ud ∧mode = read then
if ∃u ∈ Cr : (u, r∗) ∈ UA then
else foreach u ∈ U \ L:
if (u, r∗) ∈ UA then L← L ∪ {u}
PA← PA ∪ {(p∗, r∗)}
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
if mode = write then
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o∗])
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle RevokePerm(p∗, r∗)
if (p∗, r∗) /∈ PA then return ⊥
PA← PA \ {(p∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
if y = ∅ then
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
if mode = write then
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
SK [o∗]← sko∗ ; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o∗)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko∗)
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
foreach u ∈ L:
if @o ∈ Ch : HasAccess(u, (o, read))
then L← L \ {u}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Figure 4.9: Õpc (part 1)
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Oracle DelObject(o∗)
if o∗ /∈ O then return ⊥
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
foreach (p, r) ∈ PA:
if p ∈ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)} then
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ RevokePerm(p, r)
O ← O \ {o∗}
P ← P \ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
Ch ← Ch \ {o∗}; Ud ← Ud \ {o∗}
MS [o∗],SK [o∗]← ∅
fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, 0)
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle DelUser(u∗)
if u∗ /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach (u∗, r) ∈ UA:
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ DeassignUser(fs, u∗, r)
U ← U \ {u∗}
Cr ← Cr \ {u∗}; L← L \ {u∗}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle Write(u∗, o∗,m)
if ¬HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
i← GetLength(fs, o∗)
ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i+ 1 ‖ o∗)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], ctx ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
MS [o∗]← m; Ud ← Ud \ {o∗}
return fs
Oracle CorruptU(u∗)
if u /∈ U ∨ u ∈ L then
return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u∗}
x← {RT rd[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : rdk ← DKGen(fx)
x′ ← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx′)
return (rdk ,wdk)
Oracle Challenge(u∗, o∗,m0,m1)
if ¬HasAccess(u∗, (o∗, write)) then
return ⊥
if |m0| 6= |m1| then return ⊥
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u, (o∗, read)) then
return ⊥
Let k be such that PK [k] = fs[o∗][0].pk
Query : ctx ← LR(k,m0 ‖ i+ 1,m1 ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], ctx ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
MS [o∗]← (m0,m1)
foreach u′ ∈ U :
if HasAccess(u′, (o∗, read)) then
L← L ∪ {u′}
Ch ← Ch ∪ {o∗}; Ud ← Ud ∪ {o∗}
return fs
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
Figure 4.10: Õpc (part 2)
adversary is allowed to get access to a single oracle Cmd to request for the execution of
any administrative RBAC command. Here, for clarity, it is achieved in a different favour
but still has the same effect: the adversary now gets access to a group of oracles of which
each corresponds to a single RBAC command. All of the oracles listed below follow the
description of the oracle Cmd with some slight changes (e.g. the condition of removing
a user from the list L is more specific here). In each oracle, the run of the corresponding
algorithm are replaced by those specified in the construction CRBAC[PE ,Σ].
Theorem 5. If the digital signature scheme Σ is existentially unforgeable under chosen-
message attacks and the PE-SK scheme PE is message-hiding, CRBAC[PE ,Σ] is secure
with respect to write access.
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Proof. We prove this theorem through a sequence of games. It starts from the original
security game that defines write security of cRBAC systems, and ends with a game
where the adversary can gain advantage from the digital signature scheme Σ only. The
description of the games and also the hops between successive games are as follows.
Game 0 : The initial game is simply the game that defines write security of cRBAC
systems in the presence of an adversary A. Recall that at the beginning of the game, the
challenger initialises the system by running the initialisation algorithm Init with a set of
roles. Then the adversary is given access to the oracles maintained by the challenger,
by calling which it is allowed to request for the execution of any valid RBAC command,
user corruption, writing on behalf of some honest user, querying the current state of the
file system and appending data to the file system.
At some point during the game, the adversary terminates with an output of an
object o∗. The advantage of the adversary in this game is defined by the probability
that some content has been written to o∗ in an unauthorised manner: the current content
of o∗ (read by challenger with the use of the manager’s local state) differs from the last
recorded written content.
Game 1 : We now transform Game 0 into Game 1 by requiring the adversary to write
some valid content to the file associated to the verification and signing key pair specified
by the challenger. More specifically, Game 1 proceeds as the Game 0 with the following
changes.
At the beginning of the game, the challenger selects a random index i in the range of
{1, . . . , p(λ)}, where p(λ) is a bound on the number of key pairs generated by running
KeyGen, the key generation algorithm of Σ (if the adversary is polynomially bounded,
this number is also polynomially bounded).
Whenever the challenger needs to generate a new verification and signing key pair
for some file o, in case it is the i-th run of KeyGen, the challenger records the generated
key pair (sk i, vk i) and stores the verification key vk i in fs[o][0].vk . The signing key
sk i is encrypted with a set of attributes which are associated to the roles that have
write access to o and the encrypted key is stored in fs[o][0].sk . When A outputs o∗ and
terminates, if the verification key stored in fs[o∗][0].vk is not the recorded verification
key, the challenger aborts the game.
Since the choice of the random index i is independent of the event that A manages
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Here and below we write for simplicity Pr[GameA,i] for the adventage of the adversary
A in Game i.
Game 2 : This game proceeds as the one above, with the exception that in the i-th run
of KeyGen, the challenger records the obtained key pair (vk i, sk i) and selects a random
string of the same length of the signing key sk i. Then it encrypts the random string
and stores it in the related file’s header instead of sk i. Whenever the challenger needs
to generate signatures for this file, it signs the messages with the recorded signing key
until the key gets updated.
Lemma 1. Let ε0 be the advantage with which an efficient adversary can break message-
hiding of the PE-SK scheme PE, then:
∣∣Pr[GameA,1]− Pr[GameA,2]∣∣ = ε0.
We prove this lemma by constructing a distinguisher D given access to the oracles
O = (PKGen, DKGen, LR), defined for message-hiding in Definition 6. The idea is,
with use of these oracles D can simulate a hybrid game of Game 1 and Game 2 to an
adversary A. If there is a difference in the adversary’s success probability between the
two games, the distinguisher can gain the advantage equals to this in the message-hiding
game of PE .
In the i-th run of KeyGen for some file o, D checks if any corrupt user has write
access to o. If so, D terminates and outputs 0. Recall that the winning condition of the
game which requires that no corrupt user can have write access to the file outputs by A
when A generates its output. It means in order to win the game, A needs to revoke the
write permission from the corrupt users later and this will lead to the verification and
signing key pair gets updated. Otherwise, D generates a key pair (sk i, vk i) and selects
a random string rs of the same length as sk i. D queries its LR oracle with (sk i, rs) to
obtain a ciphertext and stores it in fs[o][0].sk .
After that, when D needs to update fs[o][0].sk due to A’s oracle calls, it queries
LR with the appropriate index and (sk i, rs) to obtain the ciphertext. Meanwhile, if
any of A’s queries will lead to any corrut user can have the write permission of o or
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A asks for executing some RBAC command which will also cause the current signing
and verification key pair of o being updated, D terminates the simulation and outputs
0. Finally, when A outputs an object o∗, D outputs 1 if all the winning conditions are
satisfied and else outputs 0. D is specified as follows.
Distinguisher D(mpk : O)
Cr ,T ,TT rd,SK ,PK ← ∅
i←$ {1, ..., p(λ)}; vk , sk , rs ← ∅
fs,RT rd,RT wr ← ∅; j, ctr , ctr ′ ← 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT rd[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅); fs[0][0]← mpk
o∗←$A(1λ : Õwrite-1 )
if fs[o∗].vk = vk ∧ T [o∗] 6= adv ∧ T [o∗] 6= Read(stM , fs, o∗) then
return 1
else return 0
The auxiliary algorithms of CRBAC[PE ,Σ] are also used in D’s simulation, with some
changes on the ReEnc, ReSign and RoleUpdate which are specified as follows.
Algorithm ReEnc(fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : if TT rd[o
∗] 6= ∅ then
6 : x← TT rd[o∗]
7 : else
8 : x← {RT rd[r]|((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
9 : Query : dk ← DKGen(fx)
10 : m← Dec(dk , fs[o∗][i].ctx )
11 : fs[o∗][i].ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m)
12 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i)
13 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
14 : return fs
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Algorithm ReSign(fs, o∗)
1 : if o /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : m← fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i
6 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗],m)
7 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
8 : return fs
Algorithm RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
1 : {rdku}u∈Cr ← ∅
2 : RT rd[r
∗]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
3 : foreach ((o, read), r∗) ∈ PA :
4 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o, read), r) ∈ PA}
5 : Query : fs[o][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
6 : fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o)
7 : PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk
8 : ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
9 : foreach u ∈ Cr :
10 : if (u, r∗) ∈ UA then
11 : x← {RT rd[r] | (u, r) ∈ UA}
12 : Query : rdku ← DKGen(fx)
13 : return (fs, {(rdku, ∅)}u∈Cr )
During the simulation, whenever D needs to run KeyGen to generate a verificaiton
and signing key pair, it runs the following algorithm KeyGen′ instead. KeyGen′ takes as
input the security parameter 1λ and an object o∗ and outputs the signature key pair
by running KeyGen of the digital signature scheme. In the i-th run, if there exists some
corrupt user who has the write permission of file that the new key pair will be associated
to, D aborts the simulation and outputs 0; otherwise, it records the key pair in (sk , vk)
and selects a random string rs of the same length as sko∗ . In the case that the run of
KeyGen′ is to generate a new key pair for the object which is associated to (sk , vk), D
also aborts and outputs 0.
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Algorithm KeyGen′(1λ, o∗)
1 : if fs[o∗][0].vk = vk then
2 : output 0
3 : (sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
4 : if j = i then
5 : if ∃u ∈ Cr : HasAccess(u, (o∗, write)) then
6 : output 0
7 : (sk , vk)← (sko∗ , vko∗)
8 : rs ←$ {0, 1}|sko∗ |
9 : j ← j + 1
10 : return (sko∗ , vko∗)
The oracles that D maintains are specified in Figure 4.11 and 4.12. Again, A now
can get access to a group of oracles correspond to the administrative RBAC commands
which are functionally equivalent the oracle Cmd in the security game that defines past
confidentiality.
According to the specification of D above, it is clear that D will not lead to its oracles
return an error. Since D calls LR only when it needs to generate the encryption of the
signing key for the file associated to (vk i, sk i) and it ensures that no corrupt user can
get write access to that file during the simulation. Therefore D will never request for
any decryption key which allows it decrypt any of the ciphtertexts returned by LR. For
those decryption keys that D queries for decrypting the file contents and the encrypted
signing keys, they cannot be used to decrypt the challenge ciphertexts obtained from
LR and therefore will not cause D’s oracles return an error.
In the case that LR always returns the encryption of sk i, meaning the random bit b
selected in the message-hiding game is 0. Then the hybrid game is identical to Game 1
and D outputs 1 with the same probability as A’s advantage in Game 1. Then we have
Pr[D(mpk : O)→ 1 | b = 0] = Pr[GameA,1]. (5.2)
Meanwhile, LR always returns the encryption of rs when b = 1, then the game is
identical to Game 2 and the probability that D outputs 1 is the same as A’s advantage
in Game 2. Thus we have
Pr[D(mpk : O)→ 1 | b = 1] = Pr[GameA,2], (5.3)
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Oracle AddUser(u∗)
if u ∈ U then return ⊥
U ← U ∪ {u∗}
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AddObject(o∗)
if o ∈ O then return ⊥
O ← O ∪ {o∗}
P ← P ∪ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
TT rd[o
∗]← y
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen′(1λ, o∗)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗ ; SK [o∗]← sko∗
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AssignUser(u∗, r∗)
if u∗ /∈ U ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (u∗, r∗) ∈ UA
then return ⊥
UA← UA ∪ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
x← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx)
msgu∗ .wdk ← wdk
if u∗ ∈ Cr then
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
T [o]← adv
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle DeassignUser(u∗, r∗)
if (u∗, r∗) /∈ UA then return ⊥
UA← UA \ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
(sko, vko)←$ KeyGen′(1λ, o)
SK [o]← sko; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o)
fs[o][0].vk ← vko
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
if fs[o][0].vk = vk then
Query : fs[o][0].sk
← LR(ctr ′, sko, rs)
else fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko)
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle GrantPerm(p∗, r∗)
if p∗ /∈ P ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (p∗, r∗) ∈ PA
then return ⊥
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
PA← PA ∪ {(p∗, r∗)}
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
TT rd[o
∗]← ∅
if mode = write then
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
if fs[o][0].vk = vk then
Query : fs[o∗][0].sk
← LR(ctr ′,SK [o∗], rs)
else fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o∗])
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
if ∃u ∈ Cr : HasAccess(u, p∗) then
T [o∗]← adv
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle RevokePerm(p∗, r∗)
if (p∗, r∗) /∈ PA then return ⊥
PA← PA \ {(p∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
if y = ∅ then
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
TT rd[o
∗]← y
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
if mode = write then
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen′(1λ, o∗)
SK [o∗]← sko∗ ; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o∗)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y)
if fs[o∗][0].vk = vk then
Query : fs[o∗][0].sk
← LR(ctr ′, sko∗ , rs)
else fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko∗)
PK [ctr ′]← pk ; ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Figure 4.11: Õwrite-1 (part 1)
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Oracle DelObject(o∗)
if o∗ /∈ O then return ⊥
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
foreach (p, r) ∈ PA:
if p ∈ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)} then
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ RevokePerm(p, r)
O ← O \ {o∗}
P ← P \ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
T [o∗],SK [o∗]← ∅
fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, 0)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle Write(u∗, o∗,m)
if ¬HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
i← GetLength(fs, o∗)
ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i+ 1 ‖ o∗)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], ctx ‖ i+ 1 ‖ o∗)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u, (o∗, write)) then
return fs
T [o∗]← m; return fs
Oracle DelUser(u∗)
if u∗ /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach (u∗, r) ∈ UA:
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ DeassignUser(fs, u∗, r)
U ← U \ {u∗}; Cr ← Cr \ {u∗}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle CorruptU(u∗)
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u∗}
foreach o ∈ O:
if HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
T [o]← adv
x← {RT rd[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : rdk ← DKGen(fx)
x′ ← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx′)
return (rdk ,wdk)
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.12: Õwrite-1 (part 2)
Recall that, the advantage of D in the message-hiding game is
∣∣Pr[D(mpk : O)→ 1 | b = 0]− Pr[D(mpk : O)→ 1 | b = 1]∣∣ = ε0. (5.4)
Then combining Equations (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4), we have
∣∣Pr[GameA,1]− Pr[GameA,2]∣∣ = ε0,
and the lemma is proved.
Lemma 2. Let ε1 be the advantage with which an efficient adversary gains in EUF-CMA
attack game of the digital signature scheme Σ, then Pr[GameA,2] = ε1.
Assume that the file related to the verification and signing key pair (sk i, vk i), which
is obtained from the i-th run of KeyGen, is o. We first observe that in Game 2, the
encrypted “signing key” fs[o][0].sk is independent of sk i. Then A is provided the verifi-
cation key vk i and is allowed to see the signatures on messages chosen by itself. In this
case, A wins the game only when he is able to forge a valid signature on his own. In
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other words, from A we can construct an adversary B for Expeu-cmaΣ as follows. Given
a verification key vk and the access to the oracle Sign, B simulates for A Game 2 by
playing the role of the challenger. Here B is in charge of the PE-SK scheme PE and
also the signature scheme Σ. It generates signing and verification key pairs for the files
in its simulated game, except for the the one in the i-th run of KeyGen. By that time,
B uses key vk that it receives instead of key vki and uses his signing oracle to produce
the necessary signatures. When A terminates with an output o∗, B checks if all winning
conditions are satisfied. If so, B outputs the file content and the signature of the last
valid entry of o∗; otherwise, it aborts the simulation. The adversary B is detailed as
follows.
Adversary B(vk : Sign)
(mpk ,mdk)←$ Setup(1λ, A)
Cr ,T ,TT rd,SK ← ∅
i←$ {1, ..., p(λ)}
fs,RT rd,RT wr ← ∅; j, ctr ← 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT rd[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅); fs[0][0]← mpk
stM ← (mdk ,RT rd,RT wr,TT rd,SK , ctr ,State)
o∗←$A(1λ : Õwrite-2 )
if fs[o∗].vk = vk ∧ T [o∗] 6= adv ∧ T [o∗] 6= Read(stM , fs, o∗) then
idx ← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
return (fs[o∗][idx ].ctx , fs[o∗][idx ].sig)
else abort
In B’s simulation of Game 2, the auxiliary algorithms are identical to those spec-
ified in CRBAC[PE ,Σ]. Still, B runs a modified algorithm KeyGen′ instead of the key
generation algorithm KeyGen of Σ. In the i-th run of KeyGen′, it does not generate a
signing and verification key pair. Instead, it returns vk , the verification key B obtains
from its game, and a random string rs of the same length of the signing key sk which is
unknown to B.
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Algorithm KeyGen′(1λ, o∗)
1 : if fs[o∗][0].vk = vk then
2 : output 0
3 : if j = i then
4 : if ∃u ∈ Cr : HasAccess(u, (o∗, write)) then
5 : output 0
6 : rs ←$ {0, 1}|sk |; j ← j + 1
7 : return (rs, vk)
8 : else
9 : (sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ); j ← j + 1
10 : return (sko∗ , vko∗)
The oracles that D maintains are specified in Figure 4.13 and 4.14. During the
simulation, D is able to update the global state of the cRBAC system on its own since
it is in charge of the PE-SK scheme and also the signature scheme. There is only one
situation that D needs to call its own oracle Sign, that is to provide signatures for the
contents of the file associated to the verification key vk .
It is immediate that a successful attack of A against write security of CRBAC[PE ,Σ]
translates into a forgery against the signature scheme Σ and we can conclude that
Pr[GameA,2] = ε1,
where ε1 is the advantage of B against Σ in the EU-CMA game. Thus the lemma is
proved.
Now, combining Lemma 1 and 2, we have
Pr[GameA,1] ≤ ε0 + ε1. (5.5)
From Equations (5.1) and (5.5), we can conclude that
Pr[GameA,0] ≤ (ε0 + ε1) · p(λ).
Therefore, if the PE-SK scheme PE is message-hiding and the signature scheme Σ
is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks, then both ε0 and ε1
are negligible and therefore so is Pr[GameA,0].
Theorem 6. If the PE-SK scheme PE has attribute-hiding keys, CRBAC[PE ,Σ] pre-
serves p2r∗-privacy.
Proof. We prove this theorem by reducing p2r∗-privacy of CRBAC[PE ,Σ] to identity-
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Oracle AddUser(u∗)
if u ∈ U then return ⊥
U ← U ∪ {u∗}
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AddObject(o∗)
if o ∈ O then return ⊥
O ← O ∪ {o∗}
P ← P ∪ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
fs[o∗][0].pk←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
TT rd[o
∗]← y
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen′(1λ)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗ ; SK [o∗]← sko∗
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AssignUser(u∗, r∗)
if u∗ /∈ U ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (u∗, r∗) ∈ UA
then return ⊥
UA← UA ∪ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
x← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
wdk ← DKGen(mdk , fx)
msgu∗ .wdk ← wdk
if u∗ ∈ Cr then
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
T [o]← adv
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle DeassignUser(u∗, r∗)
if (u∗, r∗) /∈ UA then return ⊥
UA← UA \ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
(sko, vko)←$ KeyGen′(1λ, o)
SK [o]← sko; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o)
fs[o][0].vk ← vko
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o, write), r) ∈ PA}
pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle GrantPerm(p∗, r∗)
if p∗ /∈ P ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (p∗, r∗) ∈ PA
then return ⊥
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
PA← PA ∪ {(p∗, r∗)}
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(mpk , y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
TT rd[o
∗]← ∅
if mode = write then
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o∗])
if ∃u ∈ Cr : HasAccess(u, p∗) then
T [o∗]← adv
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle RevokePerm(p∗, r∗)
if (p∗, r∗) /∈ PA then return ⊥
PA← PA \ {(p∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
if y = ∅ then
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
TT rd[o
∗]← y
fs[o∗][0].pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
if mode = write then
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen′(1λ, o∗)
SK [o∗]← sko∗ ; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o∗)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
pk ←$ PKGen(mpk , y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko∗)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Figure 4.13: Õwrite-2 (part 1)
hiding public keys of PE . Let A be an adversary for Expp2r
∗
CRBAC[PE,Σ], we show that an
adversary B for Expid-h-pkPE can be constructed with the use of A as a subroutine such
that
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Oracle DelObject(o∗)
if o∗ /∈ O then return ⊥
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
foreach (p, r) ∈ PA:
if p ∈ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)} then
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ RevokePerm(p, r)
O ← O \ {o∗}
P ← P \ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
T [o∗],SK [o∗]← ∅
fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, 0)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle Write(u∗, o∗,m)
if ¬HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
i← GetLength(fs, o∗)
ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
if fs[o∗][0].vk = vk then
Query : sig ← Sign(ctx ‖ i+ 1)
else sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], ctx ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if HasAccess(u, (o∗, write)) then
return fs
T [o∗]← m; return fs
Oracle DelUser(u∗)
if u∗ /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach (u∗, r) ∈ UA:
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ DeassignUser(fs, u∗, r)
U ← U \ {u∗}; Cr ← Cr \ {u∗}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle CorruptU(u∗)
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u∗}
foreach o ∈ O:
if HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
T [o]← adv
x← {RT rd[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
rdk ← DKGen(mdk , fx)
x′ ← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
wdk ← DKGen(mdk , fx′)
return (rdk ,wdk)
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.14: Õwrite-2 (part 2)




We now describe how B works. The simulation that B provides depends on the
random bit b chosen by its own challenger. Upon receiving the master public key mpk
from its challenger, B starts with the simulation of Init to initialise a CRBAC[PE ,Σ].
Here B will not run the setup algorithm of PE but just stores mpk in fs[0][0]. It will
generate the keys by calling its own oracles when needed. B then queries DKGen with
a predicate of the universe of the attribute A = {1, ..., nmax} to obtain a decryption
key dkA. Notice that this key allows B access to all the files encrypted in the system,
therefore B does not need to maintain the list TT rd as specified in the cRBAC scheme.




Whenever B needs to generate the public encryption key for some file, it submits to
its own challenge oracle a pair of the same identities. When A asks to corrupt some
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honest user, B calls DKGen with predicates related to the identities associated to the
user’s roles to obtain the two decryption keys for read and write access respectively
then forwards them to A. If B needs to decrypt some ciphertext of the system (e.g. to
perform a re-encryption of some content), it uses dkA to recover the plaintext.
Finally, when A queries the challenge oracle ChllPA with the query (p, p, r0, r1)
(for p2r∗-privacy, the specified command can only be GrantPerm) where p ∈ P and
r0, r1 ∈ R, the adversary B checks that the query would have been valid in the identity-
hiding public keys experiment. If this is not the case then it answers with an error ⊥.
Otherwise, B queries its own challenge oracle LR with (I0, I1) where Ib = I ∪ {RT [rb]}
with RT can be RT rd or RT wr, depending on the type of p and I is the set of attributes
associated to the roles that have access to the permission p, which is retrieved from RT .
After B receives a response of a public key pk b which is generated according the
random bit chosen in B’s game from LR, if the challenge permission is a read permission,
B updates the corresponding file’s public key with pk b and re-encrypts the last valid entry
of that file. If the permission is a write permission, B re-encrypts the signing key of the
file with pk b. Afterwards, all further oracle calls from A will be ignored.
Whenever A outputs a guess b′, B outputs the same bit. We now argue that the
simulation provided by B is perfect.
First notice that before A calls ChllPA, B is capable of coming up all the required
cryptographic materials. Since B is fully in charge of the signature, it knows all of the
signing keys and therefore can provide all the necessary signatures. Moreover, B is able
to decrypt all the encrypted content of the file system, including signing keys stored in
file headers and also the file contents. In addition, whenever B needs to generate public
key for any file, it queries the oracle PKGen with the appropriate set of attributes to
obtain one.
The details of the adversary B which we construct are as follows.
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Adversary B(mpk : PKGen,DKGen,LR)
Cr ,Ch,SK ← ∅
fs,RT rd,RT wr ← ∅; ctr ← 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT rd[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
foreach r ∈ R:
RT wr[r]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : dkA ← DKGen(fA)
State ← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅); fs[0][0]← mpk
b′←$A(1λ : Õp2r∗)
return b′
In B’s simulation of Expp2r
∗
CRBAC[PE,Σ](λ), the auxiliary algorithms ReEnc, ReSign and
RoleUpdate work as follows.
Algorithm ReEnc(fs, o∗)
1 : if o∗ /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : m← Dec(dkA, fs[o∗][i].ctx )
6 : fs[o∗][i].ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i)
7 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i)
8 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
9 : return fs
Algorithm ReSign(fs, o∗)
1 : if o /∈ O then
2 : return fs
3 : i← FindValidEntry(fs, o∗)
4 : if i > 0 then
5 : m← fs[o∗][i].ctx ‖ i
6 : fs[o∗][i].sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗],m)
7 : fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, i+ 1)
8 : return fs
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Algorithm RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
1 : {rdku}u∈Cr ← ∅
2 : RT rd[r
∗]← ctr ; ctr ← ctr + 1
3 : foreach ((o, read), r∗) ∈ PA :
4 : y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o, read), r) ∈ PA}
5 : Query : fs[o][0].pk ← LR(y, y)
6 : fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o)
7 : PK [ctr ′]← fs[o∗][0].pk
8 : ctr ′ ← ctr ′ + 1
9 : foreach u ∈ Cr :
10 : if (u, r∗) ∈ UA then
11 : x← {RT rd[r] | (u, r) ∈ UA}
12 : Query : rdku ← DKGen(fx)
13 : return (fs, {(rdku, ∅)}u∈Cr )
B answers A’s oracle calls as specified in Figure 4.15 and 4.16.
Then we argue that the way B carries out the simulation will not lead to its oracle
returning an error. Recall that, in B’s game, a list Ch is used to record all the pairs of
attribute sets which have been queried to the oracle LR so far. There is also another
list F maintained in the game, which is used to record all the predicates submitted to
DKGen for decryption keys so far. The oracles will not return an error if for all f ∈ F
and all (I ′0, I
′
1) ∈ Ch, it holds that f(I ′0) = f(I ′1).
During the simulation, B calls DKGen for generating decryption keys only with
the universe of attributes and the decryption keys for corrupt users. Thus, the list F
contains a predicate with the universe of attributes and also the predicates associated
to attribute sets of corrupt users’ roles. Before A calls the challenge oracle, B queries
LR only for generating public keys with pairs of identical attribute sets. Therefore, the
list Ch (in B’s game) only contains pairs of same attribute sets at this stage. Thus, for
all f ∈ F, (I ′0, I ′1) ∈ Ch, we have that f(I ′0) = f(I ′1) is always satisfied before A calls
ChllPA.
When A specifies its challenge (p, p, r0, r1) by calling ChllPA, B sends a pair of
attribute sets (I0, I1) to LR, where Ib is the set of attributes related to the roles that
have the permission p after the execution of GrantPerm with (p, rb) individually. From
the specification of LR, it is required that no corrupt user can have either the role r0 or
r1. Thus the attributes associated to the two roles will not exist in any predicate in F .
If there ever exists some corrupt user belonging to any of the two roles, the attribute
will be renewed after the user is deassigned from the role. Moreover, fA(I0) = fA(I1) is
clearly satisfied since A is the universe of attributes.
82
CHAPTER 4. GAME-BASED SECURITY OF CRBAC
Oracle AddUser(u∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u ∈ U then return ⊥
U ← U ∪ {u∗}
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AddObject(o∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if o ∈ O then return ⊥
O ← O ∪ {o∗}
P ← P ∪ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← LR(y, y)
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗ ; SK [o∗]← sko∗
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle AssignUser(u∗, r∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u∗ /∈ U ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (u∗, r∗) ∈ UA
then return ⊥
UA← UA ∪ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
x← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx)
msgu∗ .wdk ← wdk
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle DeassignUser(u∗, r∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if (u∗, r∗) /∈ UA then return ⊥
UA← UA \ {(u∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
foreach ((o, write), r∗) ∈ PA :
(sko, vko)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
SK [o]← sko; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o)
fs[o][0].vk ← vko
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o, write), r) ∈ PA}
else fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle GrantPerm(p∗, r∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if p∗ /∈ P ∨ r∗ /∈ R ∨ (p∗, r∗) ∈ PA
then return ⊥
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
PA← PA ∪ {(p∗, r∗)}
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y, y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
if mode = write then
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y, y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o∗])
return (fs, {∅}u∈Cr )
Oracle RevokePerm(p∗, r∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if (p∗, r∗) /∈ PA then return ⊥
PA← PA \ {(p∗, r∗)}
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
Parse p∗ as (o∗,mode)
if mode = read then
y ← {RT rd[r] | ((o∗, read), r) ∈ PA}
if y = ∅ then
y ← {ctr}; ctr ← ctr + 1
Query : fs[o∗][0].pk ← PKGen(y, y)
fs ←$ ReEnc(fs, o∗)
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )←$ RoleUpdate(fs, r∗)
if mode = write then
(sko∗ , vko∗)←$ KeyGen(1λ)
SK [o∗]← sko∗ ; fs ←$ ReSign(fs, o∗)
fs[o∗][0].vk ← vko∗
y ← {RT wr[r] | ((o∗, write), r) ∈ PA}
Query : pk ← PKGen(y, y)
fs[o∗][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk , sko∗)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Figure 4.15: Õp2r∗ (part 1)
Thus we have, no matter whether the challenge permission specified by A is a write
or a read permission, after the execution of GrantPerm with any of the two speicifed
roles, f(I0) = f(I1) still holds for all f ∈ F . Therefore, all A’s queries will not lead to
B’s oracle return an error.
So we conclude that the simulation provided by B is perfect. In addition, the simu-
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Oracle DelObject(o∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if o∗ /∈ O then return ⊥
{msgu}u∈Cr ← ∅
foreach (p, r) ∈ PA:
if p ∈ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)} then
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ RevokePerm(p, r)
O ← O \ {o∗}
P ← P \ {(o∗, read), (o∗, write)}
SK [o∗]← ∅
fs ← EraseRest(fs, o∗, 0)
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
Oracle Write(u∗, o∗,m)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if ¬HasAccess(u∗, (o, write)) then
return ⊥
i← GetLength(fs, o∗)
ctx ←$ Enc(fs[o∗][0].pk ,m ‖ i+ 1 ‖ o∗)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].ctx ← ctx
sig ←$ Sign(SK [o∗], ctx ‖ i+ 1)
fs[o∗][i+ 1].sig ← sig
return fs
Oracle CorruptU(u∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u /∈ U then return ⊥
Cr ← Cr ∪ {u∗}
x← {RT rd[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : rdk ← DKGen(fx)
x′ ← {RT wr[r] | (u∗, r) ∈ UA}
Query : wdk ← DKGen(fx′)
return (rdk ,wdk)
Oracle DelUser(u∗)
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if u∗ /∈ U then return ⊥
foreach (u∗, r) ∈ UA:
(fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
←$ DeassignUser(fs, u∗, r)
U ← U \ {u∗}; Cr ← Cr \ {u∗}
return (fs, {msgu}u∈Cr )
ChllPA(Cmd , (p0, p1, r0, r1))
if challd = 1 then return ⊥
if Cmd 6= GrantPerm ∨ p0 6= p1 then
return ⊥
foreach u ∈ Cr :
if (u, r0) ∈ UA ∨ (u, r1) ∈ UA then
return ⊥
Parse p0 as (o,mode)
if mode = read then
y0 ← {RT rd[r] | (p0, r) ∈ PA ∨ r = r0}
y1 ← {RT rd[r] | (p0, r) ∈ PA ∨ r = r1}
Query : fs[o][0].pk ← LR(y0, y1)
fs ← ReEnc(o)
if mode = write then
y0 ← {RT wr[r] | (p0, r) ∈ PA ∨ r = r0}
y1 ← {RT wr[r] | (p0, r) ∈ PA ∨ r = r1}
Query : pk ← LR(y0, y1)
fs[o][0].sk ←$ Enc(pk ,SK [o])
challd← 1
return (fs, {msgu}u∈U )
FS(query)
if query =“state” then
return fs
if query =“append(info)” then
fs ← fs‖info; return fs
Figure 4.16: Õp2r∗ (part 2)
lation is determined by the random bit chosen in B’s own game. Thus, if A guesses the
bit correctly, B guesses it correctly with the same probability, it holds:
Advid-h-pkPE,B (λ) = Adv
p2r∗−privacy
CRBAC[PE,Σ],A(λ),
and therefore the theorem is proved.
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4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the existing game-based security definitions for cRBAC
systems. More specifically, the existing security definitions from previous work for cor-
rectness and secure read access were both redefine within the extended system model
where access control on write access is supported. We also provide two formal security
defintions for write access: the first one is with respect to secure access and the other
one is closely related to correctness.
One main contribution in this chapter was the formal definition of past confiden-
tiality. As observed from the study in UC framework, there exists a gap between the
existing security definition for secure read access and the specification of the access con-
trol policy being enforced. Therefore, the purpose of defining past confidentiality serves
as an atempt towards briding the gap.
The other main contribution is the rigorous security definition of policy privacy.
When we use cryptographic techniques to enforce access control policies, the information
about the policies might be unintentionally revealed. The security definition allows one
to formally prove that such sensitive information will not be leaked during the system
execution.
Finally, we provided a construction of the cRBAC system based on a novel type
of predicate encryption scheme. The construction is proven to be secure under the




UC security of cRBAC
The content of this chapter is adapted from the paper Universally Composable Crypto-
graphic Role-Based Access Control [51]. The work was done in conjunction with Bogdan
Warinschi. I am responsable for providing most of the results which include the security
definition, main theorems and their proofs. For consistency with the previous chap-
ters, the results presented in this chapter have been slightly changed from those in the
published paper.
5.1 Introduction
The security definitions for cRBAC systems presented in the previous chapter use the so-
called game-based approach. The game formalises the interactions between the system
and an attacker against the system and rigorously clarifies what a security breach is (e.g.
as an event occurs during the execution or distinguishability between two executions).
The most significant advantage of definitions defined via this approach is simplicity. It
usually only considers the stand-alone scenarios where the execution environments of
the system are not taken into account, since the game must specify the information that
an adversary can obtain when attacking the system. Therefore, its security guarantee
might not be preserved when the system is employed in those environments along with
unforeseen security threats. Moreover, for complex systems like cRBAC, it is always
difficult to exhaustively enumerate the different security properties we desire from the
system. Sometimes we may not even sure whether the proposed security definitions
appropriately capture the desired security requirements or not.
In this chapter, we consider a definitional alternative, called simulation-based ap-
proach, that does not suffer from the above shortcomings mentioned above. Under
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this paradigm, security is defined by comparing a system with an idealised version and
demands that the real execution of a system reveals at most as much information is
revealed by an ideal version of the system. As a consequence, the real system inherits
all of the security properties of the ideal one, so there is no need to enumerate security
properties separately. One important class of simulation-based security considers exe-
cutions determined by an arbitrary environment (tasked, e.g. to provide inputs to and
obtain outputs from the system), so security in this sense is composable in the sense
that it is preserved in any environment in which the system is employed [12, 40, 48].
Unfortunately, simulation security is often difficult to establish and imposes stringent
restrictions on the implementations which rule out constructions with no obvious weak-
ness or, at the very least, require inefficient realisations [14, 54]. So far the only attempt
to provide a simulation-based security definition for access control systems is the work
of Halevi et al. [38]. They proposed a security security definition for access control in a
specific distributed file storage system rather than a general model.
5.1.1 Our results
Security definition. Our first result is a universally composable security definition of
cRBAC systems. The expected security guarantees are captured by ideal functionality
named Fcrbac, which simply behaves as a server-mediated access control on the files
being protected. Only authorised access request from users will be granted. This essen-
tially requires that a cRBAC implementation should enforce the expected semantics of
RBAC system [60].
Relation with existing definitions. Next, we study the relation between the exis-
tent game-based security definitions and the level of security that our definition entails.
It is generally believed that, for the same cryptographic task, simulation-based security
is stronger than game-based security, even if only because the former is supposed to
capture all of the security properties expected of a system. As expected, we show that
our definition is strictly stronger than the two existing game-based security definitions:
secure read access (introduced in [28]) and secure write access (introduced in [27]).
Lower-bound for UC-secure cRBAC. Our main result is a gap between simulation-
security and game-based security. More precisely, we show that it is impossible for a
cryptographic RBAC system to be UC-secure. In technical terms, we show that the
so-called commitment problem [14] occurs in the context of access control. Roughly,
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the problem is that the simulator required by the security definition needs to produce
valid looking encryptions of the objects that are protected without actually knowing the
actual content of these objects (e.g. files). The problem is that when the adversary gains
access to such a file (e.g. by corrupting a user who has access to this file), the simulator
needs to produce a decryption key that explains the ciphertext as an encryption of some
particular content which the simulator did not know when the ciphertext was created.
The commitment problem is usually due to adaptive corruption of parties, in access
control the problem can also be due to the transient access to files as parties gain and
lose access to files depending on administrative commands. Apart from this, in access
control adaptive party corruption is more significant since the party corruption can be
motivated by change on the access control policy. Therefore, while the commitment
problem can sometimes be waved away whenever adaptive corruption is not a concern,
in cryptographic access control the problem seems inherent and posses severe limitations
if one aims for simulation-based security.
To summarise, in this chapter we make the following contributions:
• We propose a formal security definition for cRBAC in the UC framework.
• We study the relation between the UC definition and two existing definitions
presented in Chapter 4.
• We show a lower bound for UC-secure cRBAC systems with adaptive corruption.
5.2 A UC Security Definition for cRBAC
In this section, we present a universally composable security definition for cRBAC sys-
tems. We formalise the security requirements by designing an ideal functionality Fcrbac.
5.2.1 Functionality FCRBAC
The ideal functionality we present in Figure 5.1 captures the intuitive security properties
of cRBAC systems in the way of simply behaving as a server-mediated access control on
the files being protected. Very roughly, Fcrbac keeps track of every operation performed
on the system and maintains the induced access control matrix within, while it preserves
that only the authorised access requests will be granted. This is achieved by having
Fcrbac maintain a built-in database to store the content of every file, along with a
symbolic RBAC state of the system. Then it handles every access request according to
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Functionality Fcrbac
Fcrbac proceeds as follow, with a manager M , users u1, ..., un and an adversary S.
Initialisation: Upon receiving an input (Initialisation, sid,R) from M where R
is a set of roles, send (Initialisation, sid,R) to S, initialise an
object-indexed list FS ← ∅ and the symbolic RBAC state
(U,O, P,PA,UA)← (∅, ∅, ∅, ∅, ∅). After that, mark the system as initialised
and ignore all the inputs of the form (Initialisation, sid,R′) for any R′
from now on.
RBAC administration: Upon receiving an input (RBAC, sid,Cmd , arg) from M
where Cmd is one of the administrative RBAC commands specified in
Figure 2.2 and arg is the command-specific arguments, proceed as follows: if
the system has not yet been initialised, or ¬IsValid(Cmd , arg) holds, return an
error. Otherwise, execute the RBAC command symbolically by
(U,O, P,UA,PA)← Cmd((U,O, P,UA,PA), arg). If Cmd = DelObject and
arg = o, also delete the content stored in FS [o]. Then send
(RBAC, sid,Cmd , arg) to S.
Write: Upon receiving an input (Write, sid, o,m) from some party P where o is an
object and m is some content, returns an error if the system has not been
initialised. If P is some user u such that HasAccess(u, (o, write)) is not
satisfied, returns an error; otherwise, set FS [o]← m. If there exists a corrupt
user u′ ∈ U such that HasAccess(u′, (o, read)), send a message
(Wrote, sid, o,m) to S; otherwise, send (Wrote, sid, o, |m|) instead, where |m|
is the length of m.
Read: Upon receiving an input (Read, sid, o) from some user u where o is an
object, if the system has not been initialised or HasAccess(u, (o, read)) is not
satisfied, return an error; otherwise, set m← FS [o] (if FS [o] stores no content
then set m as an empty value). If there exists a corrupt user u′ ∈ U such that
HasAccess(u′, (o, write)), send a message (Choose-value, sid, u, o) to the
adversary. Upon receiving a message (Value, sid,m′) from S, set m = m′;
upon receiving a message (Proceed, sid) from S, it does not change the value
of m. Then return m to u.
Corruption: Fcrbac is a standard corruption ideal functionality, with the
exception that any request for corrupting M will be ignored.
Figure 5.1: Ideal functionality for cryptographic Role-Based Access Control, Fcrbac.
the RBAC state.
More specifically, Fcrbac embodies the essential interfaces of a cRBAC system, in-
cluding system initialisation, RBAC administration and read/write access to the file
system. It proceeds as follows. Having received an initialisation request with a set of
roles R from the manager M , Fcrbac initialises an object-indexed list FS and the sym-
bolic system RBAC state. Then it notices the adversary that the access control system
is initialised with the set of roles R. Once Fcrbac is initialised, it ignores the other
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initialisation request afterwards. Having received a request of executing an adminis-
trative RBAC command from M , Fcrbac checks if the execution of command and its
arguments specified in the request is valid. If so, it executes the command symbolically
and updates the maintained system RBAC state. The administrative RBAC command
can be either of the commands presented in Section 2.7. Having received a request to
write some content m on a file o from some party P , if P is a user and it has the write
permission of o or P is the manager, Fcrbac stores m in FS [o] and leaks the file name
o and the length of m to the adversary. Otherwise, it returns an error. Having received
a request to read the content of a file o from some party P , if P is a user and it has the
read permission of o or P is the manager, Fcrbac sets m as the content stored in FS [o].
If FS [o] stores no content, m is set to be the empty string ε. In the case that there
exists a corrupt user who has the write permission of o, Fcrbac asks the adversary for
providing the file content that u can read. If S provides a value m′, Fcrbac replaces the
value of m by m′. Then Fcrbac returns m to u. Fcrbac is a standard corruption ideal
functionality, with an exception that the manager M cannot be corrupted. It captures
the reasonable trust on the manager to administrate the access control system.
Several remarks on Fcrbac are in order. First, Fcrbac is an ideal functionality for
cryptographic enforcement of (core) role-based access controls. Due to the purpose of
studying the relation between the existing game-based security notions, Fcrbac does not
handle any administrative command of adding a new role to the system or removing an
existing role from it. Second, Fcrbac only guarantees secure access to the file system
and preserves no policy privacy (when handling an administrative request, it simply
reveals the command and its arguments to the adversary). There are still some design
choices available on policy privacy preserving (e.g. only leaking the executed command
but not its arguments to the adversary), which is left as further study. Third, Fcrbac
makes no explicit restriction on the form of the file system. Moreover, the file system is
not designed as an individual party of the system. Thus in a real-world cRBAC system,
the file system should be implemented by the protocol itself. It also captures that the
file system does not implement any access control mechanism. Fourth, Fcrbac does not
have any authentication mechanism on the parties’ identities. The authentication is left
to the protocols that make calls to Fcrbac.
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5.2.2 The Associated Protocol
Before presenting our definition of universally composable cRBAC system, we first need
to transform a cRBAC scheme CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject,
AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm) into an associated protocol ΠCRBAC in
the UC setting. Recall that in a cRBAC system, private channels are assumed between
the manager and the users. To model this, we let the parties have access to Fsmt, the
ideal functionality of secure message transmission which is presented in Figure 2.1. Also,
CRBAC makes use of a public-accessible versioning file system. This is modelled by an
appropriate functionality Fvfs which is presented in Figure 5.2.
The ideal functionality Fvfs proceeds with a set of users and a data manager. Essen-
tially, it serves as an ideal versioning file system which guarantees the correct ordering
of the file versions. The users can “write” to the file system by appending new versions
to the files instead of overwriting existing contents. The data manager is provided with
richer interfaces: it can remove and even rewrite some existing version of a file. All the
users in the system can check the current state of the file system by providing a status
request to Fvfs. In implementation, the state of the file system would be a bitstring
which consists of an array of (possibly encrypted) files; while in Fvfs, it is presented as a
list of entries with no loss of generality. When any change happens to the file system, the
ideal functionality reveals the change to the adversary and also notices the users about
the change. These reflect the public-accessible feature of the file system. In addition,
any write operation to the file system is done in an anonymous manner, Fvfs will not
reveal information about the identity of the party who carries out the write operation.
To simplify the protocol presentation, we define the following shorthand notations.
When a party runs an cRBAC algorithm, it may generate a set of order-preserving
instructions to be carried out on the file system. We use {infoi}i∈N to denote such a set
of instructions. If the party is the manager, each instruction infoi ∈ {infoi}i∈N can be
either (Write, sid, o, ver, c) or (Remove, sid, o, ver), where sid is the session id of Fvfs.
If the party is a user, it can only be the form (Write, sid, o, c). A party may also need
to come up with a set of order-preserving instructions {infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N such that after
carrying out the instructions on the file system in order, the current state of the file
system fs would become fs ′. We say a party sends {infoi}i∈N (or {info
fs→fs′
i }i∈N) to
Fvfs, it means the party provides every instruction infoi of the set as the input to Fvfs
in order.
We now present the associated protocol ΠCRBAC (in Figure 5.3) and define universally
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Functionality Fvfs
Fvfs proceeds as follows, running with users u1, ..., un, a file system manager M and
an adversary S. At the first activation Fvfs initialises a list L to be empty.
Status: Upon receiving an input (Status, sid) from a party P , output
(Content, sid, L) to P .
Write (user): Upon receiving an input (Write, sid, o, c) from some user u, if no
record r ∈ L of the form (sid, o, ·, ·) exists, set L← L ∪ {(sid, o, 1, c)} and set
ver = 1; otherwise, set L← L ∪ {(sid, o, verm + 1, c)} and set ver = verm + 1,
where verm = max({ver|(sid, o, ver, ·) ∈ L}). Then send (Wrote, sid, o, ver, c)
to S, and send (Updated, sid) to every user.
Write (manager): Upon receiving an input (Write, sid, o, ver, c) from M , if a
record r ∈ L of the form (sid, o, ver, ·) exists, modify r as (sid, o, ver, c);
otherwise, set L← L ∪ {(sid, o, ver, c)}. Then send (Wrote, sid, o, ver, c) to S
and send (Updated, sid) to every user.
Remove: Upon receiving an input (Remove, sid, o, ver) from M , set
L← L \ {(sid, o, ver, c)}. Then send (Removed, sid, o, ver, c) to S and send
(Updated, sid) to every user.
Figure 5.2: Ideal functionality for versioning file storage, Fvfs.
composable cRBAC system.
Now we can define UC security of cRBAC systems.
Definition 13. A cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC = (Init, AddUser,
DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Read,
Write, Update) is UC-secure if the associated protocol ΠCRBAC securely realises Fcrbac
in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model and in the setting that the manager never gets corrupted.
5.3 UC security is stronger than Game-Based Security
Based on the transformation above, we now study the relation between UC security
and two existing game-based security definitions: secure read access (Definition 8) and
secure write access (Definition 10). We treat security of read access separately from that
of write access.
Theorem 7. Any cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC = (Init, AddUser,
DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm) which
is UC-secure (in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model) is secure with respect to write access.
Proof. We prove this theorem by showing that if a cRBAC system which is not secure
with respect to write access, then it cannot be UC-secure. Assumes that a cRBAC sys-
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The Protocol ΠCRBAC
The participants: a manger M and a set of users u1, ..., un.
Initialisation: Upon receiving an input (Initialisation, sid,R) where R is a set
of roles, M computes (stM , fs, {msgu}u∈U )←$ Init(1λ, R). It then invokes an
instance of Fvfs as the data manager with session id (M, sid), parses fs as
{infoi}i∈N and sends {infoi}i∈N to Fvfs. If {msgu}u∈U is non-empty, M sends
msgu to every user u using Fsmt.
Administration: Upon receiving an input (RBAC, sid,Cmd , arg) where Cmd can
be either of the administrative commands specified in Session 2.7 and arg is
the arguments of the command. If IsValid(Cmd , arg) holds, M sends
(Status, (M, sid)) to Fvfs to obtain (Content, sid, fs) and then computes
(st ′M , fs
′, {msgu}u∈U )←$ cmd(stM , fs, arg), where cmd is the algorithm that
implements the administrative command Cmd . M sets stM ← st ′M , and then
comes up with {infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N. If {info
fs→fs′
i }i∈N is non-empty, M sends
{infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N to Fvfs. If {msgu}u∈U is non-empty, M sends msgu to every
user u using Fsmt.
Update: Upon receiving a message (Update, sid,msgu) from M , a user u computes
st ′u←$ Update(stu,msgu), where stu is u’s local state (stu is an empty value
when u receives the first update message from M). Then it sets stu ← st ′u.
Write: Upon receiving an input (Write, sid, o,m), a user u sends (Status, (M, sid))
to Fvfs to get (Content, sid, fs) and computes fs ′←$ Write(stu, fs, o,m). Then
u comes up with {infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N and sends it to Fvfs.
Read: Upon receiving an input (Read, sid, o), a user u sends (Status, (M, sid)) to
Fvfs to get (Content, sid, fs) and then outputs (Read, sid,Read(stu, fs, o)).
Figure 5.3: The Protocol ΠCRBAC in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model.
tem defined by the scheme CRBAC is not secure with respect to write access, then there
exists an adversary AW which can win in the game that defines secure write access with
non-negligible probability. We show that given such an adversary, an environment Z
can be constructed to distinguish its interactions with the associated protocol ΠCRBAC
and a dummy adversary D, from the interactions with the ideal process for Fcrbac and
a simulator S with non-negligible probability. Due to the subroutine respecting require-
ment, for simplicity, we make a mild assumption that in the experiment ExpwriteCRBAC,AW ,
the adversary can append contents to a file by calling FS only when there exists some
corrupt user in the system. It restricts that the file system is publicly acceesible only to
the users in the system.
We now describe how Z works. During its execution, Z maintains three lists: an
object-indexed list T for recording the last valid file contents written by users, fs for
recording the current state of the file system and Cr for recording the corrupt users.
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Z first activates the manager M with an input (Initialization, sid,R), where sid is
an arbitrary string and R is a random set of roles, to initialise the cRBAC system. It
then obtains a sequence of messages regarding the changes on Fvfs (via the dummy
adversary D who just simply delivers the messages) and updates fs accordingly so that
fs is identical to the list L maintained by Fvfs. Then Z runs a local copy of AW and
starts to simulate ExpwriteCRBAC,AW as follows.
1. When AW asks for executing any RBAC command Cmd with arguments arg , if the
execution of Cmd with arg is valid, Z activatesM with an input (RBAC, sid, cmd , arg)
and updates fs according to the messages received from Fvfs (via D). If the exe-
cution of the command will lead to any user in the list Cr has the write permission
of any file o, Z sets T [o] as a special value adv. If M sends update messages to the
corrupt users when executing the command, Z will receive the update messages
(via D) and then forward them to AW . In addition, if AW requests to delete
some user which is in the list Cr , Z removes this user from Cr after executing the
command. If AW requests to delete some file o, the content in T [o] will be also
deleted. Finally, Z hands fs to AW .
2. When AW requests an honest user u to write some content m to a file o, if u does
not have the write permission of o, Z returns an error; otherwise Z activates u
with an input (Write, sid, o,m) and updates fs according to the messages received
from Fvfs (via D). Then Z hands fs to AW . If there exists no user in the list Cr
that has write access to o, Z sets T [o] as m.
3. When AW requests for corrupting a user u, Z corrupts u (via D) and forwards
the obtained local state to AW . For every file o to which u has write access, Z
sets T [o] as the special value adv. Then it adds u to Cr .
4. When AW queries the current state of the file system, Z hands fs to AW .
5. When AW requests to update the file system with some information info, Z parses
info as (o, c), where o is a file name and c is the content to be appended to the file
system. Z chooses a corrupt user u and sends u a message (via D) to let it provide
an input (Write, sid′, o, c) to Fvfs, where sid′ is the session id of Fvfs. Then Z
updates the fs according to the messages received from Fvfs and hands it to AW .
If such a corrupt user u does not exist, Z just returns an error.
6. When AW outputs a target file o∗, Z activates M with (Read, sid, o∗) to obtain
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the output m. If both T [o∗] 6= adv and T [o∗] 6= m are satisfied, Z outputs 1;
otherwise it outputs 0.
We now discuss Z’s outputs in the two worlds separately. In the case that Z interacts
with real-world execution of ΠCRBAC and D, from AW ’s perspective, Z’s simulation is
indistinguishable from the real experiment. Therefore, by assumption AW should have
written some valid content to the file system without having the permission with non-
negligible probability. Hence Z will output 1 with the same probability.
If Z interacts with the ideal process for Fcrbac and S, we show that Z will always
output 0 since AW can never win in this case. First recall that, in order to win the write
security game, when AW terminates with an output o∗ the following two conditions
must hold: (1) T [o∗] must not equal to the special value adv (the experiment maintains
an invariant that if there exists any corrupt user has the write permission of some file
o, the list T [o] must be the special value adv) and (2) the current content of o∗ (read
by M) must be different from the record in T [o∗]. Next we discuss that the above two
winning conditions cannot be both satisfied when AW generates its output.
Suppose that condition (1) holds when AW outputs o∗. Since T [o∗] 6= adv, T [o∗]
can be one of the two possible values, either an empty value ε or the content written
by the last operation to o by some honest user who has the write permission (otherwise
Z will not record that in T [o∗]). In the first case, T [o∗] is an empty value implies that
Z has not yet handled any write request to o∗ since the recent initialisation of o∗ (o∗
might have been deleted before but it is added back to the system later). Therefore,
the value of FS [o∗] in Fcrbac would be also an empty value. From the specification of
Fcrbac, it is clear that when Z activates M with the input (Read, sid, o∗), it will obtain
the content stored in FS [o∗] which is the empty value here. Thus we have, the content
read by u must equal to the record in T [o∗] in this case. For the other possibility, if
T [o∗] equals to the content m which is written by the last write operation to o by some
honest user, Z should have activated that user with an input (Write, sid, o∗,m) when
AW requests for this write operation. Once Fcrbac receives such an input, it stored m
in FS [o∗]. Then when Z activates the manager with an input (Read, sid, o∗), Fcrbac will
always return m in this case, Thus the content read by M also equals to the record in
T [o∗].
So, if T [o∗] 6= adv, T [o∗] must equal to the content read by the manager, which
means the two winning conditions can never be both satisfied. Thus, if Z interacts with
the ideal process for Fcrbac and S, AW can never win in the simulated experiment and
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Z will output 1 with probability 0.
Finally, it can be concluded that Z’s outputs in the two worlds differ by a non-
negligible amount, which means ΠCRBAC does not securely realise Fcrbac and the theorem
is proved.
Theorem 8. Any cRBAC system defined by the scheme CRBAC = (Init, AddUser,
DelUser, AddObject, DelObject, AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm) which
is UC-secure (in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model) is secure with respect to read access.
Proof idea. The proof idea of this theorem is analogous to Theorem 7’s. Given an
adversary AR that breaks read security of the cRBAC system defined by the scheme
CRBAC with non-negligible probability, an environment Z can be constructed to tell its
interactions with the execution of ΠCRBAC and a dummy adversary from the interactions
with the ideal process for Fcrbac and a simulator. Similarly, Z runs a local copy of
AR and simulates to it the experiment ExpreadCRBAC,AR . Z first selects a random bit
b←$ {0, 1}. When AR specifies his challenge, Z writes to the file according to the value
of b. Then Z transforms every query from AR, which will not lead to any corrupt user
can get read access to any challenge file, into appropriate inputs being provided to the
parties and the adversary.
In the case that Z is interacting with the real-world execution of ΠCRBAC and D, from
AR’s perspective, Z’s simulation would be identical to the real experiment. Therefore,
by assumption on AR, Z outputs 1 with probability significantly greater than 12 . If Z
is interacting with the ideal process for Fcrbac and S, from the specification of Fcrbac,
we can infer that the only way that AR can learn some partial information about the
contents of the files is to retrieve them via the authorised users. However, Z prevents all
the corrupt users from being granted the read permission of any challenge file. Therefore
AR will not be able to learn any partial content of the challenge files which means the
best it can do is to output a random guess. Thus, Z outputs 1 with probability 12 in
this case.
Finally, it can be concluded that Z would be able to distinguish its interactions in
the two worlds with non-negligible probability, which means ΠCRBAC does not securely
realise Fcrbac in Fvfs,Fsmt-hybrid model and therefore is not UC-secure. The proof
of this theorem is also under the assumption that in the experiment ExpreadCRBAC,AR , the
adversary can append contents to a file on its own only when there exists some corrupt
user in the system.
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Functionality Fnce
Fnce works as follows. It interacts with a message sender PS , a receiver PR and an
adversary S.
Pre-processing phase: Upon receiving an input (Init, sid, PR) from PS , send
(Init, sid, PS) to PR and send (Init, sid, PS , PR) to S. After that, mark the
channel as established.
Communication phase: Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, PR,m) from PS , if
the channel has not been established, ignore this input. Otherwise, deliver the
message (Send, sid, PS ,m) to PR and reveal (Sent, sid, PS , PR, |m|) to S,
where |m| is the length of the message.
Corruption: Upon receiving (Corrupt, sid, P ) from S where P ∈ {PS , PR}, reveal
m to S. If P = PS and the message has not yet been delivered to PR, ask S
for a value m′ then output (Sent, sid, PS ,m
′) to PR.
Figure 5.4: Ideal functionality for non-committing encryption, Fnce (adapted from [69]).
5.4 Impossibility of UC-secure cRBAC
In this section we present our main result. We show that the level of security demanded
by a UC-secure cRBAC system cannot be achieved, even in a setting where the cRBAC
system has access to an idealised file system and secure channels between all parties are
assumed. Our impossibility result is in a setting where the adversary can adaptively
corrupt honest protocol participants.
Theorem 9. In the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model, there exists no UC-secure cRBAC system
with adaptive corruptions.
Proof: Our proof consists of two steps. First, we show that the existence of any UC-
secure cRBAC system implies the existence of a universally composable non-interactive
communication protocol (NICP). Specifically, we provide a generic construction of a
NICP that securely realises the functionality Fnce of non-committing encryption (which
is presented in Figure 5.4), from any UC-secure cRBAC system. Next, we argue that
the resulting communication protocol in fact cannot securely realise Fnce – this step is
an extension of a well-known result by Nielsen, to a setting where parties have access
to a secure file system and secure channels. Thus, it contradicts the existence of the
UC-secure cRBAC systems.
We start by describing the generic construction for the universally composable NICP.
Recall that based on our transformation, the associated protocol of a cRBAC scheme
works in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model and in a setting that the manager never gets
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The Protocol Πnicp
The participants: a message sender PS , a receiver PR and a trusted party M namely
the manager.
Pre-processing phase. M establishes the communication channel for PS and PR.
In this stage, some content might be written to Fvfs for the channel set-up.
1. Upon receiving an input (Init, sid, PR), PS sends (Init, sid, PR) to M using
Fsmt.
2. Upon receiving a message (Init, sid, PR) from PS , M selects a random role r
and computes (stM , fs, {stuS , stuR})←$ Init(1λ, {r}), where uS and uR are two
users to be added to the system. It initialises two lists msgS ← stuS and
msgR ← stuR . M then invokes an instance of Fvfs with session id (M, sid) as
the data manager and parses fs as {infoi}i∈N. If {infoi}i∈N is non-empty, M
sends {infoi}i∈N to Fvfs. After that, M runs a sequence of algorithms which
implement the related administrative RBAC commands to add two users uS ,
uR and an object o to the system, to grant the write permission of o to uS via
the role r and to grant the read permission of o to uR via r. The run of any of
the algorithms might lead to the file system’s current state fs gets updated to
fs ′. If so, M comes up with {infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N and sends it to Fvfs. Whenever an
update message msg for uS (uR resp.) is generated, M appends it to the list
msgS (msgS resp.). Finally, after the run of the algorithms M sends
(Update, sid,msgS) to PS and sends (Update, sid,msgR) to PR using Fsmt.
3. Upon receiving a message (Update, sid,msgX) from M where X ∈ {S,R}, the
party PX updates its local state by running the update algorithm
stX ←$ Update(stX ,msg) on each update message msg ∈ msgX in order.
Communication Phase. Once the channel has been established, PS can send
arbitrarily many messages to PR via Fvfs.
1. Upon receiving an input (Send, sid, PR,m), PS sends (Status, (M, sid)) to
Fvfs to get (Content, (M, sid), fs), and then computes
fs ′←$ Write(stS , fs, o,m). Next, PS comes up with {infofs→fs
′
i }i∈N and sends it
to Fvfs.
2. Upon receiving an subroutine output (Updated, (M, sid)) from Fvfs, PR sends
(Status, (M, sid)) to Fvfs to get (Content, (M, sid), fs), and then outputs
m′ ← Read(stR, fs, o).
Figure 5.5: The Protocol Πnicp in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model.
corrupted, the resulting communication protocol therefore works in the same hybrid
model and makes use of such a trusted party in a restricted way.
The communication protocol involves a message sender, a receiver and a trusted
party namely the manager. We demand that there exists no direct communication
channel between the sender and the receiver. They have to communicate with each
other in an indirect way: after a pre-processing phase in which the manager interacts
with the other two parties over secure channels to establish the communication, the
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sender can send messages to the receiver by writing to the file system and then the
receiver performs read operations to get the messages. Notice that the read operation
will not make any change to the file system, and the manager only works in the pre-
processing phase and does not involve in the communication phase. The communication
protocol in fact requires no interaction between the sender and the receiver. Hence it
can be considered as non-interactive.
More specifically, let CRBAC = (Init, AddUser, DelUser, AddObject, DelObject,
AssignUser, DeassignUser, GrantPerm, RevokePerm, Update, Write, Read) be the cRBAC
scheme that defines the UC-secure cRBAC system. We denote the NICP by Πnicp and
present it Figure 5.5.
Then we show that Πnicp securely realises Fnce in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model.
By assumption, the system cRBAC is UC-secure implies that there exists a simulator
S such that no environment can tell with non-negligible probability whether it inter-
acts with the parties running ΠCRBAC in the (Fsmt,Fvfs)-hybrid model and a dummy
adversary D, or it interacts with the ideal process for Fcrbac with S. Then we give the
construction of the simulator Snce for Πnicp as follows. Snce internally runs an instance
of S. Then it interacts with S as the environment and simulates to S the ideal process
for Fcrbac. It proceeds as follow.
1. Simulating the pre-processing phase. Upon receiving from Fnce a mes-
sage (Init, sid, PS , PR), Snce selects a random role r. It then simulates the pre-
processing phase by sending messages to S sequentially in the name of Fcrbac
indicating that the cRBAC system is initialised with a role r, two users uS and
uR, an object o are added to the system, uS is granted the write permission of
o via the role r and uR is granted the read permission of o via r. When the
environment requests Snce to provide any information that it can obtain during
this phase including the length of any final update message sent by the manager
in Πnicp and any content written to Fvfs, Snce instructs S to provide the related
information and hands it to the environment appropriately.
2. Simulating the communication phase. Upon receiving from Fnce a message
(Sent, sid, PS , PR, |m|), Snce sends (Wrote, sid′, o, |m|) in the name of Fcrbac to S,
where sid′ = (M, sid). When the environment requests Snce to report the content
written to Fvfs, Snce instructs S to report such content and forwards it as its
output appropriately.
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3. Party corruption. When the environment instructs Snce to corrupt PS (PR
resp.), Snce delivers the corruption message to Fnce and also requests S to corrupt
uS (uR resp.). If the corruption happens after PS has ever sent some message to
PR, Snce will also obtain the messages sent so far from Fnce. Then it provides the
obtained information to S in the name of Fcrbac. Once S outputs the internal
state of the corrupt party, Snce forwards it to the environment. After that, any
message provided by the environment to the corrupt party would be modified as the
message for uS (uR resp.) accordingly and forwarded to S (e.g. if the environment
instructs the corrupt sender to send some message c, Snce then instructs S to write
the message c to the file o on behave of uS). Any request from the environment
to corrupt the manager will be ignored.
We briefly analyse the validity of Snce. Suppose there exists an environment Z which
can tell its interactions with parties running Πnicp in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model and
a dummy adversary, from the interactions with the ideal process for Fnce and Snce with
non-negligible probability. We show that an environment Z ′ can be constructed to tell
whether it is interacting with parties running ΠCRBAC in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model
and a dummy adversary or the interactions with the ideal process for Fcrbac and the
simulator S with non-negligible probability. The main idea is that Z ′ runs an internal
copy of Z towards which it simulates the view of the ideal process for Fnce and the
simulator Snce. The simulation depends the information that Z ′ can obtain during the
protocol execution. From the construction of Snce above, it can be inferred that every
instruction for Snce can be broken down to corresponding instructions to S. Also, for
the inputs that Z provides to the dummy parties in the ideal process for Fnce, Z ′ can
modify them appropriately and provide to the parties it interacts with. Hence we have
the simulation Z ′ provides to Z is perfectly identical to the view which Z expects to see.
Then by assumption, Z can tell its interactions in the two worlds with non-negligible
probability, and so can Z ′ in this case. Thus, S cannot be a valid simulator for ΠCRBAC
which reaches a contradiction. So if S is a valid simulator for ΠCRBAC , Snce is also a
valid simulator for Πnicp and therefore Πnicp securely realises Fnce in (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid
model.
Now we argue that in fact such a simulator S does not exist. In [54], it has been
shown that no NICP that securely realises Fnce exists in the plain model. However,
we cannot apply directly that result to complete our proof, since Πnicp makes use of
Fvfs and Fsmt, albeit in a restricted way. Nonetheless, we show that under these usage
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restrictions, we can extend Nielsen’s result to our setting.
Since Πnicp securely realises Fnce in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model, it allows the
sender to send arbitrarily many messages to the receiver non-interactively (e.g. by per-
forming write operations to the file system). Any real-world adversary that attacks the
protocol cannot obtain more than the length of the transmitted message. Consider the
following environment Z. After the communication is established between the message
sender PS and the receiver PR, Z activates PS with an input (Send, sid,m) and requests
the adversary to report the content c that has been written to some file o of Fvfs. Once Z
obtains c, it instructs the adversary to corrupt PR to obtain its internal state stR. Then
Z produces the current state of the file system from the update information provided by
the adversary as fs and computes m′ ← Read(stR, fs, o). By assumption Z should have
m′ = m except for negligible probability. Then we consider the ideal-world case, the
simulator Snce should be able to come up with c given the length of m by Fnce, and later
it should be able to provide the internal state stR which is consistent to the transmitted
message c when m is available by the time PR is corrupt. Notice that the ideal function-
ality Fnce guarantees correctness on the transmitted message, which means for every
message sent by the sender, the receiver should be able to recover the original message
except for negligible probability. Hence for Πnicp, there should not exist any local state
of the receiver that allows it to decrypt any written content to the file system into two
different messages with non-negligible probability each. Otherwise an environment can
distinguish its interactions in the two worlds with non-negligible probability. Thus if we
fix a file version c, there exists an injective mapping from the underlying messages to
the local state of the receiver, which implies that the number of possible internal states
stR of PR should be at least the same as the number of the possible messages. Notice
that the only way PR can receive the message from PS is to execute the Read algorithm
to retrieve the current content of o from the file system. The injective mapping will not
be affected by executing read operations since (by assumption) Read updates neither
the file system nor the local state of PS . Therefore it is impossible for PR to use the
unchanged local state to receiver arbitrary many messages from PS . Thus we can con-
clude that Πnicp does not securely realise Fnce in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model, which
contradicts the existence of the simulator S. Hence there exists no UC-secure CRBAC
(in the (Fvfs,Fsmt)-hybrid model) with adaptive corruptions.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the first security definition for cRBAC systems in the UC
framework. Our approach should work for any other model that benefits from a precise
semantics with an induced access control matrix. We study the relation between the our
security definition and the two existing game-based definitions with respect to secure
access, which are presented in the previous chapter. Moreover, we show an impossibility
result that no cRBAC system can be UC-secure with adaptive corruptions.
From the above results, we can observe that there is a gap between the two types
of security definitions for cRBAC systems. Recall that in [27], the construction of
cRBAC system is proven to be secure with respect to both read and write access. Thus,
UC security of cRBAC systems is strictly stronger the existing game-based security
definitions. However, the existence of the gap is not solely due to the commitment
problem which leads to the impossibility result. In fact, UC security does provide
stronger security guarantees with respect to both read and write access. To this end,
we propose a refinement of the existing game-based definition of read security and also
provide a new security definition of write security (both are presented in Chapter 4).
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Chapter 6
Some Lower Bounds for secure
cRBAC
The work presented in this chapter is adapted from our on-going work on lower bounds
for secure cRBAC systems which is not published yet. Some of the theorems are provided
with proof ideas only.
6.1 Introduction
Cryptographic access control has received a lot attention in recent decades. However,
designing cryptographic access control systems which are of practical use is still a chal-
lenging task in this research direction.
Garrison III et al. studied the practical implications of using cryptography to enforce
RBAC policies in their recent work [43]. They considered a system model with necessary
use of reference monitors to enforce access control on write access and to maintain the
metadata of each file in the file system. For their purpose, they developed two different
constructions of cryptographic RBAC systems: one bases on identity-based encryption
and identity-based signature schemes, while the other one bases on the traditional public
key cryptography with the use of Public key infrastructure (PKI). In order to analyse
the costs of their constructions, they carried out the simulation over real-world RBAC
datasets to generate traces. Their experimental results show that even with the min-
imum use of reference monitors, the computational costs of the cryptographic RBAC
systems which supports for dynamic policy update can be prohibitively expensive.
Motivated by Garrison III et al.’s work, we turn to study lower bounds for secure
cRBAC systems to find out where the inefficiency stems from. We show that the costs
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are inherent in secure cRBAC systems and also in those cryptographic access control
systems that greatly or solely rely on cryptographic techniques to enforce access control
on both read and write accesses. The main idea is, since the manager does not involve
in any read and write operation to the file system, the local states of the users and also
the file system should reflect the access control policy being enforced. Whenever the
policy gets updated, the system might inevitably require re-keying and re-encryption
in order to guarantee secure access. Our results can be valuable in the design of such
systems for practical purposes.
To summarise, in this chapter we make the following contribution:
• we presented two lower bounds for secure cRBAC systems.
6.2 The Lower Bounds
Before we introduce our results, we introduce technical term which we call Permission
Adjustment for an RBAC system. Informally, permision adjustment is a sequence of
RBAC administrative commands which changes the access rights of some user with
respect to a set of permissions. In comparison with any sequence of typical RBAC
commands, permission adjustment emphasises the change it will bring to the access
matrix of the system. Formally:
Definition 14 (Permission Adjustment). Let S0 = (U,O, P,UA,PA) be the state of an
RBAC system over a set of roles R. Given a set of user Ũ ⊆ U and a set of permis-
sions P̃ ⊆ P , where both Ũ and P̃ are non-empty, a sequence of RBAC administrative
commands ~q = (q0, ..., qn) is called a permission adjustment for S0 with respect to Ũ
and P̃ :
(1) if ∀u ∈ Ũ , p ∈ P̃ : ¬HasAccess(u, p) holds for S0 and after a sequence of transitions
S0
q0−→S S1
q1−→S , . . . ,
qn−1−−−→S Sn
qn−→S Sn+1, ∀u ∈ Ũ , p ∈ P̃ : HasAccess(u, p) holds
for Sn+1 or
(2) if ∀u ∈ Ũ , p ∈ P̃ : HasAccess(u, p) holds for So and after a sequence of transitions
S0
q0−→S S1
q1−→S , . . . ,
qn−1−−−→S Sn
qn−→S Sn+1, ∀u ∈ Ũ , p ∈ P̃ : ¬HasAccess(u, p) holds
for Sn+1.
We denote the set of all possible ~q in case (1) by Ũ↑P̃ (S0) and the set of all possible ~q
in case (2) by Ũ↓P̃ (S0).
In addition, we introduce two key properties with respect to efficiency.
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Definition 15. Let stG = (stM , fs, {stu}u∈U ) be the global state of a cRBAC system
over a set of roles R at some point during its execution. Given a sequence of RBAC
administrative commands ~q = (q0, ..., qn) and its any implementation ~Q = (Q0, ..., Qn)
such that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n: Qi implements the command qi. After carrying out ~Q:
(1) if the state of the file system remains unchanged with overwhelming probability,
we say that ~q is file system preserving for stG. It is reflected by the following
predicate:
FSP(~q, stG)⇔ Pr[∀ ~Q : stG
~Q−→ st ′G; fs = fs ′] = 1,
where st ′G = (st
′
M , fs
′, {st ′u}u∈U ′), φ(st ′G) = (U ′, O′, P ′,UA
′,PA′) and ε is a negli-
gible function in the security parameter;
(2) if the local states of a set of users U remain unchanged with overwhelming proba-
bility, we say that ~q is U-user local state preserving for stG. It is reflected by
the following predicate:
LSP(~q, stG,U)⇔ Pr[∀ ~Q : stG
~Q−→ st ′G;∀u ∈ U : stu = st ′u] = 1,
where st ′G = (st
′
M , fs
′, {st ′u}u∈U ′), φ(st ′G) = (U ′, O′, P ′,UA
′,PA′), U ⊆ U ′ and ε is
a negligible function in the security parameter.
Finally, we introduce the concept of non-trivial execution for cRBAC system. A non-
trivial execution consists of a sequence of operations such that after executing each of
the operations in order, for each file in the system, there should exist at least a user that
has the read permission for it and also exist at least a user that has the write permission
for it. The non-trivial execution serves as a mild assumption on the execution on the
cRBAC systems, for the purpose of studying the lower bound of cRBAC systems which
are commonly used in practice.
Definition 16. Let So = (U0, O0, P0,UA0,PA0) be the initial state of an RBAC system
and let ~q = (q0, ..., qn) be a sequence of operations. We say ~q is a non-trivial execution
if after the sequence of transitions
S0
q0−→S S1
q1−→S . . .
qn−→S Sn+1 = (Un+1, On+1, Pn+1,UAn+1,PAn+1),
for each file o ∈ On+1, there exist users u, u′ ∈ Un+1 such that HasAccess(u, (o, read))
and HasAccess(u′, (o, write)) hold.
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Now we present our first necessary lower bound for cRBAC systems which preserve
correctness and read security. The theorem states that in a normal execution of a cRBAC
system, any (sequence of) RBAC command for cancelling read permissions from users
requires update either all the corresponding files or the local states of all the users who
have the write permissions to those files.
Theorem 10. For any cRBAC system which is correct and secure with respect to
read access, it holds that:
Pr
stG←$ Init(1λ, R); stG ~Q−→ st ′G;∀~q ∈ Ur↓Pr(φ(st ′G)) :
FSP(~q, st ′G) ∧ LSP(~q, st ′G, Uw)
 ≤ ε,
where ~Q is any non-trivial execution for the system, st ′G = (st
′
M , fs
′, {st ′u}u∈U ′), φ(st ′G) =
(U ′, O′, P ′,UA′,PA′), Ur ⊆ U ′, Pr ⊆ {(o, read)|o ∈ O′}, Uw = {u|∀(o, read) ∈ Pr :
HasAccess(u, (o, write))} and ε is a negligible function in λ.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that if the above condition is not satisfied,
the cRBAC system cannot be both correct and secure with respect to read accesses.
Assume by contradition that there exists a cRBAC system Π which is correct and read
secure, while the above condition holds with probability ε0, which is greater than any ε.
Consider the following adversary A for ExpreadΠ,A(λ). After the random bit b is selected
and Π is initialised by running stG←$ Init(λ,R), A is provided λ and proceeds as follows:
1. A comes up with a sequence of oracle queries (query0, ..., queryn) for Or such that
it is equivalent to some non-trivial execution ~Q for Π. A also comes up with a
permission adjustment ~q which is valid for the global state of Π after making the
sequence of oracle queries;
2. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ n: A makes the oracle call according to queryi. After that, A
calls FS to obtain the current state of the file system fs;
3. A calls CorruptU to corrupt a random user u0 ∈ Ur to obtain its local state
stu0 ;
4. For each administrative RBAC command in ~q, A calls oracle that corresponds to
the command with its argument in order;
5. A chooses a random file o ∈ O such that its read permission (o, read) ∈ Pr. It
then calls Challenge with (u1, o,m0,m1), where u1 ∈ U is a random user such
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that HasAccess(u1, (o, write)) holds, m0 and m1 are two random messages of the
same length. Then A will obtain the updated state of the file system fs ′ from the
challenge oracle;
6. A computes m∗ ← Read(stu0 , fs ′, o). It terminates with an output 0 if m∗ = m0
and 1 if m∗ = m1; otherwise, it outputs a random bit b
′←$ {0, 1}.
Recall that there is an invariant maintained in ExpreadΠ,A(λ) to prevent trivial wins:
at any point in the experiment, no corrupt user in the list Cr can be granted the read
permission of any file in the list Ch. From the construction of A above, it is clear that
when A calls CorruptU, Cr = {u0} and Ch = ∅. After carrying out ~q, u0 is no longer
authorised to the read permissions in Pr. Hence when A calls Challenge to specify
any file whose read permission is in Pr as its challenge, the invariant will not be violated.
Also notice that after carrying out any non-trivial execution, for every file o ∈ O, there
should exist at least a user that has its read permission and also a user that has its write
permission. Hence the existance of u1 is guaranteed. Therefore, it can be concluded
that A will not cause any error returned by the oracles.
We now analyse the success probability of A under ExpreadΠ,A(λ). Let E0 be the event
that after A mades the queries (query0, ..., queryn), Π reaches some global state st ′G such
that FSP(~q, st ′G) and LSP(~q, st
′
G, Uw) hold. Let E1 be the event that m
∗ = mb. The
advantage that A can gain in the experiment is:
AdvreadΠ,A(λ) =











· (Pr[¬E1 ∧E0] + Pr[¬E1 ∧ ¬E0])







· (Pr[¬E1 | E0] · Pr[E0] + Pr[¬E1 | ¬E0] · Pr[¬E0])
+ Pr[E1 | E0] · Pr[E0] + Pr[E1 | ¬E0] · Pr[¬E0]−
1
2
∣∣ ≤ ε1 (6.1)
where ε1 is a negligible function of λ.
We also consider the following adversary A′ for ExpcorrΠ,A′(λ). Here the sequence of
queries (query0, ..., queryn) which is equivalent to the non-trivial execution ~Q, the user
u0, u1, the file o and the contents m0,m1 are identical to those in Exp
read
Π,A(λ) above.
The experiment starts from the system initialisation by running Init with the input of
security parameter λ and a set of roles R. Then A′ is provided λ and proceeds as follows:
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1. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ n: A′ call the corresponding oracle to make the query queryi.
Then A′ calls FS to obtain the current state of the file system fs;
2. A′ selects a random bit b←$ {0, 1} and then calls the write oracle Write with
(u1, o,mb) and obtains the updated state of the file system fs
′;
3. A′ terminates with an output (u0, o).
The challenger then computes m∗ ← Read(stu0 , fs∗, o). A′ wins the game if m∗ 6= mb.
Let E2 be the event that Π reaches the global state st
′
G and let E3 be the event that





= Pr[¬E3 ∧E2] + Pr[¬E3 ∧ ¬E2] = 0 (6.2)
From (6.2), it is clear that Pr[¬E3 ∧E2] = 0. Hence we have:
Pr[¬E3 | E2] · Pr[E2] = 0
Pr[¬E3 | E2] = 0 (6.3)
and
Pr[E3 | E2] = 1− Pr[¬E3 | E2] = 1 (6.4)
Now we relate the advantages of the adversaries in the above two experiments. After
carrying out ~Q, the tuples (stu0 , stu1 , fs) in the two experiments are identical when the
events E0 and E2 occur in their individual experiments since the system will reach
the same global state st ′G. Notice that in Exp
read
Π,A(λ), when both FSP(~q, st
′
G) and
LSP(~q, st ′G, Uw) hold, stu1 and fs likely remain unchanged before and after carrying
~q. Therefore, after A calls Challenge and A′ calls Write (for the last time), in both
cases the file system will be updated by having fs ′←$ Write(stu1 , fs, o,mb). The distri-
butions of fs ′ in both experiments are identical and fs ′ will be read with the same user
local state stu0 . Then we have:
Pr[E1 | E0] = Pr[E3 | E2] (6.5)
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and
Pr[¬E1 | E0] = Pr[¬E3 | E2] (6.6)




· [0 · ε0 + Pr[¬E1 | ¬E0] · (1− ε0)]







· (1− Pr[E1 | ¬E0]) · (1− ε0)







· Pr[E1 | ¬E0] · (1− ε0) ≤ ε1 (6.7)
From Equation (6.7), we have:
Pr[E1 | ¬E0] ≤ 2 ·
ε1 − ε0
1− ε0
Notice that by assumption ε0 is greater than any negligible function ε, which means
Pr[E1 | ¬E0] is negative. Thus, we can conclude that Π cannot be both correct and
secure with respect to read accesses in such case, which reaches a contradition. The
theorem is therefore proved.
The following lower bound is for cRBAC systems which preserve correctness and
write security. In a similar form, the theorem states that in a normal execution of a
cRBAC system, any (sequence of) command which will lead to the revocation of write
permissions from users requires update either all the corresponding files or the local
states of all the users who have the read permissions to those files. The theorem and
its proof only work for the security definition presented in the paper [27] but not for
the one presented in this thesis, because the definition presented in Chapter 4 does not
require that there exists any user who can read to the file outputed by the adversary
and therefore the equation implied by correctness does not hold here. But Definition 10
is strictly stronger than the previous definition, the lower bound is still valuable.
Theorem 11. For any cRBAC system which is correct and secure with respect to write
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accesses, let ~Q be its any non-trivial execution, it holds that:
Pr
∀ ~Q : stG←$ Init(1λ, R); stG ~Q−→ st ′G;∀ Uw↓Pw :
FSP(Uw↓Pw, st ′G) ∧ LSP(Uw↓Pw, st ′G, Ur)
 ≤ ε,
where st ′G = (st
′
M , fs
′, {st ′u}u∈U ′), φ(st ′G) = (U ′, O′, P ′,UA
′,PA′), Uw ⊆ U ′, Pw ⊆
{(o, write)|o ∈ O′}, Ur = {u|∀(o, write) ∈ Pr : HasAccess(u, (o, read))} and ε is a
negligible function in λ.
Proof sketch. The proof strategy of this theorem is similar to Theorem 10’s. Assume
by contradicition that the above condition holds with some non-negligible probability,
while the system is both correct and secure with respect to write access. Let A, A′ be
two adversarys against write security and correctness of the system respectively.
After the two adversaries drive the execution of the cRBAC systems in their indi-
vidual games according to the non-trivial execution. By assumption, there would exist
a user u0 who has the write permission to a file o and also a user u1 has the read
permission of o (here the adversaries need to make a random guess). Also, the global
state of the system will reach the same global state st ′G such that after carrying out the
permission adjustment Uw↓Pw, both FSP(Uw↓Pw, st ′G) and LSP(Uw↓Pw, st ′G, Ur) hold
for non-negligible probability.
Then the adversary A (against write security) requests to corrupt the user u0 to
obtain its local state stu0 . After that, the two adversaries request to carry out the
permission adjustments in their games respectively. Notice that at this point, u0 does
not have write permission of o any more. A then writes some content to o with the local
state stu0 . Then A outputs (u1, o) and A′ outputs o.
Since the above two conditions hold, the distributions of (stu0 , stu1 , fs) in the two
games are identical. Then by assumption, if the cRBAC system is correct, u1 should
be able to read the content written to o by A with non-negligible probability overall. It
therefore leads to a contradicition to the assumption on write security. Thus, the system
cannot be both correct and secure with respective to write access in such case.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented two lower bounds for secure cRBAC systems. To some
extent, they mathematically explain the reason why cRBAC systems that support dy-
namic policy updates may be prohibitively expensive: permission revocation can be
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costly. Therefore, for practical purpose one may choose to sacrifice security (e.g. to
use lazy re-encryption or support for batch processing) or functionality (e.g. to jointly
use other mechanisms to enforce access control policies) to some extent in order to gain
efficiency.
There is another lower bound which is not presented in this thesis. It is related to
read security and requires some mild assumption on the non-trivial execution. It states
that cancelling read permissions from users must result in updating the local states of
all the users who have those read permissions. This explains Garrison III’s experimental




Cryptographic access control, which aims to enforce access control policies with the
use of cryptographic techniques, is a promising solution to alleviate the limitations of
traditional monitor-based access control. With the emerging trend of outsourcing data
storage, there has been considerable interest in this area. However, in the literature of
cryptographic access control, formal security models for the whole access control sys-
tems have been rarely provided. This leaves a disconnection between the specification of
the policies being enforced and the implementation of the cryptographic access control
systems. More specifically, since the security of the underlying cryptographic primi-
tives may be overestimated and their use within access control systems may be poorly
understood, the absence of formal security models leads to a worrying situation that
many of the existing works do not offer formal security proofs for the constructions they
proposed.
The starting point of the work in this thesis is the recent study on cryptographic
Role-Based Access Control by Ferrara et al. Our main contribution is a comprehensive
study of rigorous security models for cRBAC systems.
For the purpose of precisely modelling cryptographic policy enforcement, we study
security of cRBAC systems in both game-based and simulation-based settings. We start
with proposing security notions of different security properties for cRBAC systems in
game-based setting. We believed that our security notions are sufficient for appropriately
modelling cryptographic policy enforcement. However, in the follow-up study of cRBAC
systems in UC framework, we identify a gap between the UC security notion and our
existing game-based notions. Our results show that the UC notion is strictly stronger.
Since the UC notion requires the execution of a cRBAC system emulating an ideal
process which behaves as a server-mediated access control system, an implementation
112
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
of cRBAC system which is considered to be secure in this sense guarantees that the
access control policy is always correctly enforced - this is exactly the goal that we want
our game-based notions to achieve. Therefore, the existance of the gap has brought
us to a question: are the existing game-based security notions appropriately modelling
the correct enforcement of the RBAC policy? Unfortunately, there is no definitive
answer yet. We also show that no cRBAC implementation can achieve UC security
with adaptive party corruption. The impossibility result stems from the well-known
commitment problem, which also occurs in the context of cryptographic access control.
Nevertheless, the study of relations between the two types of security notions for
cRBAC sytems still gives us some inspiration. We identify two types of attacks which
are not captured by the existing game-based security notions. Therefore, we refine the
existing notions with respect to secure read and write access respectively in order to
capture those overlooked attacks. The refinement work on game-based notions can be
seen as a step forward towards our goal, but we still want evidence to confirm that the
existing game-based notions are sufficient for modelling correct policy enforcement. The
future research on bridging the gap between the two types of security notions may give
us the answer and also allow us enjoy the benefits from the two definitional approaches.
We will discuss this in the next section.
We also bring forth the study of privacy issues in the context of cryptographic access
control systems. We point out that cryptographic implementations may unintentionally
leak information about the access control policy being enforced in the system. Indeed,
users need to get access to the public available metadata used to implement file system
and to the encrypted file contents themselves, yet these may reveal the access policy
in place. Therefore, privacy protection becomes an important security requirement of
cryptographic access control system, since such information can be sensitive in many
application scenarios. We identify and formalise different flavours of policy privacy,
targeted to different aspects of such systems. Our results are instructive for the work in
similar context.
Finally, we provide a construction of cRBAC system based on a novel type of privacy-
preserving predicate encryption and a standard digital signature scheme. We show that
our construction securely enforces access control on both read and write access to the




In this section, we will give several research directions for future work.
Lower bounds for secure cRBAC. A direction for future research is to study the
efficiency implications of secure cRBAC systems. Garrison III et al.’s has shown that
cryptographic enforcement of dynamic role-based access control policies can be costly
[43]. Their findings are based on simulations driven by real-world datasets rather than
mathematical proofs. Inspired by their results, we are currently working on the lower
bounds for secure cRBAC systems with respect to secure policy enforcement and also
preservation of policy privacy. This direction is worth pursuing because it will give us
some insights of the efficiency aspects of such systems.
Bridging the gap. The UC security notion for cRBAC systems provides stronger
security guarantees, but it requires additional assumption on the underlying encryption
scheme due to the well-known difficulty of adaptive security in the UC framework, which
renders cRBAC implementations impractical. However, the general composability of-
fered by the UC framework is an important property for cryptographic access control
systems. Recall that the system model of cRBAC is in fact a general one, the publicly
accessible file storage can consist of encrypted files and metadata which are logically
organised as a whole file system. Such data can be used independently by arbitrary
application while the policy should still be enforced correctly in such case. On the
other hand, our refined game-based notions are seemingly sufficient for capturing cryp-
tographic enforcement of RBAC policy, even though their composability property has
not been examined. The game-based notions are sometimes preferable to work with due
to its simplicity, especially for complex security tasks like cRBAC systems. Therefore,
bridging the gap between the two types of security notions for cRBAC systems can be
an interesting research direction since it will allow us enjoy the benefits from the two
definitional approaches.
Access Control in Blockchain-based file storage. Blockchain-based technology
has received a lot of attention since Bitcoin [53] was launched. As the key feature of
blockchain-based systems, the cryptographically auditable, append-only, decentralised
transaction ledger has unrolled a wide range of interesting applications. Decentralised
file storage is one of the applications that benefit from it. Users who need to rent
storage service can pay some fees to hire storage space provided by other users to
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store their own data. Currently, several blockchain-based file storage services have
been already launched on the market [6, 68, 49] based on various proof systems [45,
10, 62, 29]. In comparison with traditional cloud-based storage service, decentralised
file storage can reduce the trust in the service provider while preserving strong data
security and also user privacy. The enforcement of access control policies in decentralised
file storage would allow for many interesting applications (e.g. granting access and
transfering copyright/ownership of digital products, etc.), which are difficult to achieve
with traditional cloud-based file storage.
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Laurent Réveillère. IBBE-SGX: cryptographic group access control using trusted
execution environments. In 48th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on
Dependable Systems and Networks, DSN 2018, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg, June
25-28, 2018, pages 207–218, 2018.
[21] Jason Crampton. Practical constructions for the efficient cryptographic enforcement
of interval-based access control policies. CoRR, abs/1005.4993, 2010.
[22] Jason Crampton. FAST 2010. Revised selected papers., chapter Cryptographic En-
forcement of Role-Based Access Control, pages 191–205. 2011.
[23] Jason Crampton. Practical and efficient cryptographic enforcement of interval-
based access control policies. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 14(1):14:1–14:30, 2011.
[24] Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, Sara Foresti, Sushil Jajodia, Stefano Paraboschi,
and Pierangela Samarati. Over-encryption: Management of access control evolution
on outsourced data. In VLDB, pages 123–134. ACM, 2007.
[25] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
Trans. Information Theory, 22(6):644–654, 1976.
[26] David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn. Role-based access control. In In 15th NIST-
NCSC National Computer Security Conference, pages 554–563, 1992.
[27] Anna Lisa Ferrara, Georg Fuchsbauer, Bin Liu, and Bogdan Warinschi. Policy pri-
vacy in cryptographic access control. In IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations
Symposium, CSF 2015, Verona, Italy, 13-17 July, 2015, pages 46–60, 2015.
[28] Anna Lisa Ferrara, Georg Fuchsbauer, and Bogdan Warinschi. Cryptographically
enforced RBAC. In 2013 IEEE 26th Computer Security Foundations Symposium,
New Orleans, LA, USA, June 26-28, 2013, pages 115–129, 2013.
118
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[29] Ben Fisch, Joseph Bonneau, Nicola Greco, and Juan Benet. Scaling proof-of-
replication for filecoin mining. Technical report, Technical report, Stanford Univer-
sity, 2018. https://web. stanford. edu , 2018.
[30] Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Mark Zhandry. TCC 2016-A, Proceed-
ings, Part II, chapter Functional Encryption Without Obfuscation, pages 480–511.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2016.
[31] Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard lat-
tices and new cryptographic constructions. In Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM
Symposium on Theory of Computing, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, May 17-
20, 2008, pages 197–206, 2008.
[32] David K. Gifford. Cryptographic sealing for information secrecy and authentication.
Commununications of the ACM, 25(4):274–286, 1982.
[33] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. How to play any mental game
or A completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In Proceedings of
the 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1987, New York, New
York, USA, pages 218–229, 1987.
[34] Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali. Probabilistic encryption. J. Comput. Syst. Sci.,
28(2):270–299, 1984.
[35] Vipul Goyal, Omkant Pandey, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Attribute-based en-
cryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data. In Ari Juels, Rebecca N.
Wright, and Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati, editors, ACM Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security, pages 89–98. ACM, 2006.
[36] Vipul Goyal, Omkant Pandey, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Attribute-based
encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data. In Proceedings of the
13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2006,
Alexandria, VA, USA, Ioctober 30 - November 3, 2006, pages 89–98, 2006.
[37] E. Gudes. The Design of a Cryptography Based Secure File System. IEEE Trans-
actions on Software Engineering, 6(5):411–420, 1980.
[38] Shai Halevi, Paul A. Karger, and Dalit Naor. Enforcing confinement in distributed




[39] Anthony Harrington and Christian Jensen. Cryptographic access control in a dis-
tributed file system. In Proceedings of the eighth ACM symposium on Access control
models and technologies, pages 158–165. ACM, 2003.
[40] Dennis Hofheinz and Victor Shoup. GNUC: A new universal composability frame-
work. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2011:303, 2011.
[41] Jie Huang, Mohamed A. Sharaf, and Chin-Tser Huang. A hierarchical framework
for secure and scalable EHR sharing and access control in multi-cloud. In 41st Inter-
national Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops, ICPPW 2012, Pittsburgh,
PA, USA, September 10-13, 2012, pages 279–287, 2012.
[42] Luan Ibraimi. Cryptographically enforced distributed data access control. Univer-
sity of Twente, 2011.
[43] William C. Garrison III, Adam Shull, Adam J. Lee, and Steven Myers. Dynamic and
private cryptographic access control for untrusted clouds: Costs and constructions
(extended version). CoRR, abs/1602.09069, 2016.
[44] Sonia Jahid, Prateek Mittal, and Nikita Borisov. Easier: encryption-based access
control in social networks with efficient revocation. In Proceedings of the 6th ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIACCS
2011, Hong Kong, China, March 22-24, 2011, pages 411–415, 2011.
[45] Ari Juels and Burton S Kaliski Jr. Pors: Proofs of retrievability for large files. In
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security,
pages 584–597. Acm, 2007.
[46] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second
Edition. CRC Press, 2014.
[47] Jonathan Katz, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Predicate encryption supporting
disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner products. In Advances in Cryptol-
ogy - EUROCRYPT 2008, 27th Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Istanbul, Turkey, April 13-17, 2008.
Proceedings, pages 146–162, 2008.
[48] Ralf Küsters and Max Tuengerthal. The IITM model: a simple and expressive
model for universal composability. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2013:25, 2013.
120
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[49] Protocol Labs. Filecoin: A decentralized storage network, 2017.
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